CREATION OF THE MODEL ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
In 1991, the international nuclear nonproliferation community was dismayed to discover that the implementation of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under its NPT INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement with Iraq had failed to detect Iraq's nuclear weapon program. It was now clear that ensuring that states were fulfilling their obligations under the NPT would require not just detecting diversion but also the ability to detect undeclared materials and activities. To achieve this, the IAEA initiated what would turn out to be a five-year effort to reappraise the NPT safeguards system. The effort engaged the IAEA and its Member States and led to agreement in 1997 on a new safeguards agreement, the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between States and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards. The Model Protocol makes explicit that one IAEA goal is to provide assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The Model Protocol requires an expanded declaration that identifies a State's nuclear potential, empowers the IAEA to raise questions about the correctness and completeness of the State's declaration, and, if needed, allows IAEA access to locations. The information required and the locations available for access are much broader than those provided for under INFCIRC/153. The negotiation was completed in quite a short time because it started with a relatively complete draft of an agreement prepared by the IAEA Secretariat. This paper describes how the Model Protocol was constructed and reviews key decisions that were made both during the five-year period and in the actual negotiation.
- Research Organization:
- BROOKHAVEN NATIONAL LABORATORY (BNL)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/Office Of Nonproliferation & National Security
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC02-98CH10886
- OSTI ID:
- 1001740
- Report Number(s):
- BNL--91421-2010; 2221195
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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Related Subjects
45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
AGREEMENTS
Additional
Creation
IAEA
IMPLEMENTATION
INFORMATION
IRAQ
MATERIALS
MEMBER STATES
Model
NEGOTIATION
NUCLEAR POTENTIAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION
Protocol
REVIEWS
SAFEGUARDS
USES
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION
AGREEMENTS
Additional
Creation
IAEA
IMPLEMENTATION
INFORMATION
IRAQ
MATERIALS
MEMBER STATES
Model
NEGOTIATION
NUCLEAR POTENTIAL
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION
Protocol
REVIEWS
SAFEGUARDS
USES