The applicability of sample collection and analysis in support of nuclear arms control agreements

Technical Report · Tue Aug 01 04:00:00 EDT 1995

DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/108149· OSTI ID:108149

McGuire, R R

Agreements are being negotiated to halt the spread of nuclear arms both within the declared nuclear weapons states and to states not heretofore declaring their possession. With the verification regime of the recently negotiated Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as a model, negotiators are considering variations of on-site inspection as formulas to enhance the assurance of compliance with future agreements. These on-site inspections may be part of a treaty dictated verification regime or one of a set of voluntary {open_quotes}confidence building{close_quotes} measures. In either case, the collection of material samples for analysis could be an integral component of the inspection as it is in the CWC. The following is an assessment of the applicability of sampling and analysis for compliance monitoring nuclear arms control agreements currently envisioned. There are two essentially orthogonal ways of approaching this question of applicability: the consideration of the analytical questions and the consideration of the specifics of the individual agreements. This study is meant to utilize both approaches in examining the possible impact of sampling and analysis on compliance assessment. First attention must be given to technical questions relating to the efficacy of sampling and analysis.

• Research Organization: Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
• DOE Contract Number: W-7405-ENG-48
• OSTI ID: 108149
• Report Number(s): UCRL-ID--121824; ON: DE95017465
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

35 ARMS CONTROL
ARMS CONTROL
COMPLIANCE
COST
MONITORING
NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
ON-SITE INSPECTION
SAMPLING
VERIFICATION