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Title: Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid

Abstract

Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE)
OSTI Identifier:
1371964
Report Number(s):
PNNL-SA-120681
Journal ID: ISSN 0018-9219; 830403000
DOE Contract Number:
AC05-76RL01830
Resource Type:
Journal Article
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: Proceedings of the IEEE; Journal Volume: 105; Journal Issue: 7
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION; cyber-physical security; attack-resilient framework; WAMPAC

Citation Formats

Ashok, Aditya, Govindarasu, Manimaran, and Wang, Jianhui. Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid. United States: N. p., 2017. Web. doi:10.1109/JPROC.2017.2686394.
Ashok, Aditya, Govindarasu, Manimaran, & Wang, Jianhui. Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid. United States. doi:10.1109/JPROC.2017.2686394.
Ashok, Aditya, Govindarasu, Manimaran, and Wang, Jianhui. Sat . "Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid". United States. doi:10.1109/JPROC.2017.2686394.
@article{osti_1371964,
title = {Cyber-Physical Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control for the Power Grid},
author = {Ashok, Aditya and Govindarasu, Manimaran and Wang, Jianhui},
abstractNote = {Cyber security and resiliency of Wide-Area Monitoring, Protection and Control (WAMPAC) applications is critically important to ensure secure, reliable, and economic operation of the bulk power system. WAMPAC relies heavily on the security of measurements and control commands transmitted over wide-area communication networks for real-time operational, protection, and control functions. Also, the current “N-1 security criteria” for grid operation is inadequate to address malicious cyber events and therefore it is important to fundamentally redesign WAMPAC and to enhance Energy Management System (EMS) applications to make them attack-resilient. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end defense-in-depth architecture for attack-resilient WAMPAC that addresses resilience at both the infrastructure layer and the application layers. Also, we propose an attack-resilient cyber-physical security framework that encompasses the entire security life cycle including risk assessment, attack prevention, attack detection, attack mitigation, and attack resilience. The overarching objective of this paper is to provide a broad scope that comprehensively describes most of the major research issues and potential solutions in the context of cyber-physical security of WAMPAC for the power grid.},
doi = {10.1109/JPROC.2017.2686394},
journal = {Proceedings of the IEEE},
number = 7,
volume = 105,
place = {United States},
year = {Sat Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017},
month = {Sat Jul 01 00:00:00 EDT 2017}
}
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