Side Channel Considerations for SHA-512
- Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Albuquerque, NM, and Livermore, CA (United States)
We consider a theoretical side-channel attack on SHA-512; the attack should easily generalize to other algorithms in the SHA-2 family. Rather than looking at a side-channel attack on an HMAC, which has been done in various papers, we assume that the targeted device is applying the hash function as a pseudo-random function (prf) in order to generate a secret key from a secret seed, as recommended by NIST. The analyst uses side-channel information to try to recover the secret seed. We use entropy/information theory to show how one might judge whether or not a side-channel attack might be possible and/or feasible, and we show how the design of the implementation can affect the feasibility of an attack.
- Research Organization:
- Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC04-94AL85000
- OSTI ID:
- 1647526
- Report Number(s):
- SAND--2020-8190R; 689814
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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