Detection of Special Nuclear Material in Cargo Containers Using Neutron Interrogation
The goal of the work reported here is to develop a concept for an active neutron interrogation system that can detect small targets of SNM contraband in cargo containers, roughly 5 kg HEU or 1 kg Pu, even when well shielded by a thick cargo. It is essential that the concept be reliable and have low false-positive and false-negative error rates. It also must be rapid to avoid interruption of commerce, completing the analysis in minutes. A new radiation signature unique to SNM has been identified that utilizes high-energy (E{sub {gamma}} = 3-7 MeV) fission product {gamma}-ray emission. Fortunately, this high-energy {gamma}-ray signature is robust in that it is very distinct compared to normal background radiation where there is no comparable high-energy {gamma}-ray radiation. Equally important, it has a factor of 10 higher yield than delayed neutrons that are the basis of classical interrogation technique normally used on small unshielded specimens of SNM. And it readily penetrates two meters of low-Z and high-Z cargo at the expected density of {approx} 0.5 gm/cm{sup 3}. Consequently, we expect that in most cases the signature flux at the container wall is at least 2-3 decades more intense than delayed neutron signals used historically and facilitates the detection of SNM even when shielded by thick cargo. Experiments have verified this signature and its predicted characteristics. However, they revealed an important interference due to the activation of {sup 16}O by the {sup 16}O(n,p){sup 16}N reaction that produces a 6 MeV {gamma}-ray following a 7-sec {beta}-decay of the {sup 16}N. This interference is important when irradiating with 14 MeV neutrons but is eliminated when lower energy neutron sources are utilized since the reaction threshold for {sup 16}O(n,p){sup 16}N is 10 MeV. The signature {gamma}-ray fluxes exiting a thick cargo can be detected in large arrays of scintillation detectors to produce useful signal count rates of 2-4 x 10{sup 4} cps. That is high enough to quickly identify SNM fission by its characteristic high energy {gamma}-ray emission and characteristic fast decay time. Fortunately, the fission product {gamma}-radiation decays with a distinctive T{sub 1/2} = 20-30 sec lifetime that is well matched to cargo scan speeds of about one minute per container. Experimental characterization of the {gamma}-ray fluxes exiting thick cargos has not yet been undertaken. The work reported here leads to definite requirements for the interrogation neutron source that can be met with neutron commercially available source technology. A small (6-20 ft) deuteron accelerator producing about {approx} 1 mA, 2-5 MeV deuteron beam on a deuterium or beryllium target is required. Neutrons produced by such an accelerator are kinematically collimated in the forward direction, reducing shielding requirements while increasing the neutron flux on target to meet the intensity requirement even when there is thick intervening cargo. In addition, this technology provides a very penetrating beam in the energy range 4-8 MeV while remaining below the oxygen activation threshold. Maximum counting statistics and lowest error rates in the identification occur when the beam is pulsed with a 50 % duty cycle. The period for this pulsing must be comparable to the half-lives of the species that make up the signature, i.e. 10-60 sec. This is readily achieved with commercially available equipment and is well suited to rapid scanning of cargo containers.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- US Department of Energy (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-48
- OSTI ID:
- 15005260
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-ID-155315; TRN: US0305349
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: PBD: 1 Aug 2003
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
CARGO
CONTAINERS
DELAYED NEUTRONS
NEUTRON DETECTION
DEUTERON BEAMS
NEUTRON FLUX
NEUTRON SOURCES
SCINTILLATION COUNTERS
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
PLUTONIUM
NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT