skip to main content
OSTI.GOV title logo U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information

Title: The adequacy of current import and export controls on sealed radioactive sources.

Abstract

Millions of sealed radioactive sources (SRSs) are being used for a wide variety of beneficial purposes throughout the world. Security experts are now concerned that these beneficial SRSs could be used in a radiological dispersion device to terrorize and disrupt society. The greatest safety and security threat is from those highly radioactive Category 1 and 2 SRSs. Without adequate controls, it may be relatively easy to legally purchase a Category 1 or 2 SRS on the international market under false pretenses. Additionally, during transfer, SRSs are particularly susceptible to theft since the sources are in a shielded and mobile configuration, transportation routes are predictable, and shipments may not be adequately guarded. To determine if government controls on SRS are adequate, this study was commissioned to review the current SRS import and export controls of six countries. Canada, the Russian Federation, and South Africa were selected as the exporting countries, and Egypt, the Philippines, and the United States were selected as importing countries. A detailed review of the controls in each country is presented. The authors found that Canada and Russia are major exporters, and are exporting highly radioactive SRSs without first determining if the recipient is authorized by the receivingmore » country to own and use the SRSs. Available evidence was used to estimate that on average there are tens to possibly hundreds of intercountry transfers of highly radioactive SRSs each day. Based on these and other findings, this reports recommends stronger controls on the export and import of highly radioactive SRSs.« less

Authors:
; ;  [1];
  1. Beta Corporation, Glendale, AZ
Publication Date:
Research Org.:
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), Albuquerque, NM, and Livermore, CA (United States)
Sponsoring Org.:
USDOE
OSTI Identifier:
918343
Report Number(s):
SAND2003-3767
TRN: US200818%%354
DOE Contract Number:  
AC04-94AL85000
Resource Type:
Technical Report
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English
Subject:
98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; CANADA; CONFIGURATION; EXPORTS; IMPORTS; MARKET; PHILIPPINES; RUSSIAN FEDERATION; SAFETY; SECURITY; SOUTH AFRICA; THEFT; RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS; PROLIFERATION

Citation Formats

Longley, Susan W, Cochran, John Russell, Price, Laura L, and Lipinski, Kendra J. The adequacy of current import and export controls on sealed radioactive sources.. United States: N. p., 2003. Web. doi:10.2172/918343.
Longley, Susan W, Cochran, John Russell, Price, Laura L, & Lipinski, Kendra J. The adequacy of current import and export controls on sealed radioactive sources.. United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/918343
Longley, Susan W, Cochran, John Russell, Price, Laura L, and Lipinski, Kendra J. 2003. "The adequacy of current import and export controls on sealed radioactive sources.". United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/918343. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/918343.
@article{osti_918343,
title = {The adequacy of current import and export controls on sealed radioactive sources.},
author = {Longley, Susan W and Cochran, John Russell and Price, Laura L and Lipinski, Kendra J},
abstractNote = {Millions of sealed radioactive sources (SRSs) are being used for a wide variety of beneficial purposes throughout the world. Security experts are now concerned that these beneficial SRSs could be used in a radiological dispersion device to terrorize and disrupt society. The greatest safety and security threat is from those highly radioactive Category 1 and 2 SRSs. Without adequate controls, it may be relatively easy to legally purchase a Category 1 or 2 SRS on the international market under false pretenses. Additionally, during transfer, SRSs are particularly susceptible to theft since the sources are in a shielded and mobile configuration, transportation routes are predictable, and shipments may not be adequately guarded. To determine if government controls on SRS are adequate, this study was commissioned to review the current SRS import and export controls of six countries. Canada, the Russian Federation, and South Africa were selected as the exporting countries, and Egypt, the Philippines, and the United States were selected as importing countries. A detailed review of the controls in each country is presented. The authors found that Canada and Russia are major exporters, and are exporting highly radioactive SRSs without first determining if the recipient is authorized by the receiving country to own and use the SRSs. Available evidence was used to estimate that on average there are tens to possibly hundreds of intercountry transfers of highly radioactive SRSs each day. Based on these and other findings, this reports recommends stronger controls on the export and import of highly radioactive SRSs.},
doi = {10.2172/918343},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/918343}, journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Wed Oct 01 00:00:00 EDT 2003},
month = {Wed Oct 01 00:00:00 EDT 2003}
}