Standoff enrichment analysis of UF6 cylinders

Canion, B.; Jarman, K.; McDonald, B.; Dreyer, J.; Drury, O.; Labov, S.; Lawson, G.; Forrestor, J.; Myjak, M.; Zalavadia, Z.; Nelson, K.; Seilhan, B.; Pfund, D.

doi:10.1016/J.NIMA.2018.10.020

Standoff enrichment analysis of UF₆ cylinders

Journal Article · Fri Oct 12 00:00:00 EDT 2018 · Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research. Section A, Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/J.NIMA.2018.10.020· OSTI ID:1491259

Canion, B. ^[1]; Jarman, K. ^[2]; McDonald, B. ^[2]; Dreyer, J. ^[1]; Drury, O. ^[1]; Labov, S. ^[1]; Lawson, G. ^[2]; Forrestor, J. ^[2]; Myjak, M. ^[2]; Zalavadia, Z. ^[2]; Nelson, K. ^[1]; Seilhan, B. ^[1]; Pfund, D. ^[2]

Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)

We investigate a new safeguards approach for verification of uranium processing operations via standoff measurement of UF₆ cylinder transports entering and leaving a facility. Current safeguards verification at facilities with UF₆ cylinders includes attended enrichment measurements of several randomly-selected cylinders using handheld instruments with inspection of all the cylinders typically only once a year. This approach requires significant inspector effort and can only be performed intermittently. Here we explore an unattended, multi-sensor enrichment measurement system that can operate continuously on cylinders in motion. Such an approach could be used to enhance continuity of knowledge by verifying that all shipments entering and leaving a facility are consistent with declared operations. The challenges in developing a standoff enrichment technique include limited statistical significance of the collected data, and interpreting the complex signatures from a shipment of UF₆ cylinders. These signatures vary with cylinder properties (e.g. the fuel cycle history, cylinder history, material distribution, material age, etc.) and measurement conditions (e.g. speed and distance of vehicle, detector response, cylinder orientation, attenuation from overpack and vehicle, etc.). We demonstrate that we can extract useful enrichment signatures from standoff measurements of UF₆ cylinders entering and leaving a facility. Our initial analysis demonstrates a measurable difference in enrichment-related signatures from a cylinder in motion, measured with modest detection efficiency from several meters away. We also demonstrate that the inclusion of vehicle tracking increases the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of our radiation signatures, and decreases uncertainty of parameters needed for enrichment analysis, e.g. distance and velocity.

Research Organization:: Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States); Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)

Sponsoring Organization:: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (NA-20)

Grant/Contract Number:: AC05-76RL01830; AC52-07NA27344

OSTI ID:: 1491259

Alternate ID(s):: OSTI ID: 1631513
OSTI ID: 1636233
OSTI ID: 2479669

Report Number(s):: PNNL-SA--138534; PII: S0168900218313354

Journal Information:: Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research. Section A, Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment, Journal Name: Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research. Section A, Accelerators, Spectrometers, Detectors and Associated Equipment Vol. 954; ISSN 0168-9002