Russian Multi-Domain Strategy against NATO: information confrontation and U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
Western philosophical and moral principles incline strategic thinkers in democratic societies to reject the notion that information can be used as a weapon or a domain of warfare instead of a tool of freedom and truth. International law suggests that the vast majority of societies and governments agree that freedom of information and truth are crucial to healthy societies. In practice, however, there are also governments that perceive them as both a form of strategic deception and as a vulnerability that can be exploited through information operations. An increasingly common dimension of Russian strategy against the United States and its NATO allies and partners is information confrontation [informatsionnoe protivoborstvo], or IPb. Russia actively pursues a strategy of exploiting perceived vulnerabilities of these democratic societies by carrying out informational-technical (e.g., cyber) and informational-psychological operations below the threshold of open military conflict in order to exacerbate pre-existing societal, political, and military divisions, thereby degrading NATO cohesion. The literature on IPb suggests that a key element of this strategy is an effort to create confusion and sow doubt in the existence of truth. Russia has also applied these operations alongside traditional military means of armed conflict in NATO partner states, Georgia and Ukraine, in order to slow down the decision-making processes in those countries as well as throughout the international community. In Georgia and Ukraine, Russia has employed both aspects of IPb to challenge the Westphalian international order and achieve a fait accompli with a limited use of military force. The body of literature dedicated to understanding the role of IPb in Russian strategy has yet to explore its relationship to U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. This topic merits study for at least three reasons. First, Russian strategic thinkers and official strategic documents identify NATO as threat and assign an increased role for asymmetric, indirect, and non-military (including informational) measures in conflict resolution. Second, Russia has historically used IPb against the Alliance with mixed success. In this regard, Soviet active measures [aktivnie meropriyatiya] operations targeting societal, political, and military divisions about NATO nuclear posture in the late 1970s and early 1980s are illuminating. Finally, current Russian practice reflects an effort to propagate disinformation about U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons. This study seeks to contribute to the body of literature on IPb by analyzing the evolution of Russian strategic thought on and practice of IPb in relation to U.S. forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Europe. It explores the following questions: How and under which conditions does Russia employ IPb in an effort to achieve preferred strategic outcomes related to NATO nuclear force structure? What insights about contemporary Russian IPb efforts can be gained from studying Soviet active measures campaigns against NATO nuclear force posture?
- Research Organization:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC52-07NA27344
- OSTI ID:
- 1635758
- Report Number(s):
- LLNL-TR-767588; 957964; TRN: US2201416
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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