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Title: Analyzing Resiliency of the Smart Grid Communication Architectures

Abstract

Smart grids are susceptible to cyber-attack as a result of new communication, control and computation techniques employed in the grid. In this paper, we characterize and analyze the resiliency of smart grid communication architecture, specifically an RF mesh based architecture, under cyber attacks. We analyze the resiliency of the communication architecture by studying the performance of high-level smart grid functions such as metering, and demand response which depend on communication. Disrupting the operation of these functions impacts the operational resiliency of the smart grid. Our analysis shows that it takes an attacker only a small fraction of meters to compromise the communication resiliency of the smart grid. We discuss the implications of our result to critical smart grid functions and to the overall security of the smart grid.

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
City of Los Angeles Department
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (OE)
OSTI Identifier:
1326234
Report Number(s):
DOE-USC-00192-130
DOE Contract Number:
OE0000192
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Journal Name: Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET’12); Conference: 5th Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET’12) Bellevue, Washington August 1, 2012
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English

Citation Formats

Anas AlMajali, Anas, Viswanathan, Arun, and Neuman, Clifford. Analyzing Resiliency of the Smart Grid Communication Architectures. United States: N. p., 2016. Web.
Anas AlMajali, Anas, Viswanathan, Arun, & Neuman, Clifford. Analyzing Resiliency of the Smart Grid Communication Architectures. United States.
Anas AlMajali, Anas, Viswanathan, Arun, and Neuman, Clifford. 2016. "Analyzing Resiliency of the Smart Grid Communication Architectures". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1326234.
@article{osti_1326234,
title = {Analyzing Resiliency of the Smart Grid Communication Architectures},
author = {Anas AlMajali, Anas and Viswanathan, Arun and Neuman, Clifford},
abstractNote = {Smart grids are susceptible to cyber-attack as a result of new communication, control and computation techniques employed in the grid. In this paper, we characterize and analyze the resiliency of smart grid communication architecture, specifically an RF mesh based architecture, under cyber attacks. We analyze the resiliency of the communication architecture by studying the performance of high-level smart grid functions such as metering, and demand response which depend on communication. Disrupting the operation of these functions impacts the operational resiliency of the smart grid. Our analysis shows that it takes an attacker only a small fraction of meters to compromise the communication resiliency of the smart grid. We discuss the implications of our result to critical smart grid functions and to the overall security of the smart grid.},
doi = {},
journal = {Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Cyber Security Experimentation and Test (CSET’12)},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = 2016,
month = 8
}

Conference:
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