An incentive-based distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks
The underlying assumption of Divisible Load Scheduling (DLS) theory is that the pro-cessors composing the network are obedient, i.e., they do not “cheat” the scheduling algorithm. This assumption is unrealistic if the processors are owned by autonomous, self-interested organizations that have no a priori motivation for cooperation and they will manipulate the algorithm if it is beneficial to do so. In this paper, we address this issue by designing a distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree net-works, called DLS-T, which provides incentives to processors for reporting their true processing capacity and executing their assigned load at full processing capacity. We prove that the DLS-T mechanism computes the optimal allocation in an ex post Nash equilibrium. Finally, we simulate and study the mechanism under various network structures and processor parameters.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 1439043
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA-84721
- Journal Information:
- Journal of Parallel and Distributed Computing, Vol. 72, Issue 3; ISSN 0743-7315
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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