Nash Embedding and Equilibrium in Pure Quantum States
Journal Article
·
· Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Khalifa Univ., Abu Dhabi (United Arab Emirates)
- Oak Ridge National Lab. (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
With respect to probabilistic mixtures of the strategies in non-cooperative games, quantum game theory provides guarantee of fixed-point stability, the so-called Nash equilibrium. This permits players to choose mixed quantum strategies that prepare mixed quantum states optimally under constraints. Here, we show here that fixed-point stability of Nash equilibrium can also be guaranteed for pure quantum strategies via an application of the Nash embedding theorem, permitting players to prepare pure quantum states optimally under constraints.
- Research Organization:
- Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Oak Ridge, TN (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Science (SC), Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) (SC-21)
- Grant/Contract Number:
- AC05-00OR22725
- OSTI ID:
- 1513384
- Journal Information:
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Journal Name: Lecture Notes in Computer Science Journal Issue: 0 Vol. 11413; ISSN 0302-9743
- Publisher:
- SpringerCopyright Statement
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
Quantum games: a review of the history, current state, and interpretation
|
journal | October 2018 |
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