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Paul E. Zinner

April 1990



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The objective of this study is to analyze: 1) how the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe impacts on the Soviet military presence in this region and on Soviet security interests; 2) how political changes in Eastern Europe and Soviet troop reductions in this area affect the military forces and security interests of individual countries and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO); and 3) how Soviet troop reductions reflect on political and economic relations between the countries affected by these reductions and the USSR. This study is one of a series of planned reports dealing with the causes and effects of military force reductions in Europe.

* * * * *

Background

It has been widely believed in the West that one of the major missions of Soviet troops stationed in Eastern Europe was to secure stability for the Communist regimes by inhibiting or, if need be, suppressing political opposition to them, and also to assure the loyalty of these regimes to Moscow.

A survey of the historic record reveals that the Soviet Union has not consistently maintained troops in all countries simultaneously, and that stationed troops have not always successfully fulfilled the police missions with which they were charged.

Since the founding of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in May 1955, no Soviet troops have been stationed in Bulgaria at all; and there have been no Soviet troops in Romania since 1958, when Khrushchev ordered them removed in response to a request from the Romanian Communist leadership. In Czechoslovakia there were no permanently stationed Soviet troops until August 1968, when a massive invasion force of five WTO member states moved in to suppress reformist tendencies on the part of this country's Communist leadership. Subsequently, five Soviet divisions remained permanently deployed in Czechoslovakia.

Stationed troops were ineffectual in forestalling or combating developments that occurred in Hungary and Poland in October 1956, and again in Poland in 1980-1981. In Hungary, where popular revolt swept away the Communist regime and threatened to lead to the country's defection from the WTO, stationed troops were sporadically and ineffectively engaged during the revolt. Their numbers were simply not sufficient to cope with a national rising. The Soviet Union ultimately mobilized an overwhelming invasion force to crush the insurgency and restore Communist rule.

In Poland, where Soviet military contingents were stationed and a Soviet Marshal of World War II fame (Rokossowski) held the post of Minister of Defense, shifts took place in the personnel of the armed forces, the police, and the central apparatus of the Communist Party (Polish United Workers Party--PUWP), which surprised the Soviet leadership. Caught off guard, it desisted from organizing intervention from the outside and acquiesced in the fait accompli with which it was confronted. In 1980-1981, under

substantially different circumstances, the Soviet Union again refrained from engaging its stationed forces in an effort to quell massive popular challenge to the Communist regime, and also shied away from outside intervention. Instead, it encouraged the Polish military to declare martial law and restore Communist authority.

Thus, except for the German Democratic Republic (GDR), where a far more numerous Soviet military force than in any other East European country succeeded in containing and suppressing a workers' revolt in June 1953, the Soviet Union managed to overcome major internal challenges to Communist power or to avert basic policy shifts on the part of the national Communist parties themselves only by resorting to full-scale military invasion.

Gorbachev's offer of unilateral Soviet troop reductions in Eastern Europe.

In the context of a vastly improved climate of East-West relations, Mikhail Gorbachev, addressing the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988, announced the Soviet government's intention to reduce its military forces within the next two years (1989-1990) by 500,000 troops, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery pieces, and 800 combat aircraft. These reductions included the removal of 50,000 Soviet troops and 5,000 tanks stationed on the territory of East European members of the WTO. They were to be implemented unilaterally and apart from multilateral reductions that might be agreed on in negotiations about conventional forces in Europe (CFE) conducted in Vienna.

Gorbachev spoke of withdrawing "from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary [Poland was added to the list later] six tank-divisions, assault landing troops, and a number of other formations and units, including assault river-crossing forces, with their armaments and combat equipment." [1] All remaining Soviet divisions would be restructured to make them unambiguously defensive. The contingent of tanks at their disposal would be substantially thinned out. His offer was interpreted as a significant initiative intended to give an impetus to the completion of a mandate for the opening of CFE.

Although the importance of Gorbachev's gambit should not be minimized, unilateral Soviet troop reductions in the projected magnitude over a two-year period would not have had a significant impact on individual East European countries. Selective (and unverified) removal of 50,000 troops from a total of approximately 565,000 would constitute a small fraction (8-9%) of the aggregate number of Soviet forces stationed in the region. The quantitative correlation between deployed WTO and NATO troops would be only marginally affected. However, the combat capacity of Soviet troops would be significantly diminished. (For example, the inventory of Soviet tanks would be cut in half.) [2]

Collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.

Unanticipated developments throughout Eastern Europe in the last quarter of 1989 caused the precipitous collapse of Communist regimes in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Romania, as well as substantial modification of the Bulgarian Communist regime. (Po-

land and Hungary had achieved similar transformations gradually.) While unprecedented popular demonstrations actually toppled the regimes, these demonstrations would probably not have taken place (and most likely would not have succeeded so rapidly and easily) without Gorbachev's tacit support. His motives can only be guessed at, but circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that he wanted to rid himself of obstructionist, conservative Communist leaders in Eastern Europe who were thwarting the introduction of perestroika in their countries, and either overtly or covertly were in collusion with conservatives in the Soviet Communist power structure who also oppose his program. Most likely, Gorbachev expected that reform-oriented Communists would replace conservative leaders and would be more supportive of reforms he advocates. Such changes would gain public favor and strengthen the position of Communist parties in their respective countries. This would enhance his chances of success in the Soviet Union and also contribute to further improvement of East-West relations.

In any event, it is unlikely that he foresaw the collapse of the entire Communist structure in Eastern Europe, or still less that he wished to undermine the strategic position of the Soviet Union. He appears to have underestimated the revulsion of feeling among East European populations toward the Communist parties and to have overestimated the ability of these parties to preserve their power in the absence of explicit Soviet backing. Surprised as he might have been, he has taken no action to reverse the "course of history"

in Eastern Europe, as indeed he could not hope to do without risking his credibility with the Western powers and thereby undermining his major foreign policy achievements.

Military Implications of Recent Developments in Eastern Europe

Impact on Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe.

Although it is too early to gauge the full impact that the collapse of Communist regimes will have on the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe, it is clear that Gorbachev's plan for modest, gradual, and selective unilateral withdrawals has lost its relevance.

The Soviet Union confronts different conditions in various countries. To some extent, these conditions reflect dissimilar juridical bases for, and thus different terms and conditions governing, the presence of Soviet troops. In the GDR, Soviet troops--not unlike the U.S. forces in the FRG--have prerogatives that derive from their victory in World War II. This means that the GDR government legally cannot make demands on the Soviet Union to reduce or withdraw its troops. Minor unilateral reduction of Soviet forces might continue throughout 1990. The scope and timing of additional reductions of a force of approximately 380,000 troops will probably be determined in the framework of the Vienna CFE talks. Alternatively, the terms and conditions governing the presence of foreign troops will be negotiated in

separate talks between the two German states and the four victorious World War II powers. For the time being, the Soviet Union is not acting as if it foresaw an abridged stay for its forces in the GDR.

From February 5 to February 11, 1990, Soviet troops and units of the East German National People's Army (NPA) participated in routine joint exercises in several locations on GDR territory. [3] Between March 28 and 30, Soviet, GDR, Czechoslovak, and Polish units took part in tactical air defense training exercises in the GDR. [4]

On March 16, 1990, the USSR and the GDR governments concluded an agreement that sets forth terms of job placement in the GDR economy for family members of Soviet servicemen stationed on GDR territory. [5] Henceforth, family members of Soviet servicemen may seek employment on the GDR labor market. They must obtain consent from the Soviet military command, which is also entitled to initiate procedures for the dissolution of Soviet citizens' labor contracts or temporary work agreements.

The pathbreaking provisions of this pact appear to be designed in part to diminish the isolation of the Soviet military from its social environment and thus, perhaps, to convey the impression that the stay of Soviet troops is not transitory. In part, the addition of Soviet citizens (possibly as many as several thousands) to the labor market may be intended to help alleviate at least marginally the acute "manpower" shortage in the GDR.

In Poland, the juridical bases of the Soviet military presence were established in bilateral negotiations conducted following substantial personnel changes in the leadership and the policies of the Polish Communist Party in October 1956. In the light of recent developments, some provisions of existing agreements--specifically the basic rules governing the use of various types of Polish installations and services--are being redefined. [6] Lech Walesa, the Solidarity leader, has raised the advisability of an early troop withdrawal with the Soviet Ambassador, and the continued Soviet military presence has been protested in numerous street demonstrations. [7] The Polish government, however, has desisted from asking for an immediate reduction or total removal of Soviet troops stationed in their country. The imminence of German unification and the possibility of an attempt by a unified German state to press for a rectification of the post-World War II border on the Oder-Neisse rivers have aroused apprehension in the Polish population. Pending satisfactory resolution of this issue, the presence of Soviet troops is seen as a security guarantee of Poland's territorial integrity. By the same token, vital military interests of the USSR are also served, inasmuch as it retains control over key transportation and communication links with its forces in the GDR.

In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union dictated the terms of its military presence and embodied them in treaties signed in the aftermath of the occupation of these countries by invading forces. Both countries have urgently demanded rapid and complete removal of Soviet troops from their territory.

In the face of manifest insistence and impatience on the part of these countries, the Soviet Union at first resorted to dilatory tactics. It attempted to tie the removal of its troops from Eastern Europe to multilateral force reductions in the framework of a CFE agreement. Moreover, it suggested that withdrawals be completed in a rather extended time frame of five years after the effective date of a second-phase CFE agreement. [8] But the Soviet Union soon abandoned these tactics, entered into direct negotiations, and in short order signed treaties (with Czechoslovakia on February 26, 1990, and Hungary on March 10, 1990). [For treaty texts, see Appendix]

In the case of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union on December 4, 1989, explicitly acknowledged the illegality of its intervention in 1968 and thus repudiated the juridical basis of its military presence. With respect to the 1956 intervention in Hungary, the Soviet Union has not yet made a similar admission. Nevertheless, it has negotiated with the two countries for substantially identical terms. These stipulate that by June 30, 1991, all troops (73,500 and 49,700, respectively), support personnel, family members, armaments and supplies (ammunition, fuel, etc.) will be withdrawn from both countries.

The Soviet command began removal operations by rail in Czechoslovakia one day (February 27) and in Hungary two days (March 12) after treaty signing. Summary results from Czechoslovakia of progress from February 27 through March 30 show that 5,372 troops, 338 tanks, 350 armored infantry-fighting vehicles,

1,572 trucks, and 91 self-propelled artillery pieces (of greater than 100 mm caliber) have left the country. [9]

Rapid as it is, the process of troop removal is bound to make inroads on the normal performance of military functions by units that temporarily remain in the country. In quick succession, they will be preoccupied with preparations for orderly withdrawal. Still, not all troops have been affected immediately. Plans for joint exercises with Czechoslovak national forces in March 1990 have been adhered to (as they have in the GDR). [10] Scheduled military construction projects, however, have been suspended. In Hungary, the Soviet command has not yet cancelled the customary troop rotation in the spring, although Hungarian authorities have requested that military activities be curtailed during the period of troop removals. [Article 4 of the Soviet-Hungarian treaty on troop removals states that "the training and combat activity of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the Hungarian Republic--including flights--will be limited."]

Impact on Soviet security interests.

Substantially if not yet completely abandoning its military glacis in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union will clearly lose a valuable asset which it has had since the termination of World War II. It will be denied the use of a staging area either for offensive or for defensive military operations. Perhaps this will not have a crucial bearing on its military security, at

least as long as the current climate which de-emphasizes the adversarial aspects of East-West relations prevails. But it is unlikely that all strata of the Soviet population view with equanimity this turn of events, whereby the Soviet Union is driven back to its national borders, albeit these for the time being continue to reflect wartime annexation of territory (as in the case of former German, Polish, Czechoslovak, and Romanian areas). Given deeply entrenched feelings of encirclement by enemies, the situation in which the Soviet Union finds itself is bound to arouse feelings of anxiety and resentment against those who can be most obviously blamed with responsibility for the perceived, if not actual, diminution of the Soviet Union's security.

While the overwhelming majority of civilian commentators soft-pedal the negative aspects of the aforementioned developments, some civilians--among them leading conservative Communist officials--and a growing number of military officers express apprehension and bitterness about increasing numbers of instances in Eastern Europe manifesting hostility toward members of the Soviet armed forces; hardships faced particularly by returning officers and their families for whom no living quarters and school facilities are available; unanticipated expenses to provide for the needs of officers who are forced out of the service; and, last but not least, losses of wartime gains which were attained at the cost of horrendous material and human sacrifice. Sagging morale among the military is especially aggravated by the necessity to abandon forward positions and dismantle experienced, high quality combat units.

Impact on East European military forces and security interests.

The effect of political changes and Soviet troop withdrawals on East European military forces and security interests has not yet made itself fully felt. National responses have not crystallized and they have tended to vary somewhat among different countries. The general trend seems to favor a diminution in the size of armed forces, a reduction of the military budget, and a shortening of the compulsory time of service of conscripts.

In mid-1989, General Mikhail Moiseyev, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and USSR Deputy Minister of Defense, summarized these reductions in indigenous national personnel and budgetary savings as follows: [11]

Country	Bulgaria	Czechoslovakia	GDR	Hungary	Poland	Romania
Personnel (1000s)	10.0	12.0	10.0	9.3	40.0	5(%)
Savings (% of defense budget)	12.0	15.0	10.0	17	2.2	5

It is doubtful that the East European countries reached their decisions to cut military forces under duress. Following the political upheavals throughout Eastern Europe in late 1989, Hungary announced its intention to execute an additional 35% cut in troop strength by 1992 [12], and declared that the length of the compulsory military service period will be limited to 12 months, beginning August 1990. [13] Czechoslovakia has adopted legislation to shorten the compulsory service period from two years to 18 months, and will undertake a "further" cut of 10% in defense expenditures. [14] The GDR, in turn, is experiencing an

involuntary reduction in the size of the NPA. Reportedly, thousands of soldiers (the exact number has not been reliably ascertained) have simply left their units and deserted. Their whereabouts are unknown, and no particular effort seems to be underway to locate them and return them to their posts. By contrast, Poland at this point does not contemplate reductions beyond the total of 40,000 that will be attained by the end of 1990. Similarly, the military budget, which has been cut by 30% in the past three years (1988-1990), will also level off. The Polish Defense Minister, General Florian Sivicki, cites concerns about the size and adequacy of the military under existing circumstances. He claims that the numerical ratio between current Polish forces and the Bundeswehr is less favorable than the ratio that existed between Poland and the "Hitlerite Reich" in 1939. [15]

Clearly, Poland is concerned about a potential Western (that is, German) threat to its security. No other country seems to be equally perturbed. Nor is there particularly acute apprehension about a military threat from the East, although the irreversibility of Soviet military policy is not taken for granted. The main reason why Czechoslovakia and Hungary want to hasten completion of the removal of all Soviet troops is the fear that an aggravation of internal conditions in the Soviet Union could cause a change of leadership there and give rise to a hardening of policies.

There are no ironclad safeguards against a suspension of withdrawals, nor against a future attempt at reentry of Soviet troops. In the final analysis, the East European countries'

immunity from invasion from the East is largely contingent upon the political will of the Soviet Union. This in turn is likely to be substantially influenced by the prevailing climate of East-West relations. Under certain circumstances, the reintroduction of troops in Eastern Europe would be counterproductive, in that the damage to broader Soviet interests could more than offset any advantage that could be gained in Eastern Europe.

Perhaps the greatest threat to the security of East European countries arises from the assertion of the individuality of each nation. Resurgent nationalism has rekindled traditional national rivalries and hostilities. A major source of conflict is the status of national minorities. The most acute case is that of the Hungarian minority in Romania. The status of Hungarians in Slovakia causes frictions between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. German minority groups in Romania, Hungary, and especially in Poland are also asserting themselves, causing domestic unrest and possible conflict with Germany, which has strong traditional propensities for championing the cause of its nationals abroad. Tensions between Germany and Poland are not entirely a figment of paranoid Polish imagination. Nor can one fully believe the staunch assertions of Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovakia's recently elected non-Communist President, that he does not anticipate Germany's making claims on the Sudetenland (the border zone rimming Bohemia which was annexed by Hitler in 1938 and returned to Czechoslovakia after World War II, whereupon Germans living in this area were forcibly expelled). The stabilizing influence of Soviet military power may yet be missed in the event of armed

aggression against an East European country by one or another of its neighbors.

Impact on Warsaw Treaty Organization.

Changes in power configurations in Eastern Europe have profoundly affected the existence of WTO. Many people question its survivability under the new conditions which have arisen. Actually, so far no member state has withdrawn, although attitudes toward continued membership vary widely.

The GDR is unlikely to have a free choice as long as key issues concerning German unification and the status of a unified German state (affiliation with NATO; split affiliation of the Western and Eastern parts of Germany between NATO and WTO; non-affiliation with either alliance) remain unresolved. Bulgaria, where no Soviet troops are stationed, has not questioned the rationale of its WTO membership. Similarly, Romania--which under its Communist dictator, Nicolae Ceausescu, often found itself at odds with WTO policy--has not put in question its adherence to the alliance. Poland currently finds that its security interests are well served by continuing membership in WTO. (In November 1989, when the non-Communist Prime Minister of Poland, Thadeusz Mazowiecki, held policy talks in Moscow, it was rumored that Soviet leaders "coerced" him to sign a pledge of loyalty to WTO.) But the country's President, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, a Communist, has made no commitment about his country's disposition toward WTO in the event that its security interests are adequately protected by broad international treaty. Czechoslovak

President Havel has explained that his country's continued membership in WTO bespeaks a desire not to be deprived of opportunities to influence the evolution of the alliance (and the dissolution of both military alliances in Europe). [16] Hungary's position toward WTO membership is ambiguous. Its interim Communist Foreign Minister, Gyula Horn, has intimated that he did not consider some sort of Hungarian affiliation with NATO in the future out of the question, and perhaps not even incompatible with WTO membership. [17] Right-wing politicians, in turn, are claiming that Prime Minister Imre Nagy's declaration repudiating the Warsaw Treaty and affirming Hungary's neutrality, which he issued at the height of revolutionary upheaval on November 1, 1956, has never lost its legal validity. [18]

Irrespective of the stance Hungary may take, WTO cannot be preserved in its old form. A new framework for its existence has to be developed. Clearly, time has been too short and circumstances too chaotic to work out a comprehensive overhaul. Major changes of purpose shifting the main area of WTO concerns from the military to the political sphere (transforming it from a military-political into a political-military organization) will have to be effected, and the manner in which WTO business is conducted will have to change from a command to a consultative mode. Membership will have to be voluntary, for it is unlikely that the Soviet Union could successfully coerce any member state to remain in the organization against its will.

Of particular importance among issues to be resolved are: the place and authority of the Joint Command structure, which

seemed to be the most effective feature of WTO; the relationship between the Joint Command and individual country national defense establishments; jurisdiction over troops in peacetime and in the event of war; and so forth. None of the East European countries wants to continue to subordinate its armed forces to the Joint Command, which is properly regarded as a Soviet tool and whose agencies represent direct Soviet influence in the member states. As a first step, newly constituted governments in each country wasted no time in removing from office the old Minister of Defense.

Similarly, new channels of communication have to be developed, since until recently Communist parties were the conduits for WTO decision-making. Henceforth this will be neither satisfactory nor really feasible. Decision-making and multilateral as well as bilateral communications will have to be conducted on a government-to-government basis. Trial balloons for WTO reorganization began to emerge from the Soviet Union in the fall of 1989. One proposed the creation of an international general secretariat headquartered either in Warsaw, Budapest, or Prague. [19]

On March 17, 1990, the Foreign Ministers of all WTO countries held a consultative meeting in Prague. According to Eduard Shevardnadze, "it was the first meeting of this kind after the major changes in Eastern Europe." [20] He described the discussions as "frank and constructive," terms which--in the Soviet vacabulary--usually connote that discussions were less than friendly. Shevardnadze acknowledged that on the key issue of Germany's future, "opinions and approaches differed . . . .

There was no unanimity on the adherence of a united Germany to blocs." Indeed, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland favored admission of a united German state into NATO.

As far as "the necessity of improving the mechanism of cooperation" in WTO is concerned, the Soviet Foreign Minister said:

> In many aspects now we have good cooperation, even better than before. As a result of work conducted by experts, we practically agreed on formulations related to the activity of the Political Consultative Committee, the Committees of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense. A mutually beneficial solution was adopted on the issue of appointing the Commander-in-Chief, cooperation among political and other organs, and other issues. . . . We also talked significantly about revitalizing WTO and increasing the share of political cooperation within it. . . . We have more things in common than things that divide us, even if there is no complete trust in our relations. For this we need time and personal contacts." [21]

Considering that Shevardnadze's mission increasingly appears to consist of conveying upbeat assessments about contentious and complex international issues, his characterization of the state of affairs in WTO cannot be taken as overly optimistic. But at least the first two-thirds of his conclusion that "WTO is alive, functioning and its existence is necessary" can be accepted at face value. Colonel General Igor Sergeyev, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Strategic Rocket Forces, holds a different view. According to him, "The changes in WTO--including the withdrawal of Soviet troops from allied territories--will be a loss for us from a military viewpoint and will shift the danger of war toward Soviet borders. . . . All considerations of replacing a military-political treaty with a political-military one . . . [are] only a play on words." [22]

Political and Economic Repercussions of Soviet Troop Reductions in Eastern Europe

Political repercussions on relations between East European countries and the Soviet Union.

In the light of Soviet military intrusions experienced by East European countries, it is noteworthy that the tumultuous public demonstrations that were instrumental in toppling Communist regimes remained free of public agitation against the Soviet Union. Apart from isolated attacks on Soviet military installations and personnel and scattered instances of desecration of Soviet monuments in the GDR, no clashes between aroused citizens and the Soviet military occurred. Notwithstanding minor transgressions, which are attributable to small extremist groups or simply to casually formed bands of rowdies acting on momentary impulse in emotionally charged situations, citizens from all walks of life who filled public squares and marched along traditional parade routes in awesome numbers displayed exemplary self-discipline vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

The absence of confrontation between the public and Soviet military as well as civilian representatives was due in no small measure to the distance which Gorbachev put between himself and national Communist leaders, who stubbornly resisted the introduction in their countries of perestroika-like reforms. In the existing situation, the Soviet leader and the East European peoples were in a sort of tacit alliance against common foes, assisting each other in achieving their respective objectives.

Under his orders, the Soviet military remained on the sidelines and allowed domestic developments to take their course. The possibility of Soviet military intervention arose only in Romania, where widespread violence accompanied the ouster of the Communist dictator Ceausescu. With the absence of Soviet stationed troops in Romania, intervention would have had to be undertaken by forces from outside the country. For a short time, many people in Romania and abroad speculated that if a Soviet invasion took place, its purpose would be to support the people's struggle against the armed agents of tyrannical Communist regime. The validity of such speculation has remained untested because the Romanian military switched sides and tipped the scales in favor of the people. The sentiments of the Soviet leadership were revealed when Gorbachev jubilantly announced Ceausescu's fall before a session of the Congress of People's Deputies, and the assembled legislators responded with a standing ovation.

Since the ouster from power of Communist regimes, the public mood has changed drastically. Its hostility has been directed mainly against the Soviet military and other symbols of Soviet power. Anti-Soviet sentiments have been quite virulent in the GDR, where neo-Nazi gangs have rampaged in several localities, but no country has been free of incidents. Even in Czechoslovakia, which has a historic tradition of peaceable behavior, the population has expressed its irritation through posters denouncing the presence of Soviet troops, street demonstrations, and

alleged altercations between towns people and troops in localities with a heavy Soviet troop concentration.

Pent-up grievances arising from an accumulation of unavoidable frictions between the population and the foreign military are being suddenly released, for it has become possible to air complaints without fear of reprisals. Specific sources of popular dissatisfaction have received nationwide attention through publication or commentary in the media. They involve frequent military road marches, low-altitude and helicopter training flights, ecological damage inflicted on the environment, personal injuries, and fatalities [in 1989 six people are said to have died due to traffic accidents]. (Incidents of this nature are familiar to U.S. troops stationed in the FRG.) Judging by its behavior, there has been a radical turnabout in the feelings of the Czechoslovak citizenry. Basic attitudes toward the USSR used to be quite friendly, but have now become highly skeptical, suspicious, and inimical. President Havel's effort to picture Czechoslovakia's relations with the Soviet Union as friendly and even better than before [presumably under the Communist regime] have fallen on deaf ears with the population and have not struck a sympathetic chord with members of the Federal Assembly (the nation's parliament). The Assembly adopted a unanimous resolution appealing to the government to declare the treaty of October 16, 1968, on the temporary stay of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak territory, invalid from its date of signing. It also condemned the Assembly then in office for ratifying the treaty just two days after signing.

The Hungarian-Soviet agenda is burdened by several issues, including Hungary's deep dissatisfaction with major aspects of its trade with the Soviet Union (terms of trade, delivery schedules, Soviet indebtedness). Still, difficulties surrounding the presence and removal of Soviet troops are the primary source of Hungarian concerns.

Hungary's Foreign Minister Gyula Horn angered conservative politicians who felt that he did not pursue national objectives aggressively enough in negotiating the time-frame of troop withdrawals with the Soviet Union. When it became certain that a treaty would be signed in Moscow, a three-man team of observers from conservative parties accompanied Horn to gain first-hand information about the progress of negotiations and the terms of the proposed treaty. These observers were very critical about the outcome of the negotiations. They were disturbed by what they perceived to be favoritism shown by the Soviet Union toward Czechoslovakia. As evidence of favoritism, they considered the Soviet Union's: 1) disavowing the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 while refusing to acknowledge any wrongdoing against Hungary in 1956; 2) signing of a treaty with Czechoslovakia two weeks earlier than with Hungary; and 3) setting the date of completion of withdrawals from Czechoslovakia for June 30, 1991, two months ahead of Hungary. By offering to purchase quantities of fuel and lubricants from the Soviet military (the removal of which would have required the use of 264 freight trains or the equivalent of two months' worth of transportation) and by allowing the sale in Hungary of the storage tanks that held the fuel and lubricants,

the Hungarians ultimately prevailed on the Soviet Union to agree to a termination date identical with that for Czechoslovakia.

But Vaclav Havel's reference to a verbal agreement between him and Gorbachev about the possible acceleration of troop removals--so that the last Soviet soldier might leave Czechoslovakia as early as February 26, 1991, the anniversary of the signing of the treaty on troop removals [23]--further perturbed Hungarians who consider it a matter of national pride to have withdrawals from their country completed by March 15, the date of their great patriotic holiday commemorating the anniversary of their abortive revolution of 1848. [24]

The nature of these grievances may seem frivolous. Yet they are shared by leaders of the Hungarian Democratic Forum (Magyar Demokratikus Forum--MDF), a political group that won a commanding plurality of the votes in parliamentary elections held on April 8, 1990, and as such will dominate the newly formed government. Under MDF leadership, the Hungarian government may be expected to press for the reopening of talks with the Soviet Union to set a new, still faster time-table for troop withdrawals. The MDF may also seek the Soviet Union's rescinding the treaty on the temporary stay of Soviet troops which Hungary was coerced to accept in May 1957. In the opinion of MDF leaders, this treaty lacks legal validity because it violates provisions contained in the Hungarian Peace Treaty signed in Paris in 1947. The disposition of the MDF in these matters suggests that Hungarian-Soviet (and possibly Hungarian-Czechoslovak) relations will be conducted in an emotionally charged atmosphere, at least in the near term. In

dealing with these matters, the forbearance of the Soviet Union is bound to be severely tested.

Economic repercussions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

Soviet troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe are in large part limited to the removal of the entire Soviet military force (personnel, armaments, and materiel) from Czechoslovakia and Hungary within a period of 18 months. To carry out this task, Soviet planners have to mobilize scarce resources (railway equipment, funds, and housing) without advance notice. At the beginning of 1990, they had no idea that they would confront a logistical operation of this magnitude. Troop removals in accordance with planned unilateral reductions were to be of modest proportions. From Hungary, 6,000 troops, 120 tanks, approximately 180 artillery pieces, over 40 jet planes, and more than 400 trucks were slated to be withdrawn in 1990. [25] Exact figures were not publicly announced for Czechoslovakia, but they were probably of comparable size.

Under the terms of treaties, the Soviet Union has obligated itself to remove about 70 percent of all the troops and materiel resources by the end of 1990 and the rest during the first six months of 1991. This includes in Hungary 49,700 soldiers (of whom one-third are professional military and two-thirds conscripts), 50,000 civilian support staff and family members, 860 tanks, 600 self-propelled artillery pieces, 27,146 various types of combat vehicles, 18,000 trucks and materiel (including ammunition and fuel) in excess of 600,000 tons. [26] From Czechoslo-

vakia, 73,500 soldiers, 57,000 support staff and family members, 1,260 tanks, 2,505 armed personnel carriers, 1,218 artillery pieces and an unspecified amount of equipment and ammunition will be removed. [27]

Soviet spokesmen have estimated that to carry out the entire operation, they will need 2,029 train loads from Hungary and upward of 1,500 train loads from Czechoslovakia. The reason for the discrepancy between the two countries is that although the number of troops is greater in Czechoslovakia, there is much more equipment and ammunition in Hungary. Just to provide the rolling stock (engines, freight, and passenger cars) will impose a hardship because of chronic shortages in the Soviet Union. Yet there appears to be no alternative to rail transport. The cost of airlifting would be prohibitive; the use of motor transport would tear up roads; and neither Yugoslavia nor Romania gave permission for military transports on the Danube.

Soviet military spokesmen have warned about the possibility of a breakdown in the schedule, since an uninterrupted supply of rolling stock has to be made available throughout the entire period of troop removals and the facilities are very limited at the border station at Chop, where loads have to be transferred from regular-gauge rails (in Czechoslovakia and Hungary) to broad-gauge rails (in the USSR). [28]

While transportation schedules in Czechoslovakia and Hungary are likely to be disrupted at least occasionally and damage to rails is likely to occur, the inconvenience and costs to these countries will be negligible compared to those incurred by the

Soviet Union. In addition to the transport of the military forces, provision will have to be made for appropriate garrisons for the returning troops and their equipment. Apartments, schools, kindergartens, and recreational facilities will have to be provided for about 30,000 officers and warrant officers and their families. Given the chronic housing shortage and woefully inadequate consumer services, the prospect is dim that these unexpected needs can be met. Colonel General B. Omelichev, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, estimated that it will require capital investments of half-a-billion rubles just to take care of the troops returning from Hungary. [29] The Ministry of Defense is not in a position to resolve the problem, for which--among other things--no budgetary allocations have been made.

Aside from the hardships attendant upon the transport of troops, other costs will undoubtedly be incurred; and a cost accounting will have to be made of fiscal obligations that have accumulated during the long stay of Soviet troops on Czechoslovak and Hungarian territory. Soviet representatives have steadfastly maintained that their country bore all expenses in connection with the stationing of troops. Czechoslovak and Hungarian citizens, by and large, have been under the impression that their countries had to bear the full cost of Soviet "occupation." Both treaties contain provisions for the signatories to compensate each other for their expenses. Joint commissions are set up for the purposes of ascertaining outstanding debts and reconciling any discrepancies. It is difficult to determine at this stage

who will end up with the greater share of the fiscal burden. Real estate leased to Soviet troops (barracks, residential, office, and other buildings and structures; test ranges; airfields; etc.) will be returned to the home country "in its technical state on the day of transfer." Facilities constructed by Soviet troops or purchased by them will have to be paid for in fair market value prices, considering their condition and usefulness. In Hungary, Soviet forces claim that they are returning 100 billion Forints ($160 million) worth of assets to Hungarian ownership. At the same time, the Soviet Union is asking Hungary to pay 45 billion Forints for real property which Soviet forces constructed. Hungarians hold this claim to be exorbitant. They say it is more than offset by unpaid rent for the use of Hungarian-built apartments; free medical treatment received by Soviet soldiers and their dependents, in the amount of approximately 500-600 million Forints per year; and the cost of top-to-bottom repair to 15,000 apartments in which Soviet families lived. [30]

Roughly similar problems have arisen in Czechoslovakia. Clearly, misunderstandings about outstanding fiscal obligations are powerful sources of mutual irritation. Although such irritations are likely to subside after troop removals are completed, they will leave behind a residue of ill feelings. Right or wrong, both Czechoslovakia and Hungary claim that the presence of Soviet troops has cost them heavily, quite aside from the psychic burden which it imposed on them. [31]

Observations and Conclusions

What Gorbachev launched in December 1988 as a cautious and controlled program of unilateral troop reductions, which would not upset stability nor diminish Soviet influence in Eastern Europe, has become (as a consequence of political upheavals for which he was the catalyst but which acquired their own dynamism and led to results neither desired nor anticipated by him) a hasty military retreat with farreaching consequences for the Soviet Union. However one evaluates the military impact of large-scale removal of Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, one cannot escape the conclusion that a sizable area of considerable strategic importance has ceased being available for the deployment of Soviet troops. Mutatis mutandis, this is a net loss.

Although lines of communication and supply routes linking the Soviet Union with its forces in the GDR remain open, the status of this contingent of 380,000 troops has drastically changed. To all intents and purposes, they have lost their military usefulness. Instead of being the spearhead of a force poised for attack if necessary, these forces are, as it were, hostages in an unfriendly environment. The Soviet military's Chief-of-Staff, General Mikhail Moiseyev, has reflected about these realities without having an appropriate policy recommendation for his civilian superiors. The most pressing problem for the Soviet Union will be to find a way gracefully to extricate these troops from their predicament. Judging by the Czechoslovak

and Hungarian precedents, the orderly removal of nearly 400,000 troops and their gear is an operation that cannot be carried out in less than four years. Hence, Soviet policy concerning troop reductions under the CFE or some other forum is likely to be motivated by an effort to gain time and, if possible, to extract some price from the NATO powers and avoid the ignominy of capitulating, that is, going away empty-handed from the negotiating table.

Undoubtedly, Soviet behavior in the CFE talks will be predicated on the goal of folding involuntary, unilateral troop removals into the framework of internationally agreed multilateral force reductions. This is bound to delay rather than hasten the attainment of results in the Vienna CFE negotiations.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the Soviet Union's policy on the control and reduction of conventional military forces was comprehensively projected for a five-to-ten-year period, that is, until 2000. In a document filed with the United Nations in December 1989, the Soviet Union indicated that it intended to withdraw gradually all its military contingents stationed outside its national borders (not only in Eastern Europe)--currently some 627,500 strong--and to return them home by the year 2000. If, as it seems likely, plans of this nature were in effect worked out, the Soviet Union would find it difficult to adapt readily to a different timetable, but that is precisely the task which it confronts because of the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe.

At present, the deterioration of the Soviet Union's military position in Eastern Europe does not endanger its basic national security interests. The prevailing climate of East-West relations does not contain the threat of resurgent confrontation that would jeopardize the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union. But perhaps that is not the issue. No self-respecting country can entrust its security to the goodwill of others. The Soviet Union has lost definite advantages; it has had to dismantle forward positions which have given it a flexibility of maneuver. The geographic area which it dominated has been denied to it. Its defense begins on its own borders, and any offensive designs it may have in the future will have to be put in action from a peripheral vantage.

Similarly, the WTO, which has been the most effective instrument at its disposal for the exercise of hegemonial control over Eastern Europe, has ceased to serve this purpose. Nor is the organization usable for joint military purposes under existing conditions. Its military as well as its political structure has to be fundamentally overhauled, and the prevailing <u>modus operandi</u> among its members has to be adjusted to conform to new realities. Questions concerning military cooperation have not yet been broached, let alone resolved. This does not mean that the WTO will necessarily be disbanded in the near term. Its member states might find it useful to remain within the organization during the process of CFE talks. Some might even be tempted to stay in the WTO by the opportunity to bring influence to bear on, and temper the policies of, the Soviet Union.

Most East European countries are not concerned that by ridding themselves of the Soviet military presence they run the risk of adversely affecting their security interests. With the exception of Poland, they are not apprehensive about an encroachment from the West on their territorial integrity; and the possibility of intrusion from the East, while not totally eliminated, is vastly diminished. This does not mean that they are free of any danger of aggression against them. With their emancipation from Soviet hegemony, they have put themselves at the risk of potential conflict with a neighboring state. While the Soviet-enforced regional integration was only skin-deep, it kept the lid on national rivalries and provided for regional stability. In the absence of this stabilizing force, traditional ethnic rivalries have indeed flared up; unless they soon subside as the emotional exuberance of newly acquired sovereignty wears off, the East European region may revert to a pattern of hostile interaction among individual countries, which will not serve anyone's interests.

The political and economic consequences attendant upon the removal of troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary, though not insignificant, are not likely to be either serious or long lasting. They do constitute a momentary aggravation of relations between the two East European countries and the Soviet Union. There is more at stake than the physical removal of "occupation troops," for this is how the population has viewed them. Both Czechoslovakia and Hungary want rehabilitation in the sense of having the trumped-up juridical bases for their occupation by

foreign troops rescinded. They want the Soviet Union to recant. As for the economic burdens, surely both countries feel that they deserve and would like to obtain compensation from the Soviet Union for the tangible costs that were imposed on them by occupying forces. It is doubtful that the Soviet Union will meet their demands, especially since it will have to bear heavy costs for removing its troops, at a time of great economic strain in the country and without advance provision for these outlays.

Plans for orderly reductions in Soviet armed forces did not include such large numbers of troops stationed in Eastern Europe. Military units returning from there will probably not be demobilized, and appropriate quarters will have to be found for over 120,000 military personnel. For the Soviet Union--especially at present--this is an unwelcome, major expenditure. The absence of proper facilities, in turn, is likely to exacerbate resentment which at least the professional military probably feel about the implications of every aspect of their retreat from abroad, not just for themselves but their country. Growing resentment among a country's military personnel is probably an unavoidable corollary of the loss of empire. A disgruntled military is not likely to tip the scales of power and decisively influence the direction of change in the Soviet Union. But it may be an important contributing factor to internal tensions and frictions and, at a given moment, could play a vital role in determining the country's future.

FOOTNOTES

1. "M.S. Gorbachev's Address at the United Nations Organization," Pravda, Moscow: December 8, 1988, pp. 1, 2.

2. Philip Karber, "The Military Impact of the Gorbachev Reductions," Armed Forces Journal International, January 1989, pp. 54-64.

3. FBIS-EEU-90-023, February 2, 1990, p. 33.

4. FBIS-EEU-90-060, March 28, 1990, p. 1.

5. Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow: March 21, 1990, p. 3; English text in FBIS-SOV-90-059, March 27, 1990, pp. 39-40.

6. Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow: March 7, 1990, p. 3; English text in FBIS-SOV-90-045, March 7, 1990, pp. 29-30.

7. Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moscow: March 7, 1990, p. 3; English text in FBIS-SOV-90-047, March 9, 1990, p. 20.

8. Jan Reifenberg, "Moscow Favors Removal of Foreign Troops from Eastern and Western Europe in Five Years," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), January 30, 1990, p. 2.

9. FBIS-SOV-90-063, April 2, 1990, p. 15.

10. FBIS-EEU-90-047, March 9, 1990, p. 29.

11. Mikhail Moiseyev, "Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments--a Guarantee of Security for All," International Affairs #9 (English edition), Moscow: 1989, pp. 3-12.

12. FBIS-EEU-90-051, March 15, 1990, p. 32.

13. FBIS-EEU-90-057, March 23, 1990, p. 48.

14. FBIS-EEU-90-042, March 2, 1990, pp. 25-26.

15. FBIS-EEU-90-049, March 13, 1990, pp. 46-47.

16. FBIS-EEU-90-054, March 20, 1990, p. 20.

17. FBIS-EEU-90-036, February 22, 1990, pp. 48-49.

18. "Telegram from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Hungary, Nagy, to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Hammarskjold, November 1, 1956," Paul E. Zinner, ed., National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe, Columbia University Press, New York: 1956, p. 462. (The operative sentence in Prime Minister Nagy's message was: "The Hungarian Government immediately repudiates the Warsaw Treaty and at the same time declares Hungary's neutrality.")

FOOTNOTES (continued)

19. Mikhail Bezrukov and Andrej Kortunov, "What Kind of Alliance Do We Need? Prospects for the Development of the Warsaw Pact," New Times (English edition), #41, Moscow: October 10-16, 1989, pp. 7-9.

20. FBIS-SOV-90-062, March 30, 1990, p. 3.

21. loc. cit

22. FBIS-SOV-90-043, March 5, 1990, p. 5.

23. Die Welt, Hamburg: March 10, 1990, p. 7; English translation in FBIS-EEU-90-048, March 12, 1990, p. 13.

24. FBIS-SOV-90-048, March 12, 1990, p. 31.

25. FBIS-SOV-89-249, December 29, 1989, p. 1.

26. FBIS-EEU-90-046, March 8, 1990, p. 38.

27. FBIS-SOV-90-063, April 2, 1990, pp. 28-29.

28. FBIS-SOV-90-039, February 27, 1990, p. 31.

29. FBIS-SOV-90-056, March 22, 1990, pp. 23-24.

30. FBIS-EEU-90-048, March 12, 1990, p. 45.

31. Major General Svetozar Nadovic, the chief representative appointed by the Czechoslovak Defense Ministry to the joint Czechoslovak-Soviet commission to oversee the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, holds the opinion that "their presence cost Czechoslovakia a lot of money." It will be his task to determine how much.

FBIS-EEU-90-057, March 23, 1990, p. 18.

APPENDIX

Agreement on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops Temporarily Stationed on the Territory of Czechoslovakia

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, taking into consideration the statement issued by the Czechoslovak Government on December 3, 1989, and the statement issued by the Soviet Government on December 4, 1989, including their legal aspects, motivated by an attempt to develop traditional friendship and cooperation between the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics while thoroughly adhering to the principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter, including the principles of respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, confirming their firm resolve to comprehensively assist in the strengthening of peace, stability, and security in Europe and throughout the world, and expressing their desire to adhere to the undertakings resulting from the Warsaw Pact Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955, have agreed to the following:

Article 1

1. The complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic* will taken place in stages; the first stage will be completed by May 31, 1990, the second stage by December 31, 1990, and the third stage by June 30, 1991.

2. During the first stage, the withdrawal of a substantial part of the Soviet troops will be completed in harmony with the jointly drafted timetable.

Article 2

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic will provide the Soviet side with the necessary cooperation during the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Article 3

During the period prior to the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the principles in existence when this agreement was reached--including property, financial, and other issues--with regard to appropriate changes in conditions for the mutual settling of accounts and mutual payments, will apply to these troops.

Article 4

The sides will appoint commissioners for matters connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops who will resolve practical issues resulting from the implementation of the appropriate stipulations of this agreement.

Article 5

Property and financial issues occurring in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops will be considered by the commissioners for matters connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops, and will be resolved by agreements between the appropriate ministries of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Article 6

Property and financial issues associated with Soviet troops in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, not revised prior to the period of their complete withdrawal, will be dealt with by a special agreement between the sides, by an agreement that will be reached no later than two years from the date that this agreement becomes valid.

Article 7

This agreement is valid from the date it is signed.

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*Since the signing of the treaty, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has ceased to exist as a legal entity. The country's new (double) name is Czechoslovak Federative Republic (in Czech) and Czecho-slovak Federative Republic (in Slovak).

Agreement on the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops Temporarily Stationed on the Territory of the Hungarian Republic

Guided by their efforts to develop the friendly and good-neighborly relations between the Hungarian Republic and the USSR and consistently adhering to the basic principles of international law stipulated in the UN Statute and in the CSCE Final Document, including adherence to the principle of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, the Government of the Hungarian Republic and the Government of the USSR (the two sides) regard the withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary as an organic part of their joint efforts to strengthen European and international confidence and security, and have agreed on the following:

Article 1

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic will commence on March 12, 1990, and will be completed by June 30, 1991.

To be withdrawn are the entire personnel of the Soviet troops, including the Soviet civilian employees and their weapons, combat equipment, and materiel.

The appendix of this agreement contains the schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic, and this appendix is an integral part of this agreement.

Article 2.

The Government of the Hungarian Republic will contribute to guaranteeing the conditions necessary for implementing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary's territory.

Article 3

Transportation of Soviet troops and the elimination of various materials and waste remaining in Hungary will be carried out while taking into consideration the interests of the civilian population and observing the regulations for environmental protection.

Article 4

The training and combat activity of the Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the Hungarian Republic--including flights--will be limited.

Article 5

The two sides will nominate their representatives to guarantee the implementation of this agreement, to supervise the orderly withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic, and to register, evaluate, hand over, or sell the various installations and materials by coordinated methods.

Article 6

Until the final withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic, the legal status of the Soviet troops, and the property law, financial, and other issues concerning the temporary deployment of Soviet troops in Hungary will be determined by the agreement on the legal status of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic signed between the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Government of the USSR on May 27, 1957, as well as by the stipulations of other valid Hungarian-Soviet agreements.

Article 7

The property, financial, and other economic issues concerning the withdrawal of Soviet troops that are not included in the valid agreements will be regulated by separate agreements. The two sides will take immediate steps to deal with the aforementioned questions by the time of the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Article 8

The two sides will settle disputed issues in respect of the interpretation and application of this agreement, as well as the implementation of the withdrawal in accordance with the planned schedule, within thirty days of the date of submitting the same, in the framework of the joint Hungarian-Soviet commission established on the basis of Article No. 17 of the agreement on the legal status of the Soviet troops temporarily stationed on the territory of the Hungarian People's Republic, signed between the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic and the USSR Government on May 27, 1957.

If the joint commission is unable to decide on any submitted question, the dispute must be settled through diplomatic channels.

Article 9

The stipulations of this agreement do not apply to the obligations deriving from the existing bilateral and multilateral agreements, including those deriving from the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid signed in Warsaw on May 14, 1955.

Article 10

This agreement shall enter into force on the day it is signed.

Drawn up in Moscow, on March 10, 1990, in two original copies, each in the Hungarian and Russian languages, both texts being authentic.

[Appendix referred to in Article 1 is not published]

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