Methodology and Tool for the Physical Security Analysis of Micro and Advanced Reactors

S&T Accomplishment Report · Tue Aug 15 04:00:00 EDT 2023

OSTI ID:1996220

Christian, Robby ^[1]; Prescott, Steven R ^[1]; Yadav, Vaibhav ^[1]; St Germain, Shawn W ^[1]; Chwasz, Christopher Paul ^[1]; Zhang, Sai ^[1]; Ziccarelli, Michael Anthony ^[1]; Bucknor, Matthew D. ^[2]; Grabaskas, Dave ^[2]

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1. Idaho National Laboratory
2. Argonne National Laboratory

This work proposes a dynamic evaluation methodology to relax the conservatism in physical security evaluation, by leveraging an ongoing work in the Light Water Reactor Sustainability pathway. This methodology is implemented in a dynamic risk assessment tool named Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD). The work extends EMRALD’s capability to support a sandbox feature where analysts can easily create attack scenarios and modify advanced/small modular reactor (A/SMR) security and safety features using templates. This approach saves time and cost since the analysis does not require creating detailed computer-aided design models, as is commonly required in commercial force-on-force software tools. EMRALD is completely free to use at https://emraldapp.inl.gov. We have developed basic templates including physical barriers, intrusion sensors, physical areas, and safety actions, that can be downloaded from EMRALD’s GitHub site: https://github.com/idaholab/EMRALD. These templates use generic data commonly used for training purposes, which do not reflect any actual operating nuclear reactor. Users may adjust the data in the templates with their own dataset and/or create new templates in EMRALD. The proposed methodology combines security and safety by assessing sabotage effects up to the radiological consequence to the public instead of merely the core damage state. This practice follows the industry standard for advanced non-light-water reactors currently proposed for endorsement by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The combination of security and safety is expressed in an achievability-consequence chart. EMRALD can be used to generate data for this chart. A hypothetical case study using a representative sodium-cooled fast reactor (SFR) facility is presented in this report to demonstrate this methodology. This case study does not contain any actual nuclear plant information. This work will benefit A/SMR vendors and utilities to implement security by design during the reactor design iteration phase, such that they do not have to perform upgrades and retrofits to the reactor after it is installed to improve its physical protection system. The tool may also be used to analyze domestic or foreign reactor designs to support the International Nuclear Security Techniques for Advanced Reactors (INSTAR) bilateral missions. Future works are planned to implement the methodology on a reference SFR reactor and a reference high-temperature gas-cooled reactor to obtain insights and lessons-learned for the A/SMR community.

• Research Organization: Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Idaho Falls, ID (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: 51
• DOE Contract Number: AC07-05ID14517
• OSTI ID: 1996220
• Report Number(s): INL/RPT-23-74073-Rev000
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
A/SMR
EMRALD
Physical Security