Nuclear Warhead Verification: A Review of Attribute and Template Systems

Journal Article · Fri Oct 23 00:00:00 EDT 2015 · Science and Global Security

DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/08929882.2015.1087221· OSTI ID:1367681

Yan, Jie ^[1]; Glaser, Alexander ^[2]

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1. China Academy of Engineering Physics, Sichuan (China). Inst. of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry; Princeton Univ., NJ (United States). Program on Science and Global Security; Princeton University
2. Princeton Univ., NJ (United States). Program on Science and Global Security

Verification of current nuclear arms control treaties between United States and Russia relies primarily on the verification of delivery vehicles. Warheads are counted indirectly via the delivery vehicles that they are associated with. As states move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, verification will likely pose complex challenges. Most importantly, future nuclear disarmament treaties may place limits on the total number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals. Their verification would require inspections of individual nuclear warheads without revealing secret information. By confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads and perhaps also of warhead components we show the verification challenge for future reductions in the nuclear arsenals. Our paper provides an overview of the development of verification systems, and highlights the challenges and the opportunities for future research in this area.

• Research Organization: Univ. of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• Grant/Contract Number: NA0002534
• OSTI ID: 1367681
• Journal Information: Science and Global Security, Journal Name: Science and Global Security Journal Issue: 3 Vol. 23; ISSN 0892-9882
• Publisher: Taylor and Francis
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION