Assurance Theory: A Strategic Imperative

Technical Report · Fri Apr 01 04:00:00 EDT 2022

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/1853895· OSTI ID:1853895

Stover, Luke R. ^[1]

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1. Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

A commonly stated goal of many US Military activities, especially in the strategic realm of nuclear weapons, is to “deter potential adversaries and assure allies.” However, sometimes the phrase “assure allies” seems to be an appendage to a larger deterrence objective. Yet, assurance is fundamentally different than deterrence, even extended deterrence, which aims to shape the decisions of potential adversaries. Assurance, on the other hand, seeks to influence the decisions of allies. As such, assurance must not be treated as an appendage to deterrence, but rather as the strategic imperative that it is. A proper understanding of assurance is critical in an age of renewed great power competition where alliances provide an asymmetric strategic advantage over potential adversaries. This paper provides a primer on assurance theory, to include its definition, variables, challenges, and measures of success.

• Research Organization: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Programs (DP)
• DOE Contract Number: 89233218CNA000001
• OSTI ID: 1853895
• Report Number(s): LA-UR-22-21941
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE