Mitigating the Threat of Nuclear-Weapon Proliferation via Nuclear-Submarine Programs

Journal Article · Thu Jun 27 00:00:00 EDT 2019 · Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/25751654.2019.1625504· OSTI ID:1798681

von Hippel, Frank ^[1]

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1. Princeton Univ., NJ (United States). Program on Science and Global Security; University of Michigan

Brazil is building a nuclear-powered attack submarine, South Korea has in the past asserted its need for nuclear-powered attack submarines to deal with the threat of North Korean nuclear-armed submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and Iran has asserted more vaguely its need for naval nuclear propulsion. All three countries are non-weapon-state parties to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Their interest in naval reactors brings with it two challenges to the NPT: 1) The safeguards “loophole” under which a country can withdraw nuclear materials from IAEA safeguards indefinitely for allowed “non-peaceful activities;” and 2) A justification for the acquisition of national uranium-enrichment facilities because the international suppliers of enrichment services have peaceful-use requirements. In fact, Brazil’s acquisition of enrichment was driven by its navy. It is argued, however, that nuclear-powered attack submarines have advantages over modern conventional attack submarines primarily in their ability to transit great distances at high speed whereas only a few countries have foreign military commitments requiring such capabilities. For defense of nearby waters against foreign navies, attack submarines are merely one component of a complex system of anti-submarine aircraft and surface vessels and underwater sensor networks. Conventional attack submarines are no less effective and much less costly than nuclear-powered attack submarines in this role.

• Research Organization: Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• Grant/Contract Number: NA0002534
• OSTI ID: 1798681
• Journal Information: Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Journal Name: Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament Journal Issue: 1 Vol. 2; ISSN 2575-1654
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
Brazil
Nuclear submarine
South Korea
enriched uranium
nuclear proliferation