Stability issues in reconstitution by weapon addition
Reconstitution of strategic forces by the unilateral uploading of additional weapons from initially symmetric modest force levels reduces first strike stability. These changes are quantified and traced to changes in first and second strike costs in a model of missile exchanges in which both strikes are optimized analytically.
- Research Organization:
- Los Alamos National Lab. (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Assistant Secretary for Human Resources and Administration, Washington, DC (United States)
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-ENG-36
- OSTI ID:
- 560822
- Report Number(s):
- LA-UR-97-3149; ON: DE98001555; TRN: 98:000305
- Resource Relation:
- Other Information: PBD: Aug 1997
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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