Commonly Overlooked Material Attractiveness Issues [Slides]
- Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
SG-Pu, WG-Pu, FG-Pu, RG-Pu, HEU, and Np should not be ignored in safeguards or security discussions: Nation states prefer SG-Pu and WG-Pu for missile delivery. Terrorists and some nation states will prefer FG-Pu and RG-Pu to minimize the mass that must be stolen/diverted and to minimize the risk of detection. Terrorists and some nation states will prefer HEU to eliminate the need for testing. A nation state with reprocessing capabilities might prefer 237Np because the IAEA doesn’t require it to be safeguarded. Terrorists might prefer 237Np if the nation state does not provide adequate safeguards and security for it.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- 89233218CNA000001
- OSTI ID:
- 1774382
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-21-23091
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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