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Title: Site-wide seismic risk model for Savannah River Site nuclear facilities

Abstract

The 200,000 acre Savannah River Site (SRS) has nearly 30 nuclear facilities spread throughout the site. The safety of each facility has been established in facility-specific safety analysis reports (SARs). Each SAR contains an analysis of risk from seismic events to both on-site workers and the off-site population. Both radiological and chemical releases are considered, and air and water pathways are modeled. Risks to the general public are generally characterized by evaluating exposure to the maximally exposed individual located at the SRS boundary and to the off-site population located within 50 miles. Although the SARs are appropriate methods for studying individual facility risks, there is a class of accident initiators that can simultaneously affect several of all of the facilities, Examples include seismic events, strong winds or tornados, floods, and loss of off-site electrical power. Overall risk to the off-site population from such initiators is not covered by the individual SARs. In such cases multiple facility radionuclide or chemical releases could occur, and off-site exposure would be greater than that indicated in a single facility SAR. As a step towards an overall site-wide risk model that adequately addresses multiple facility releases, a site-wide seismic model for determining off-site risk hasmore » been developed for nuclear facilities at the SRS. Risk from seismic events up to the design basis earthquake (DBE) of 0.2 g (frequency of 2.0E-4/yr) is covered by the model. Present plans include expanding the scope of the model to include other types of initiators that can simultaneously affect multiple facilities.« less

Authors:
;  [1];  [2]
  1. Los Alamos Technical Associates, Inc., Idaho Falls, ID (United States)
  2. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States)
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
OSTI Identifier:
10192651
Report Number(s):
WSRC-MS-93-193; CONF-9303221-1
ON: DE93040907; TRN: 93:022918
DOE Contract Number:
AC09-89SR18035
Resource Type:
Conference
Resource Relation:
Conference: Probabilistic safety assessment and management (PSAM) conference,San Diego, CA (United States),20-24 Mar 1993; Other Information: PBD: 1993
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES; SAVANNAH RIVER PLANT; SAFETY ANALYSIS; SEISMIC EFFECTS; SEISMIC EVENTS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PUBLIC HEALTH; RISK ASSESSMENT; RADIONUCLIDE MIGRATION; ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSPORT; HAZARDOUS MATERIALS; 054000; 540250; HEALTH AND SAFETY; SITE RESOURCE AND USE STUDIES

Citation Formats

Eide, S.A., Shay, R.S., and Durant, W.S. Site-wide seismic risk model for Savannah River Site nuclear facilities. United States: N. p., 1993. Web.
Eide, S.A., Shay, R.S., & Durant, W.S. Site-wide seismic risk model for Savannah River Site nuclear facilities. United States.
Eide, S.A., Shay, R.S., and Durant, W.S. Wed . "Site-wide seismic risk model for Savannah River Site nuclear facilities". United States. doi:. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/10192651.
@article{osti_10192651,
title = {Site-wide seismic risk model for Savannah River Site nuclear facilities},
author = {Eide, S.A. and Shay, R.S. and Durant, W.S.},
abstractNote = {The 200,000 acre Savannah River Site (SRS) has nearly 30 nuclear facilities spread throughout the site. The safety of each facility has been established in facility-specific safety analysis reports (SARs). Each SAR contains an analysis of risk from seismic events to both on-site workers and the off-site population. Both radiological and chemical releases are considered, and air and water pathways are modeled. Risks to the general public are generally characterized by evaluating exposure to the maximally exposed individual located at the SRS boundary and to the off-site population located within 50 miles. Although the SARs are appropriate methods for studying individual facility risks, there is a class of accident initiators that can simultaneously affect several of all of the facilities, Examples include seismic events, strong winds or tornados, floods, and loss of off-site electrical power. Overall risk to the off-site population from such initiators is not covered by the individual SARs. In such cases multiple facility radionuclide or chemical releases could occur, and off-site exposure would be greater than that indicated in a single facility SAR. As a step towards an overall site-wide risk model that adequately addresses multiple facility releases, a site-wide seismic model for determining off-site risk has been developed for nuclear facilities at the SRS. Risk from seismic events up to the design basis earthquake (DBE) of 0.2 g (frequency of 2.0E-4/yr) is covered by the model. Present plans include expanding the scope of the model to include other types of initiators that can simultaneously affect multiple facilities.},
doi = {},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 1993},
month = {Wed Sep 01 00:00:00 EDT 1993}
}

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