ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE OF INNOVATIVE NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES.
The National Nuclear Security Administration is developing methods for nonproliferation assessments to support the development and implementation of U.S. nonproliferation policy. This paper summarizes the key results of that effort. Proliferation resistance is the degree of difficulty that a nuclear material, facility, process, or activity poses to the acquisition of one or more nuclear weapons. A top-level measure of proliferation resistance for a fuel cycle system is developed here from a hierarchy of metrics. At the lowest level, intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to proliferation are defined. These barriers are recommended as a means to characterize the proliferation characteristics of a fuel cycle. Because of the complexity of nonproliferation assessments, the problem is decomposed into: metrics to be computed, barriers to proliferation, and a finite set of threats. The spectrum of potential threats of nuclear proliferation is complex and ranges from small terrorist cells to industrialized countries with advanced nuclear fuel cycles. Two general categories of methods have historically been used for nonproliferation assessments: attribute analysis and scenario analysis. In the former, attributes of the systems being evaluated (often fuel cycle systems) are identified that affect their proliferation potential. For a particular system under consideration, the attributes are weighted subjectively. In scenario analysis, hypothesized scenarios of pathways to proliferation are examined. The analyst models the process undertaken by the proliferant to overcome barriers to proliferation and estimates the likelihood of success in achieving a proliferation objective. An attribute analysis approach should be used at the conceptual design level in the selection of fuel cycles that will receive significant investment for development. In the development of a detailed facility design, a scenario approach should be undertaken to reduce the potential for design vulnerabilities. While, there are distinctive elements in each approach, an analysis could be performed that utilizes aspects of each approach.
- Research Organization:
- Brookhaven National Lab. (BNL), Upton, NY (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- DOE/SC/IAEA (US)
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC02-98CH10886
- OSTI ID:
- 812519
- Report Number(s):
- BNL-71329-2003-CP; R&D Project: 04954; NN4001011; TRN: US0303402
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLES, VIENNA (AT), 06/23/2003--06/26/2003; Other Information: PBD: 23 Jun 2003
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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