The role of quantitative uncertainty in the safety analysis of flammable gas accidents in Hanford waste tanks

Conference · Mon May 18 04:00:00 EDT 1998

OSTI ID:10148360

Bratzel, D R

Following a 1990 investigation into flammable gas generation, retention, and release mechanisms within the Hanford Site high-level waste tanks, personnel concluded that the existing Authorization Basis documentation did not adequately evaluate flammable gas hazards. The US Department of Energy Headquarters subsequently declared the flammable gas hazard as an unresolved safety issue. Although work scope has been focused on resolution of the issue, it has yet to be resolved due to considerable uncertainty regarding essential technical parameters and associated risk. Resolution of the Flammable Gas Safety Issue will include the identification of a set of controls for the Authorization Basis for the tanks which will require a safety analysis of flammable gas accidents. A traditional nuclear facility safety analysis is based primarily on the analysis of a set of bounding accidents to represent the risks of the possible accidents and hazardous conditions at a facility. While this approach may provide some indication of the bounding consequences of accidents for facilities, it does not provide a satisfactory basis for identification of facility risk or safety controls when there is considerable uncertainty associated with accident phenomena and/or data as is the case with potential flammable gas accidents at the Hanford Site. This is due to the difficulties in identifying the bounding case and reaching consensus among safety analysts, facility operations and engineering, and the regulator on the implications of the safety analysis results. In addition, the bounding cases are frequently based on simplifying assumptions that make the analysis results insensitive to variations among facilities or the impact of alternative safety control strategies. The existing safety analysis of flammable gas accidents for the Tank Waste Remediation system (TWRS) at the Hanford Site has these difficulties. However, Hanford Site personnel are developing a refined safety analysis approach which will solve the two basic difficulties of defining the bounding case and assessing the impact of controls. The refined safety analysis does this by explicitly quantifying the effects of the uncertainty in the state of knowledge about accident phenomena and data and providing a consistent basis for calculating the impact of alternative control strategies on parameters that affect accident risk. The refined analysis allows the assessment of the risk impact of the variability in conditions (e.g., waste inventory) among storage tanks in the TWRS. Finally, the refined flammable gas accident safety analysis supports sensitivity studies to examine the impact on the results of differences in flammable gas accident perspectives.

• Research Organization: Fluor Daniel Hanford Inc., Richland, WA (United States)
• Sponsoring Organization: USDOE Office of Environmental Restoration and Waste Management, Washington, DC (United States)
• DOE Contract Number: AC06-96RL13200
• OSTI ID: 10148360
• Report Number(s): HNF--2054-FP; CONF-980616--; ON: DE99050709; BR: EW3120071
• Country of Publication: United States
• Language: English

Related Subjects

052002
054000
11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES
ACCIDENTS
DATA COVARIANCES
FLAMMABILITY
GASES
HANFORD RESERVATION
HEALTH AND SAFETY
HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES
RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE
SAFETY ANALYSIS
STORAGE FACILITIES
TANKS
WASTE DISPOSAL AND STORAGE