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Title: Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators

Abstract

Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.

Authors:
 [1];  [1];  [1]
  1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
1402552
Report Number(s):
SAND-2017-11187
657845
DOE Contract Number:
AC04-94AL85000; NA0003525
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Citation Formats

Finch, Robert J., Smartt, Heidi A., and Haddal, Risa. Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.2172/1402552.
Finch, Robert J., Smartt, Heidi A., & Haddal, Risa. Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators. United States. doi:10.2172/1402552.
Finch, Robert J., Smartt, Heidi A., and Haddal, Risa. 2017. "Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators". United States. doi:10.2172/1402552. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1402552.
@article{osti_1402552,
title = {Developing reliable safeguards seals for application verification and removal by State operators},
author = {Finch, Robert J. and Smartt, Heidi A. and Haddal, Risa},
abstractNote = {Once a geological repository has begun operations, the encapsulation and disposal of spent fuel will be performed as a continuous, industrial-scale series of processes, during which time safeguards seals will be applied to transportation casks before shipment from an encapsulation plant, and then verified and removed following receipt at the repository. These operations will occur approximately daily during several decades of Sweden's repository operation; however, requiring safeguards inspectors to perform the application, verification, and removal of every seal would be an onerous burden on International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA's) resources. Current IAEA practice includes allowing operators to either apply seals or remove them, but not both, so the daily task of either applying or verifying and removing would still require continuous presence of IAEA inspectors at one site at least. Of special importance is the inability to re-verify cask or canisters from which seals have been removed and the canisters emplaced underground. Successfully designing seals that can be applied, verified and removed by an operator with IAEA approval could impact more than repository shipments, but other applications as well, potentially reducing inspector burdens for a wide range of such duties.},
doi = {10.2172/1402552},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2017,
month =
}

Technical Report:

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  • This report is the outcome of a study of the technical and procedural requirements which would need to be met if the Agency and facility operators were to agree that under certain circumstances the operator could remove or apply on Agency seal in the absence of an inspector. In the FRG and USA Support Programmes respectively an electronic seal (VACOSS) and a CCTV system (MIVS) have been developed. Through a joint project, an interface has been demonstrated which enables the seal data to be superimposed upon the surveillance data. This interface is briefly described in the appendix. A proposed applicationmore » for this integrated system is to allow facility operators to carry-out some of the seal procedures normally performed by an inspector, thereby reducing the need for inspector presence at certain crucial times.« less
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  • The SEALS (State Estimator for Large Systems) computer code was applied to the estimation of displacement time histories of points on a vibrating mechanical structure given noisy measurements at two locations on the structure. The goal was to demonstrate the feasibility of determining the motion of internal members of the structure given only noisy measurements from the exterior and a finite-element model of the structure. This study was done in four distinct phases, i.e., model development; simulation of displacements vs time; acquisition of noisy measurement data (computer simulated); and estimation of displacements from measurements. The model was developed from themore » geometry of the structure using the ZONE finite-element mesh generator to produce an axi-symmetric finite-element model consisting of 15 elements and 32 nodes. The SAP4 code was used to translate the geometry and material properties into a 2nd order matrix differential equation (with matrices of size 87 by 87) which was then transformed into 174 state space equations (i.e., first order differential equations) for input to the SEALS state estimation code. A model check feature of SEALS was used to simulate displacement time histories at all the nodes of the finite-element model given an initial displacement for one of the nodes. Noisy measurements at two exterior locations on the structure were simulated by adding Gaussian white noise to the appropriate simulation waveforms. The standard deviation of the noise was chosen to given an approximate signal-to-noise ratio of 40. The SEALS code was used to reconstruct the displacement time histories of all the nodes of the model given the measurements, and erroneous initial value for both the initial condition displacement and the measurement noise covariance. Plots of displacement time histories at selected nodes of the model for simulation, measurement, and state estimation (reconstruction) are given.« less
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