Experimental Setup for Grid Control Device Software Updates in Supply Chain Cyber-Security

Conference · Sun Oct 09 00:00:00 EDT 2022 · 2022 North American Power Symposium (NAPS)

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1109/naps56150.2022.10012179· OSTI ID:1997525

Keller, Joseph ^[1]; Paul, Shuva ^[2]; Grijalva, Santiago ^[2]; Mooney, Vincent J. ^[3]

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1. Georgia Institute of Technology,School of Electrical and Computer Engineering,Atlanta,Georgia,USA,30345; Georgia Institute of Technology
2. Georgia Institute of Technology,School of Electrical and Computer Engineering,Atlanta,Georgia,USA,30345
3. School of Computer Science Georgia Institute of Technology,School of Electrical and Computer Engineering,Atlanta,Georgia,USA,30345

Supply chain cyberattacks that exploit insecure third-party software are a growing concern for the security of the electric power grid. These attacks seek to deploy malicious software in grid control devices during the fabrication, shipment, installation, and maintenance stages, or as part of routine software updates. Malicious software on grid control devices may inject bad data or execute bad commands, which can cause blackouts and damage power equipment. This paper describes an experimental setup to simulate the software update process of a commercial power relay as part of a hardware-in-the-loop simulation for grid supply chain cyber-security assessment. The laboratory setup was successfully utilized to study three supply chain cyber-security use cases.

• Research Organization: Georgia Institute of Technology
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER)
• DOE Contract Number: CR0000004
• OSTI ID: 1997525
• Report Number(s): DOE-GATECH-00004-6
• Journal Information: 2022 North American Power Symposium (NAPS), Journal Name: 2022 North American Power Symposium (NAPS)
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English