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Title: Fuel Handling Facility Criticality Safety Calculations

Technical Report ·
DOI:https://doi.org/10.2172/841267· OSTI ID:841267
 [1]
  1. Yucca Mountain Project, Las Vegas, NV (United States)

The purpose of this design calculation is to perform a criticality evaluation of the Fuel Handling Facility (FHF) and the operations and processes performed therein. The current intent of the FHF is to receive transportation casks whose contents will be unloaded and transferred to waste packages (WP) or MGR Specific Casks (MSC) in the fuel transfer bays. Further, the WPs will also be prepared in the FHF for transfer to the sub-surface facility (for disposal). The MSCs will be transferred to the Aging Facility for storage. The criticality evaluation of the FHF features the following: I) Consider the types of waste to be received in the FHF as specified below: 1. Uncanistered commercial spent nuclear fuel (CSNF); 2. Canistered CSNF (with the exception of horizontal dual-purpose canister (DPC) and/or multi-purpose canisters (MPCs)); 3. Navy canistered SNF (long and short); 4. Department of Energy (DOE) canistered high-level waste (HLW); 5. DOE canistered SNF (with the exception of MCOs). II) Evaluate the criticality analyses previously performed for the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-certified transportation casks (under 10 CFR 71) to be received in the FHF to ensure that these analyses address all FHF conditions including normal operations, and Category 1 and 2 event sequences. III) Evaluate FHF criticality conditions resulting from various Category 1 and 2 event sequences. Note that there are currently no Category 1 and 2 event sequences identified for FHF. Consequently, potential hazards from a criticality point of view will be considered as identified in the ''Internal Hazards Analysis for License Application'' document (BSC 2004c, Section 6.6.4). IV) Assess effects of potential moderator intrusion into the fuel transfer bay for defense in depth. The SNF/HLW waste transfer activity (i.e., assembly and canister transfer) that is being carried out in the FHF has been classified as safety category in the ''Q-list'' (BSC 2003, p. A-6). Therefore, this design calculation is subject to the requirements of the ''Quality Assurance Requirements and Description'' (DOE 2004), even though the FHF itself has not yet been classified in the Q-list. Performance of the work scope as described and development of the associated technical product conform to the procedure AP-3.124, ''Design Calculations and Analyses''.

Research Organization:
Yucca Mountain Project, Las Vegas, NV (United States)
Sponsoring Organization:
USDOE National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP)
DOE Contract Number:
AC28-01RW12101
OSTI ID:
841267
Report Number(s):
210-00C-FH00-00400-000-00A; ENG.20040630.0012, DC#42074; TRN: US0600517
Country of Publication:
United States
Language:
English