Augmenting Probabilistic Risk Assesment with Malevolent Initiators

Conference · Tue Nov 01 04:00:00 EDT 2011

OSTI ID:1032081

Smith, Curtis; Schwieder, David

As commonly practiced, the use of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in nuclear power plants only considers accident initiators such as natural hazards, equipment failures, and human error. Malevolent initiators are ignored in PRA, but are considered the domain of physical security, which uses vulnerability assessment based on an officially specified threat (design basis threat). This paper explores the implications of augmenting and extending existing PRA models by considering new and modified scenarios resulting from malevolent initiators. Teaming the augmented PRA models with conventional vulnerability assessments can cost-effectively enhance security of a nuclear power plant. This methodology is useful for operating plants, as well as in the design of new plants. For the methodology, we have proposed an approach that builds on and extends the practice of PRA for nuclear power plants for security-related issues. Rather than only considering 'random' failures, we demonstrated a framework that is able to represent and model malevolent initiating events and associated plant impacts.

• Research Organization: Idaho National Laboratory (INL)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE
• DOE Contract Number: AC07-05ID14517
• OSTI ID: 1032081
• Report Number(s): INL/CON-11-21275
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS
ACCIDENTS
DESIGN
NPP
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
PRA
PROBABILITY
RISK ASSESSMENT
SECURITY
VULNERABILITY
risk
security