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Title: Final Review of Safety Assessment Issues at Savannah River Site, August 2011

Abstract

At the request of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) management, a review team composed of experts in atmospheric transport modeling for environmental radiation dose assessment convened at the Savannah River Site (SRS) on August 29-30, 2011. Though the meeting was prompted initially by suspected issues related to the treatment of surface roughness inherent in the SRS meteorological dataset and its treatment in the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System Version 2 (MACCS2), various topical areas were discussed that are relevant to performing safety assessments at SRS; this final report addresses these topical areas.

Authors:
; ;
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
1034237
Report Number(s):
PNNL-20990
830403000; TRN: US201203%%507
DOE Contract Number:
AC05-76RL01830
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES; ACCIDENTS; MANAGEMENT; RADIATION DOSES; ROUGHNESS; SAFETY; SAVANNAH RIVER PLANT; SIMULATION; TRANSPORT; Savannah River Site; dispersion; meteorology; MACCS2

Citation Formats

Napier, Bruce A., Rishel, Jeremy P., and Bixler, Nathan E. Final Review of Safety Assessment Issues at Savannah River Site, August 2011. United States: N. p., 2011. Web. doi:10.2172/1034237.
Napier, Bruce A., Rishel, Jeremy P., & Bixler, Nathan E. Final Review of Safety Assessment Issues at Savannah River Site, August 2011. United States. doi:10.2172/1034237.
Napier, Bruce A., Rishel, Jeremy P., and Bixler, Nathan E. Thu . "Final Review of Safety Assessment Issues at Savannah River Site, August 2011". United States. doi:10.2172/1034237. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1034237.
@article{osti_1034237,
title = {Final Review of Safety Assessment Issues at Savannah River Site, August 2011},
author = {Napier, Bruce A. and Rishel, Jeremy P. and Bixler, Nathan E.},
abstractNote = {At the request of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) management, a review team composed of experts in atmospheric transport modeling for environmental radiation dose assessment convened at the Savannah River Site (SRS) on August 29-30, 2011. Though the meeting was prompted initially by suspected issues related to the treatment of surface roughness inherent in the SRS meteorological dataset and its treatment in the MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System Version 2 (MACCS2), various topical areas were discussed that are relevant to performing safety assessments at SRS; this final report addresses these topical areas.},
doi = {10.2172/1034237},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Thu Dec 15 00:00:00 EST 2011},
month = {Thu Dec 15 00:00:00 EST 2011}
}

Technical Report:

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  • At the request of Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) management, a review team composed of experts in atmospheric transport modeling for environmental radiation dose assessment convened at the Savannah River Site (SRS) on August 29-30, 2011. Several issues were presented at the meeting for discussion. This is a short summary that is organized in accordance with the primary issues discussed, which is not necessarily a chronological record. Issues include: SRS Meteorological Data and its Use in MACCS2; Deposition Velocities for Particles; Deposition Velocities for Tritium; MACCS2 Dispersion Coefficients; Use of Low Surface Roughness in Open Areas; Adequacy of Meteorological Towermore » and Instrumentation; Displacement Height; and Validity of MACCS2 Calculations at Close-in Distances. A longer report will be issued at a later date that expands upon these topics and recommendations.« less
  • The Savannah River Site (SRS) Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) will vitrify high-level radioactive waste that is presently stored as liquid, salt-cake, and sludge in 51 waste-storage tanks. Construction of the DWPF began in 1984, and the Westinghouse Savannah Company (WSRC) considers the plant to be 100% turned over from construction and 91% complete. Cold-chemical runs are scheduled to begin in November 1992, and hot start up is projected for June 1994. It is estimated that the plant lifetime must exceed 15 years to complete the vitrification of the current, high-level tank waste. In a memo to the Assistant Secretarymore » for Defense Programs (DP-1), the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste management (EM-1) established the need for an Independent Technical Review (ITR), or the Red Team, to review process technology issues preventing start up of the DWPF.'' This report documents the findings of an Independent Technical Review (ITR) conducted by the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM), at the request of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, of specified aspects of Defense Waste Process Facility (DWPF) process technology. Information for the assessment was drawn from documents provided to the ITR Team by the Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), and presentations, discussions, interviews, and tours held at the Savannah River Site (SRS) during the weeks of February and March 9, 1992.« less
  • The Savannah River Site (SRS) Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) will vitrify high-level radioactive waste that is presently stored as liquid, salt-cake, and sludge in 51 waste-storage tanks. Construction of the DWPF began in 1984, and the Westinghouse Savannah Company (WSRC) considers the plant to be 100% turned over from construction and 91% complete. Cold-chemical runs are scheduled to begin in November 1992, and hot start up is projected for June 1994. It is estimated that the plant lifetime must exceed 15 years to complete the vitrification of the current, high-level tank waste. In a memo to the Assistant Secretarymore » for Defense Programs (DP-1), the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste management (EM-1) established the need for an Independent Technical Review (ITR), or the Red Team, to ``review process technology issues preventing start up of the DWPF.`` This report documents the findings of an Independent Technical Review (ITR) conducted by the Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (EM), at the request of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, of specified aspects of Defense Waste Process Facility (DWPF) process technology. Information for the assessment was drawn from documents provided to the ITR Team by the Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC), and presentations, discussions, interviews, and tours held at the Savannah River Site (SRS) during the weeks of February and March 9, 1992.« less
  • As part of the U.S. Department of Energy`s (DOE) initiative to identify potential chemical safety vulnerabilities in the DOE complex, the Chemical Safety Vulnerability Core Working Group issued a field verification assessment report. While the report concluded that Savannah River Site (SRS) is moving in a positive direction, the report also identified five chemical safety vulnerabilities with broad programmatic impact that are not easily nor quickly remedied. The May 1994 SRS Management Response Plan addressed the five SRS vulnerabilities identified in the field assessment report. The SRS response plan listed observations supporting the vulnerabilities and any actions taken or plannedmore » toward resolution. Many of the observations were resolved by simple explanations, such as the existence of implementation plans for Safety Analysis Report updates. Recognizing that correcting individual observations does not suffice in remedying the vulnerabilities, a task team was assembled to address the broader programmatic issues and to recommend corrective actions.« less
  • This report documents the result of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Environment, Safety and Health (ES H) Progress Assessment of the Savannah River Site (SRS) principally in Aiken and Barnwell Counties, South Carolina. The initial site visit was conducted from January 25 through January 29, 1993, and the onsite assessment was conducted from February 22 through March 8, 1993. The Progress Assessment included a selective review of the ES H management systems and programs with principal focus on the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP); the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Restoration and Wastemore » Management (EM); DOE Savannah River Field Office (SR); and the Operating Contractor, Westinghouse Savannah River Company (WSRC). The ES H Progress Assessments are part of the DOE's continuing effort to institutionalize line management accountability and the self-assessment process throughout DOE and its contractor organizations. The purpose of the SRS ES H Progress Assessment is to provide senior DOE management with an independent assessment of the adequacy and effectiveness of the DOE and contractor management structures, resources, and systems to address ES H issues and requirements. The assessment was not a comprehensive« less