Evaluating Nonproliferation Bona Fides
Anticipated growth of global nuclear energy in a difficult international security environment heightens concerns that states could decide to exploit their civilian nuclear fuel cycles as a means of acquiring nuclear weapons. Such concerns partly reflect a fundamental tension in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On the one hand, Articles II and III of the NPT clearly prohibit each non-nuclear-weapon state party from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Article IV of the NPT confers the “inalienable right” of Parties to the treaty to “develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes…,” and directs all Parties to “facilitate… the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy…,” and “cooperate in contributing…to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes….” This juxtaposition raises the possibility that a state could exercise its Article IV right to develop a civilian nuclear fuels cycle and then use the equipment, materials and technology to acquire nuclear weapons in violation of its Article II and III obligations.
- Research Organization:
- Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL), Richland, WA (US)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC05-76RL01830
- OSTI ID:
- 1001561
- Report Number(s):
- PNNL-SA-54732; NN4001020
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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