SRTC criticality safety technical review of SRT-CMA-930039
Review of SRT-CMA-930039, ``Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE): DWPF Melter-Batch 1,`` December 1, 1993, has been performed by the Savannah River Technical Center (SRTC) Applied Physics Group. The NCSE is a criticality assessment of the Melt Cell in the DWPF. Additionally, this pertains only to Batch 1 operation, which differs from batches to follow. Plans for subsequent batch operations call for fissile material in the Salt Cell feed-stream, which necessitates a separate criticality evaluation in the future. The NCSE under review concludes that the process is safe from criticality events, even in the event that all lithium and boron neutron poisons are lost, provided uranium enrichments are less than 40%. Furthermore, if all the lithium and as much as 98% of the boron would be lost, uranium enrichments of 100% would be allowable. After a thorough review of the NCSE, this reviewer agrees with that conclusion. This technical review consisted of: an independent check of the methods and models employed, independent calculations application of ANSI/ANS 8.1, verification of WSRC Nuclear Criticality Safety Manual({sup 2}) procedures.
- Research Organization:
- Westinghouse Savannah River Co., Aiken, SC (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC09-89SR18035
- OSTI ID:
- 10133403
- Report Number(s):
- SRT-CMA--930069; ON: DE94008276
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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