Endogenous monitoring and enforcement of a transferable emissions permit system
Journal Article
·
· Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
The literature on noncompliant firms in transferable emissions permit systems offers little guidance to policymakers that must determine how to commit resources to monitor firms and punish violations in such systems. The authors consider how a budget-constrained enforcement authority that seeks to minimize aggregate noncompliance in a transferable emissions permit system should allocate its monitoring and enforcement efforts among heterogeneous firms. With a conventional model of firm behavior in a transferable permit system, they find that differences in the allocation of monitoring and enforcement effort between any two types of firms should be independent of differences in their exogenous characteristics.
- Research Organization:
- Univ. of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA (US)
- OSTI ID:
- 20005486
- Journal Information:
- Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Journal Name: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management Journal Issue: 3 Vol. 38; ISSN JEEMDI; ISSN 0095-0696
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Similar Records
The role of emission factors in permitting and enforcement
Regulatory enforcement and compliance: Industrial waste water pretreatment programs
Enforcing pollution control laws
Conference
·
Mon Dec 30 23:00:00 EST 1996
·
OSTI ID:617917
Regulatory enforcement and compliance: Industrial waste water pretreatment programs
Thesis/Dissertation
·
Mon Dec 31 23:00:00 EST 1990
·
OSTI ID:7267711
Enforcing pollution control laws
Conference
·
Tue Dec 31 23:00:00 EST 1985
·
OSTI ID:6077378