Progress to Date on Developing the NUSAM Methodology Document

Technical Report · Wed Apr 01 04:00:00 EDT 2015

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/1178357· OSTI ID:1178357

Snell, Mark K. ^[1]

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1. Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)

The same basic steps occur when evaluating the physical protection of nuclear or radiological material in transport against theft or sabotage as are needed for protecting nuclear facilities and nuclear material in use or storage. There are some notable distinctions, however. There are limited layers of protection around material when in transport so that the analysis focuses more on scenario analysis than for fixed sites which may require formal path analysis if the facility has some complexity. In many respects, ground transportation security is more challenging than security at a fixed site. Operation in the public domain is frequently required and the same degree of access limitation is not possible as it is in a protected fixed site. Because of these differences, response force personnel in transit play a more dominant role in the security of a mobile system than they do for a fixed site. In all cases, however, the system time delay that is required to provide the response force the time to react must be provided primarily by transportation vehicle technology elements.

• Research Organization: Sandia National Laboratories (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
• DOE Contract Number: AC04-94AL85000
• OSTI ID: 1178357
• Report Number(s): SAND--2015-2727R; 582030
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

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