Standardizing Acquisition Path Analysis: Quantifying a State’s Ability to Establish and Clandestinely Operate an Undeclared Nuclear Facility of a Given Type
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Acquisition path analysis is an important tool for developing safeguards strategies as it allows for the determination and assessment of all technically plausible paths a state may pursue to obtain weapons usable nuclear material. A state may obtain such material either through diverting declared material, misusing a declared facility to produce undeclared material, producing undeclared material in a clandestine facility, illicitly importing undeclared material, or combinations of these actions. In states with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has mechanisms in place to detect the diversion of declared material or the misuse of a declared facility for undeclared production, and it can adjust the frequency and intensity of those mechanisms to achieve specific detection probability and timeliness goals. The IAEA also has tools to look for and investigate indications of clandestine nuclear facilities or undeclared imports of nuclear material, but it only has limited control over the actual effectiveness of those measures. However, quantifying a state’s technical capability to establish and clandestinely operate an undeclared facility of a given type or to import nuclear material and quantifying the probability that it will evade detection are both much more difficult. By looking at a facility’s detection susceptibility as opposed to explicit detection probability, this research uses a new approach to score detection risks. Using these risks, along with a more structured approach to determine a state’s capability of establishing and operating a clandestine nuclear facility, this research develops a methodology to quantify a state’s ability to successfully construct and operate a clandestine facility without detection. This research considers the use of this methodology when evaluating each undeclared import path step.
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC52-07NA27344
- OSTI ID:
- 1424622
- Report Number(s):
- LLNL-TR-745003
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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