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Title: Containment and Surveillance as a Primary Approach for Safeguarding Geological Repositories.


Abstract not provided.

; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
OSTI Identifier:
Report Number(s):
DOE Contract Number:
Resource Type:
Resource Relation:
Conference: Proposed for presentation at the Annual meeting of the Institute for Nuclear Materials Management held July 24-28, 2016 in Atlanta, GA.
Country of Publication:
United States

Citation Formats

Finch, Robert, Haddal, Risa, and Baldwin, George. Containment and Surveillance as a Primary Approach for Safeguarding Geological Repositories.. United States: N. p., 2016. Web.
Finch, Robert, Haddal, Risa, & Baldwin, George. Containment and Surveillance as a Primary Approach for Safeguarding Geological Repositories.. United States.
Finch, Robert, Haddal, Risa, and Baldwin, George. 2016. "Containment and Surveillance as a Primary Approach for Safeguarding Geological Repositories.". United States. doi:.
title = {Containment and Surveillance as a Primary Approach for Safeguarding Geological Repositories.},
author = {Finch, Robert and Haddal, Risa and Baldwin, George},
abstractNote = {Abstract not provided.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2016,
month = 7

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  • Abstract not provided.
  • The application of international safeguards to spent fuel and waste destined for final disposal must balance the operational features of such facilities with the need to meet fundamental safeguards requirements. Strategies for meeting safeguards requirements must provide for establishment and verification of inventory, maintaining continuity of knowledge of inventory, timely detection of diversion, and diversion path analysis. Specific facility operations will influence which safeguards implementation strategies will be employed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to meet these safeguards requirements. Primary safeguards issues surrounding these operations, such as transfer of spent fuel and waste from the generation to receivingmore » sites, spent fuel and waste conditioning, and geologic disposal may necessitate development and deployment of new safeguards measures and technologies. Inspector resource constraints, nonretrievability of the nuclear material, and requirements for maintaining continuity of knowledge have placed new emphasis on the use of containment and surveillance (C/S) as an essential part of a safeguards system. This paper will focus on C/S strategies and examine the ability of C/S to fulfill international safeguards requirements for spent fuel and waste at the backend of the fuel cycle. 20 refs.« less
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently pursuing development of an international safeguards approach for the final disposal of spent fuel in geological repositories through consultants meetings and through the Program for Development of Safeguards for Final Disposal of Spent Fuel in Geological Repositories (SAGOR). The consultants meetings provide policy guidance to IAEA; SAGOR recommends effective approaches that can be efficiently implemented by IAEA. The SAGOR program, which is a collaboration of eight Member State Support Programs (MSSPs), was initiated in July 1994 and has identified 15 activities in each of three areas (i.e. conditioning facilities, active repositories, andmore » closed repositories) that must be performed to ensure an efficient, yet effective safeguards approach. Two consultants meetings have been held: the first in May 1991 and the last in November 1995. For nuclear materials emplaced in a geological repository, the safeguards objectives were defined to be (1) to detect the diversion of spent fuel, whether concealed or unconcealed, from the repository and (2) to detect undeclared activities of safeguards concern (e.g., tunneling, underground reprocessing, or substitution in containers).« less
  • The FCA C and S system is representative of large scale operator-provided systems likely to be offered to the Agency for safeguards use, and is currently nearing the end of its field trial. This current paper describes the specific approach that has been selected, some reasons for the choices made, and the corresponding implications for authentication equipment design. Although the approach is specific to FCA the principles described have possible relevance to other operator-provided systems. The final working installation at FCA is expected to be a sub-set of the initial features provided, the choice to be dictated by field experience.
  • The present paper discusses some relevant phenomena occurring in advanced Light Water Reactors (LWR) during postulated accident scenarios. In particular, the operation of emergency safety features (ESF) is the starting point for analysis of those phenomena that cause the mutual influence between primary system (PS) and containment in these plants. Exemplified thermal-hydraulic analyses are presented, using the FUMO integrated model, for highlight accident evolutions taking into account these interactions. The architecture of this integrated toot is also presented and the discussion is focused on the problems related to the validation of such an integrated tool. Furthermore, a stronger integrated approachmore » is required, during a severe accident (SA), for a realistic source term (ST) evaluation: determination of the thermal-hydraulic conditions has to be performed together with chemical-equilibria and radio nuclide retention phenomena. This is done by the ECART code, tool based on a mechanistic approach in modelling vapour and aerosol transport phenomenology and aimed at unifying reactor system analysis. After a short description of main features of this integrated code, the strategy for coupling the different code sections and the results on VANAM M3 test on thermal-hydraulic and aerosol behaviour are discussed, illustrating capabilities of this integrated methodology for ST evaluation. 18 refs., 12 figs.« less