Limiting Future Proliferation and Security Risks
Abstract
A major new technical tool for evaluation of proliferation and security risks has emerged over the past decade as part the activities of the Generation IV International Forum. The tool has been developed by a consensus group from participating countries and organizations and is termed the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Evaluation Methodology. The methodology defines a set of challenges, analyzes system response to these challenges, and assesses outcomes. The challenges are the threats posed by potential actors (proliferant states or sub-national adversaries). It is of paramount importance in an evaluation to establish the objectives, capabilities, resources, and strategies of the adversary as well as the design and protection contexts. Technical and institutional characteristics are both used to evaluate the response of the system and to determine its resistance against proliferation threats and robustness against sabotage and terrorism threats. The outcomes of the system response are expressed in terms of a set of measures, which thereby define the PR&PP characteristics of the system. This paper summarizes results of applications of the methodology to nuclear energy systems including reprocessing facilities and large and small modular reactors. The use of the methodology in the design phase a facility will be discussedmore »
- Authors:
- Publication Date:
- Research Org.:
- Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)
- Sponsoring Org.:
- American Nuclear Society
- OSTI Identifier:
- 1013526
- Report Number(s):
- BNL-94588-2011-CP
TRN: US1102506
- DOE Contract Number:
- DE-AC02-98CH10886
- Resource Type:
- Conference
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: American Nuclear Society PSA 2011 International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety ASsessment and Analysis.; Wilmington, NC; 20110313 through 20110313
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; DESIGN; EVALUATION; NUCLEAR ENERGY; PHYSICAL PROTECTION; PROBABILISTIC ESTIMATION; PROLIFERATION; REPROCESSING; RISK ASSESSMENT; SABOTAGE; SAFEGUARDS; SECURITY; proliferation; security; risk; methodology
Citation Formats
Bari, R. Limiting Future Proliferation and Security Risks. United States: N. p., 2011.
Web.
Bari, R. Limiting Future Proliferation and Security Risks. United States.
Bari, R. Sun .
"Limiting Future Proliferation and Security Risks". United States. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/1013526.
@article{osti_1013526,
title = {Limiting Future Proliferation and Security Risks},
author = {Bari, R},
abstractNote = {A major new technical tool for evaluation of proliferation and security risks has emerged over the past decade as part the activities of the Generation IV International Forum. The tool has been developed by a consensus group from participating countries and organizations and is termed the Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) Evaluation Methodology. The methodology defines a set of challenges, analyzes system response to these challenges, and assesses outcomes. The challenges are the threats posed by potential actors (proliferant states or sub-national adversaries). It is of paramount importance in an evaluation to establish the objectives, capabilities, resources, and strategies of the adversary as well as the design and protection contexts. Technical and institutional characteristics are both used to evaluate the response of the system and to determine its resistance against proliferation threats and robustness against sabotage and terrorism threats. The outcomes of the system response are expressed in terms of a set of measures, which thereby define the PR&PP characteristics of the system. This paper summarizes results of applications of the methodology to nuclear energy systems including reprocessing facilities and large and small modular reactors. The use of the methodology in the design phase a facility will be discussed as it applies to future safeguards concepts.},
doi = {},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/1013526},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {2011},
month = {3}
}