PNL-3403
BHARC-411/80/034
UC-70

COMMUNITY STRESS AND SOCIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE: A FRAMEWORK FOR INTERPRETING THE BEHAVIOR OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COMMUNITY ACTION GROUPS

FINAL REPORT

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JUNE 1980

Work performed under contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830

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Legal Notice

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Prepared for the Waste Management Systems Studies Program
of the Pacific Northwest Laboratory
of the U.S. Department of Energy
under contract DE-AC06-76RLO 1830

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FOREWORD

This report examines the research on organized community response relevant to the kind of social and technological change posed by the proposed siting of major nuclear facilities (particulary those related to nuclear waste). It is concerned with such manifestations of organized behavior as social movements and community action groups, and with the interaction of these "organizations" with other established organizations in the community political arena. This report represents an effort to make explicit principles of organizational and community analysis which bear upon the issue of waste facility siting. Previous efforts in this area have tended to examine the attitudes and actions of <u>individuals</u>. This work is a logical extension of such studies in that it considers what happens when groups of individuals band together to form organizations in order to promote their interests (i.e., attitudes, proposed actions, etc.) in the political arena constituted by the local community.

Through analyzing the existing literature on community organizations, we attempt to provide a series of propositions designed to aid in understanding the behavior of such organizations as they may be activated relative to the relatively recent issue of waste facility siting. It should be emphasized that, as a first effort in this area, this report seeks to present principles of organizational response which are <u>firmly</u> grounded both in social scientific theory and research. A major advantage of this approach to the problem is that the propositions about

the likely behavior of action organizations are sufficiently general to be applicable in a variety of community settings and across different issue areas. The propositions are based upon data and principles of organizational behavior which apply as well to organizations responding to the proposed siting of a nuclear waste facility as they do to those responding to any other stress-producing proposed change in a community.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to provide a comprehensive examination of existing research on community organizations and community political systems. These findings will be integrated into a framework for understanding the variety of social and political responses which may be manifest in small communities facing the prospect of hosting a major nuclear facility. The principal focus is on the formation and behavior of social groups in communities, particularly politically oriented social movements or community action groups. This analysis is set in the context of a community experiencing social stress. Most of the discussion which follows is based on an extrapolation from the large body of research literature on the topics in sociology, political science, and psychology.

Chapter I examines the community political systems which are the arena in which local action groups will operate. The research literature on small community political systems provides some significant insights into understanding both local citizens' reactions to proposed nuclear facilities and the impetus for forming specialized local political action groups.

The principal thesis of Chapter I is that small town governments have traditionally maintained nearly complete control over all the significant events which occur within their boundaries. As such, local politics has concentrated on subjects such as local schools, local control of institutions, maintenance or alteration of existing social status conditions, and local economic matters. Citizens who only have

experience in local politics are poorly equipped to cope with major external events such as the prospect of hosting a nuclear facility. Four propositions are offered as explanations:

- Local governments, which have been able to make authoritative determinations over matters, are no longer controlling actions in their jurisdiction.
- The prevailing political culture has often not prepared citizens for the methods they must use to influence nuclear facility siting decisions.
- Local citizens must resort to types of political behavior that are new to them in order to influence the political decision-making process.
- Because of the complexity of the issues, and the resources required to effectively participate in the decision-making process, citizens must join/form local political action groups.

It is this last point which is particularly critical. Citizens may influence the govermental decision-making process almost exclusively as members of political action groups. Consequently, major portions of the discussion in this paper center on factors which surround the formation and maintenance of community level action groups.

Chapter II focuses on the internal conditions necessary for the formation and maintenance of community action groups. To exist for any period of time, a community action group must evolve a division of labor, regularize interaction among its members, and establish some form of leadership. By analyzing these groups as complex organizations, one can understand a relationship between the social organizations or social movements and the environment in which they operate, namely the local community. The fate of any social movement, whether it flourishes or

declines, depends to a large degree upon its relationship to its environment.

Chapter III reviews the research literature on the social environment of organizations in communities and the external conditions which are necessary to maintain organizations over time. A conceptual framework of local community environment is presented. A social environment in this case is defined as those material and social conditions which either produce or receive an effect from an organization.

It is argued that some degree of community consensus with regard to the value or utility or legitimacy of an organization's service goals is necessary for the survival of the organization. Furthermore, by interpreting the impact of organization-member consensus and goal orientations in terms of community support, certain predictions can be made regarding the behavior of organizations over time. One may summarize these predictions in the form of six propositions:

- For organizations with positive goals, if there is member consensus and cultural consensus, the organization will thrive or persist over time.
- If cultural consensus is lost, it is likely that the organization will adopt new--more culturally acceptable--goals.
- If member consensus is lost, it is likely that the structure of the organization will change so that contending ideologies can coexist.
- For organizations with negative goals, if there is member consensus and cultural consensus, the organization will thrive or persist over time.
- If cultural consensus is lost, the organization will retain its goals and shift to a new target population for support.
- Without regard to the nature of its goals, an organization which loses both member consensus and cultural consensus will cease to exist.

Chapter IV develops a logic whereby the community consensus model can be adapted to particular social movement organizations and community actions groups. It is pointed out that all organizations--whether representatives of official agencies, local governments, social movements, or action groups--must form some relationship with the local community and among themselves. Over time these relationships tend to stabilize. Any changes in these relationships (such as those introduced by the prospect of siting a nuclear facility in the community) create severe system stress. The presence of stress changes the demands the environment places upon existing organizations and creates the conditions for new (politically active) organizations to form. Based upon the available empirical evidence, five propositions are presented which summarize expected organizational behavior when the community social system is disrupted by an external force.

- The greater or more pervasive the level of disruption caused by outside forces, the greater will be the discrepancy between the level of services provided by established organizations and the community demands for service.
- The longer the time lag before established organizations can restore system stability, the greater the probability that social movements or community action groups will emerge to attempt to provide transitory inputs.
- The larger the number of unmet community demands, the more likely is the creation of emergent (new) organizations.
- As emergent organizations perform their tasks, the number of community demands decreases.
- The longer an emergent organization formalizes, the greater the probability it will persist and compete with established organizations which provide similar services to the community.

Based upon these propositions, a causal model is developed which predicts the emergence, formalization, and persistence of emergent organizations.

Chapter V examines changes in aspects of the environment which can be a function of the operation of movement organizations, and changes in the structure and tactics of movement organizations which appear to be a response to the environment. It is pointed out that three factors are important in social and technological change when we focus upon the interplay between established organizations and emergent organizations: shifting levels of environmental inputs, the adaptability of the movement organization, and the character of the goals of the movement organization relative to other organizations operating in the same environment. Furthermore, each of these factors contributes to the way in which the public defines a movement organization, which impacts upon: (1) the perceived legitimacy of the movement organization, (2) the type of opposition it will face, and (3) the nature of the means of achieving goals open to it (i.e., legitimate or illegitimate).

Appendix A presents the results of a detailed review of studies of interorganizational relationships from a community conflict perspective.

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CHAPTER I

COMMUNITY POLITICS AND RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR FACILITIES

The principal thesis of this chapter is that town governments have traditionally maintained nearly complete control over all the significant events which occur within their boundaries. As such, local politics has concentrated on subjects such as local schools, local control of institutions, maintenance or alteration of existing social status conditions, and local economic matters. However, federally reviewed nuclear facilities require quite different modes of political activity if local citizens are to impact the decision-making process. Experience in local political systems generally leaves citizens poorly equipped to cope with major external events such as the prospect of hosting a nuclear facility. Four propositions are offered as explanations:

- Local governments, which have been able to make authoritative determinations over matters, are no longer controlling actions in their jurisdictions.
- The prevailing political culture has often not prepared citizens for the methods they must use to influence nuclear facility siting decisions.
- Local citizens must resort to types of political behavior which are new to them in order to influence the political decision-making process.
- Because of the complexity of the issues, and the resources required to effectively participate in the decision-making process, citizens must join/form local political action groups.

Siting nuclear facilities in the United States has produced substantial local opposition over the past 15 years. The purpose of this

chapter is to examine the literature in political science and community politics and to provide some insights as to why such opposition is both widespread and particularly vehement. In this chapter we will examine the political contextual factors which are likely to influence community reaction to the proposed siting of any nuclear facility. We will explicitly avoid detailing substantive citizen concerns which are outside the realm of purely political mapping.

It is a central thesis of this paper that the siting of nuclear facilities as a public process tends to create stresses in communities that are to be recipients of nuclear facilities because the processes of decision disenfranchise citizens at the local level. The presence or potential presence of nuclear facilities creates anxiety or concern in citizens about both nuclear and nonnuclear issues. Key nonnuclear issues in this case have to do with citizens' views about the proper role of government, their control of government, and the extent to which federal decision processes ignore the political traditions of many of these communities. It should be emphasized that these political traditions of local control of local activity are deeply ingrained and are among the most intensely held values in the United States' political system. Thus, it is hardly surprising to find that in many instances, which will be discussed below, there is strong citizen reaction to the siting of nuclear facilities which can in many cases be based on political grounds alone.

Political Context

Power reactors and other nuclear facilities tend to be sited in remote locations in the United States. This means that the local political jurisdictions in which such facilities are sited are small governments. The decisions to site nuclear facilities are made at the federal level, under the control of federal agencies, and based on federal reviews. However, the localities that are most severely disrupted by the presence of the nuclear facilities are the small communities near the site, which have virtually no legal authority over the approval process. Conflicts thus emerge between local groups and federal actions over the proper locus of decision-making control and authority. As will be discussed below, one source of local outrage very likely occurs as a result of a perceived violation of the norm of local issues being controlled by local people. Conflict with federal authority can be rooted in this violation of the American political tradition. Finally, conflicts will emerge within the local polity because of the restricted options available to express discontent or to make input to the federal political decision-making process.

It is evident that the public's concern about nuclear power has evolved very dramatically since 1955. In the 1950s citizens tended to trust the federal government and very limited opposition to nuclear power development was manifest. By 1979 nuclear power generation and the management of the associated wastes from the nuclear fuel cycle constituted one of the main political issues in the United States. The nuclear power concern has, of course, evolved in the context of several

other contributing issues which have led to an overall decline in public confidence in government and resulted in an increased and strident demand for more active and directed public participation in key decision-making processes. It is against this background that many small communities in the 1970's found themselves faced with the prospect of being host to large nuclear facilities. The resulting conflicts that emerged can in part be traced to the generalized desire on the part of the citizens to exercise some direct control over these major activities, which were influencing their lives.

Locus of Decision-making Control

The character of the local governments in remote areas, which are expected to play host to these large federal facilities, has been the subject of detailed study by political analysts for many years (White, et al., 1975). The literature on decision-making and the powers of local government goes back to the 1930's when the Lynds began to study the consequences of major industrial change in a small midwestern community code named Middle Town (see Gillespie, et al., 1976). During the intervening forty-five years, a very large number of studies has been conducted on both the mechanisms for decision-making in communities and on the style of decision-making in small communities.

For the most part studies of political decision-making in small towns regarded the small community as basically a closed system with a limited agenda of action in its docket. Work on community politics and decision-making carried out by legions of scholars since the Lynds has

tended to focus on how decisions are arrived at and how political power is distributed in these small, closed systems. For example, decision-making in small communities has been represented as a six-step decision-making, policy-making model. In such an approach, the six stages utilized to understand the complex local decision-making processes consist of the following:

- policy formulation;
- policy deliberation;
- organization of political support;
- authoritative consideration;
  then an event, decisional outcome;
- promulgation of decisional outcome; and
- policy effectuation.

These stages can be particularly useful for understanding the complicated and interrelated operations in a small community political system when people are making choices over such things as school curriculum, zoning and land management, welfare activities, fire and police protection, and the provision of other public services that are restricted to that community. Clearly, the substantive political battles that occur tend to be over strictly localized issues. Hawley (1950) has observed that the most intense concern of analysts of local politics has been with the analysis of problems related either to local economics, the allocation of local power, the preservation of class or status interests, or the rigorous attack on existing class or status relationships.

The combination of the processes sketched above and the substantive battles which have been distilled by Hawley provide a picture of local

government which maintains a very limited agenda, but maintains within its scope of government all of those critical issues that are of concern to the local political power interests.

Vidich and Stein (1961) add another insight to the conventional political form and process of small towns. In their studies of class power and religion in rural communities in New York State, they noted that the functions of local government were frequently to manage potential conflicts in local affairs by avoiding difficult decisions. The power of local governments to delay decisions was seen as a key element in managing conflict and in keeping the locus of control from slipping out of the command of local decision-makers.

This characterization of local government decision-making and politics as: (a) essentially, a closed system; (b) a system in which the subject matter of decision-making is almost exclusively local issues; and (c) a system in which the decision process is geared to reaching an authoritative outcome over issues which come under consideration. This characterization is in stark contrast to the decision-making situations which a small community faces when confronted by the possibility of having a nuclear power facility located nearby.

The Federal Decision-making Process and Local Political Action

Although no formal process presently exists for the review and determination of potential sites for nuclear waste repositories, a well-established process exists for determining the acceptability of given site and given plan for locating nuclear power reactors. The

Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission are required to hold a series of reviews regarding the siting of any given nuclear reactor. These reviews cover subject matter ranging from safety issues to technical performance and cost estimates. Public hearings are a routine part of this set of federal reviews. The principal difference between the reviews that are conducted by the federal agencies and the political processes to which citizens of most small communities have become attuned is that the federal process provides for no single decision point at which some authoritative action can be taken which would provide the citizens with the opportunity to obtain a decisive yes or no vote on the proposed project. Furthermore, the standing of local citizens at federal hearings or in other parts of the federal review process is not substantially different from the standing accorded citizens far removed from the locality who may or may not be sensitive to any of the substantive concerns of local citizens.

Another aspect of the federal process that puts it in direct conflict with traditional local politics is that the decision-makers are, for the most part, remote and unreachable people. They appear in the local communities only periodically to carry out specifically prescribed functions, such as holding public hearings which may or may not represent the interests of local concerns. In contrast, local political figures have been regularly and routinely accessible to local residents.

Another facet of the federal decision-making process that is at variance with most small town governments is that many key decisions are made by bureaucrats. Because of this the local people are denied the opportunity to exert direct public pressure on decision-makers.

Bureaucrats within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, who must make critical decisions regarding substantive safety and technical operational features of a plant, are, for the most part, insulated from any form of direct accountability to the general public. They are not elected and thus are not subject to recall through the election mechanism. Also, as noted above, the bureaucratic organizations that manage the various segments of the reactor review have quite specialized functions. Thus, they are not responsible for the full range of reviews. Decision-making then becomes disjointed and incremental.

Another fairly dramatic departure from traditional political decision-making in small towns is that participation in these federal reviews requires modes of participation and styles of action that are new for the local people. For example, in making input to proceedings of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, local people frequently must hire lawyers from outside the community to engage in adversarial proceedings representing local interests. This is in sharp contrast to a more familiar style of local politics, which is to deal with the public figures directly, using one's own resources and relying on local channels that are reasonably well understood.

In summary, it is apparent that the decision-making process posed by the federal siting reviews is substantially different than the political process which, if the research literature is accurate, is one which most Americans living in small towns have come to know and understand. The principal differences between the local and the federal processes are the absence of a responsive forum in which some direct authoritative action might be taken in which local citizens would have a direct involvement.

By moving the locus of decision and authoritative allocation away from the local community, citizens in smaller towns are essentially disenfranchised unless they are able to effectively participate in the federal decision-making process. To effectively participate in the federal process requires that local citizens adopt dramatically different forms of political behavior than those to which they have become accustomed in community politics. Becoming involved in the federal process also involves a substantially greater commitment of personal time, financial resources and technical expertise than most citizens have ever before allocated to any political activity.

Political Culture

Another factor that will influence how people in small communities will react to the prospect of hosting a nuclear facility is the political culture of the locale. Political culture is the psychological orientation towards social objects, in this case, towards political objects and processes. The content of a political culture is that group of shared expectations (beliefs and values) on the part of a majority of the community's members about specific roles and structures in the political system. These shared beliefs include views on the appropriate activities for government, on the range of acceptable ways for citizens to participate in decision-making, on the legitimate means for arriving at public decisions, and on what activities are not legitimate either for citizens or for governments. In short, the content of political culture is not directly related to specific substantive issues such as siting

nuclear facilities, but rather is focused on how public matters ought to be resolved or managed. In most of the United States, there is a strong cultural ethos or commitment to participatory democratic government. These deep-seated cultural beliefs and values are very fundamental and are not easily changed.

A sizable research literature on political culture has developed in the United States since the pioneering work of Almond and Verba in the early 1960's (cf. Galbraith, 1968). Particularly appropriate to the present discussion are a number of studies that have attempted to isolate specific political subcultures within the United States.

For analytic purposes one may distinguish three pure types of political culture: parochial, subject, and participant. The principal distinguishing features of these political cultures are marked differences in a citizen's understanding of the political system, his cognitive and affective orientation toward it, and the citizen's role in activities which occur within the political system.

The parochial political culture is one which in its purest form does not really exist in the United States. A parochial political culture is one where individuals in the political system have little or no understanding, knowledge, or interest in any specialized political roles, political decision-making, or specialized political functions. Primitive African societies provide examples of this. They may perceive only in a very dim way that there is such a thing as a nation or political system which in any way, shape, or form might impact their lives.

The subject political culture is the second pure type. It is only rarely found in its purest form in the United States. However, in some

regions of the country strong elements of the subject political culture are found. The subject is essentially aware of government authority and may in fact be positively oriented toward it. However, the subject does not generally become involved in an active way in trying to influence the decisions of either administrators or political figures. The subject political culture is essentially a one-way model with government officials making decisions and the subjects complying or acquiescing in these decisions without active resistance. There is little or no protest raised against unpopular decisions because the norms of the political culture stress that questioning or protesting government decisions is unacceptable behavior.

As noted, it is rare that researchers have found pure examples of a subject political culture in the United States. However, the actual political culture of any community will generally be a mixture of the subject and participant strains. The states of the Old South is an area of the United States where researchers have found the most pronounced tendency toward a subject political culture. Although there are wide variations from one community to another, the rural south tends more toward a subject dominant political culture than any other part of the country.

The most common of all U.S. political culture strains is the participant culture. The participant political culture in its most pure form would be the New England town meeting. This is one in which all members of society tend to be explicitly oriented toward understanding thesystem, actively participating in it, both in the policy input stage and in effectuating policies once made. The citizen, in this case, is a

model of an efficacious, resourceful, civic-minded actor who is both motivated to participate and who expects to see some results from the participation. With few exceptions, the pure participant political cultures is an ideal rather than something which is realized in practice. Because of the number and complexity of issues facing most political jurisdictions, direct active participation by all interested citizens becomes a logistical impossibility. The norm or value expectation of citizens that they can participate in the process and influence decisions does not necessarily change even though the practical conditions may limit their real opportunities to do so.

Some argument exists among researchers on how to interpret lack of public participation in many areas of government that directly impact their lives (e.g. schools). Some analysts emphasize that apathy and alienation may curb participation (e.g., exemplified by the attitude that "you couldn't influence things if you wanted to, so why bother?"). Others emphasize that citizens may choose not to participate in the political process as long as government does not take action that is beyond some threshold of acceptability. Only where this threshold is crossed will a number of citizens become actively involved in attempting to influence the government's actions.

In the latter example, the implicit belief is that if citizens choose to enter the public decision-making process, then they do so expecting that the process will to some extent operate in accord with their normative beliefs and values. In the present context, this implies that the decision-making system is accessible, subject to rules of law and responsible to citizens.

The specific political culture in the United States varies considerably by region and will vary within a region by locality. In small communities, research on local political cultures has tended to indicate that the most pure forms of participant political culture may be found in areas of New England, the mountain west, and rural midwest. In the South, one finds the most pure forms of subject political culture, particularly in rural areas. The general norm for the country as a whole is heavily oriented to the participant political culture.

The relevance of this discussion of political culture to nuclear facility siting is that there appear to be some substantial differences between the political cultural norms of many small communities and the actual conduct of public decision-making regarding nuclear facility siting. Violation of these norms can be seen as treading on very fundamental values of the impacted citizens. To the extent that the exercise of federal decision-making processes substantially violates the norms of the existing local political culture, there is significant opportunity or likelihood for political conflict. In the next section, we will discuss how such conflicts may be manifest.

Options for Political Action: Exit, Loyalty, or Voice

The discussion to this point has emphasized that, first of all, the federal decision-making process is considerably different than the small town decision-making process which has most likely been the main political experience for the potentially impacted group. Secondly, those citizens who wish to participate in the federal process must learn new

forms of political behavior and new means for participating in an effective manner in the federal process. This implies that on a personal level the individuals in question must be extremely motivated and effective. Finally, the conduct of the federal decision-making process may violate deeply held political cultural norms and values by significantly altering the terms on which citizen input to decision-making processes can be made and changing the locally accepted criteria by which major decisions are made.

Having discussed the conditions that might motivate individuals to act, it is now appropriate to discuss how citizens of small communities might organize their efforts to effectively participate in the federal decision-making process. The specific form and content of participation will be conditional upon the nature of the federal review process, and the subject matter which is appropriate for discussion in that process.

In the present context, we may view the possible arrival of a large nuclear facility in a small community as a major change in the context of that community's activities. The citizens have, in theoretical terms, three basic options: to <u>exit</u>, to express <u>loyalty</u>, or to <u>voice</u> opposition. Exit involves withdrawing from any sort of active participation in the decision process and merely letting events take their course. In some cases, it may involve physically leaving the locality. Loyalty involves becoming an active supporter of the proposed project. Voice is the active opposition to a proposal through a variety of political channels. Here the ultimate objective is to keep the facility from being sited in the community.

The extent to which any specific number of citizens opt for the nonparticipant or exit role is a subject that deserves substantial further research. There is very limited information on the extent to which citizens in small communities consider local changes such as nuclear power plants to be inevitable and thus, against their desires or inclinations, merely withdraw from any active role in influencing the decision.

The option of expressing loyalty or support for the project is one which is also somewhat an unresearched phenomenon. However, in a few cases it has been observed that those individuals in a community who are particularly active supporters of building nuclear power plants in or near their communities are those who initially feel that they have something to gain directly in terms of an economic advancement. Supporters may also see the construction of the plant as fulfilling certain other desirable ends, such as community growth or economic diversificaion. It should be emphasized that the strong supporters of measures are frequently a politically powerful and active minority of local citizens.

The citizens who opt for voicing opposition to facility proposals quickly find that in order to effectively participate in the decision-making process, they must form political action groups. There are two main reasons for this. First, the substantive grounds on which a citizen may enter the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearings are generally (not exclusively) technical. As such, technical experts must be hired as consultants. Also, legal counsel must be retained for virtually all proceedings. One citizen alone rarely if ever possesses

the technical sophistication to actively intervene in more than one or two substantive areas. Retaining consultants and lawyers, even those who donate their time, requires both financial and logistical outlays normally beyond the ability of most individuals to bear alone. Thus, marshalling the necessary resources to effectively participate requires group support.

It has been noted that the requirement of dealing with ASLB proceedings using outside lawyers and hired experts had placed citizen groups at some disadvantage since, among other things, the groups frequently lacked the necessary information and experience to recognize what kind of scientific help they needed and where to locate it. This, however, would appear to be changing as the anti-nuclear movement becomes a more nationally based phenomenon.

A second major reason why group action is a virtual necessity stems from the fact that political opposition to nuclear siting actions must be carried on in a wide variety of public forums simultaneously. Rather than facing an election where one authoritative outcome might be anticipated, citizens must carry on challenges in many proceedings over a range of subject matter that often appears to bear little direct relationship to the issues of greatest concern to the local interests (e.g., will the facility be built or not?). This situation often results in strategic political behavior on the part of attorneys or technical specialists representing citizen groups, which makes little sense to observers who feel the opponents are "not addressing the issues."

This can be seen regularly in situations where local citizens groups are dependent on the skill and experience of the lawyer they engage to

represent them in hearings before the ASLB. Licensing Board proceedings are for the most part extremely detailed legal proceedings where lawyers deal with other lawyers over points of law. The opportunity for direct citizen input is effectively muted by this set of circumstances. As was discussed by Eben and Kasper, lawyers tend to completely dominate the proceedings, doing battle to represent their respective clients. Attorneys employ whatever tactics or strategy that might seem most appropriate to achieve their given ends. These are frequently viewed as bringing suits over utterly frivolous points, presenting challenges under NEPA, which would appear on purely technical grounds to be somewhat ridiculous, and relying on purely procedural matters to turn the proceedings in the desired direction. This activity is somewhat confusing to observers who feel that the ASLB hearings are designed to clarify technical issues. When one considers that ASLB hearings have become substitutes for other forms of political decision-making, the tactics noted are quite understandable.

The ASLB hearing is one of the major forms in which citizen groups have been able to protest possible siting of nuclear facilities. However, there are other means which have become more widely used by citizens groups since 1970, including direct communications with members of Congress or with State legislatures and utilization of newspapers, television, and radio to generate a broader base of support for one's essentially localized political concerns. The net result of these activities has been to expand the political debate over nuclear power into a national political movement. As will be discussed in the following chapters, the community level opposition to a specific nuclear

facility will in part be reinforced by the national level anti-nuclear political movements.

Summary

Nuclear facilities are most often sited in relatively isolated areas near small towns. When new facilities are proposed, the citizens in communities near the prospective site are moved to a variety of political actions.

The principal thesis of this chapter is that small town governments have traditionally maintained nearly complete control over all the significant events that occur within their boundaries. As such, local politics has concentrated on subjects such as local schools, local control of institutions, maintenance or alteration of existing social status conditions, and local economic matters. However, federally reviewed nuclear facilities require quite different modes of political activity if local citizens are to impact the decision-making process. Experience in local political systems generally leaves citizens poorly equipped to cope with major external events such as the prospect of hosting a nuclear facility. Four propositions are offered as explanation:

- Local governments, which have been able to make authoritative determinations over matters, are no longer controlling actions in their jurisdictions.
- The prevailing political culture has often not prepared citizens for the methods they must use to influence nuclear facility siting decisions.
- Local citizens must resort to types of political behavior that are new to them in order to influence the political decision-making process.

- Because of the complexity of the issues, and the resources required to effectively participate in the decision-making process, citizens must join/form local political action groups.

In the following chapters we will discuss the dynamics of the kinds of social movements and community action groups that are likely to emerge in response to proposed nuclear facilities. By necessity, this discussion focuses upon the empirical and theoretical literature developed by social scientists to deal with organizational and community response to stress situations associated with social and technological change in general. Thus, the literature involved cites research on a variety of organizations and addresses a wide range of community issues. The principles of organizational behavior developed here, however, are applicable over a wide range of situations and are as useful in understanding organized community response to the proposed siting of a nuclear waste facility as they are in understanding organized response to any other type of community intervention. Chapter II begins the process of deriving principles of expected organized response by examining the definition and character of social movements and community action groups as special types of complex organization.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COMMUNITY ACTION GROUPS AND THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

Social movements and community action groups,[1] in attempting to introduce or impede changes in society, operate within a milieu or environment. Thus, movements interact with their environment in promoting specified goals and, as a function of these interactions, both the movement and the environment undergo social changes. The purpose of this chapter is to review the two primary approaches to understanding the development and growth of social movements and to demonstrate that one can apply principles of organizational behavior to the study of social movements in the context of local communities.

Historically, studies of social movements utilize either a social-psychological or a social-organizational perspective in structuring an analytic framework. Social-psychological studies, which constitute the bulk of social movements research, focus upon the individuals who comprise movements--their personalities, attitudes, beliefs, motivation, and perceptions. Since most of the classic research in social movements (Festinger et al., 1956; Cantril, 1941; Talmon, 1962) has taken a social-psychological approach, the primary unit of analysis has tended to be the individual. Accordingly, movements themselves have been characterized as collectivities of individuals seeking to promote or retard social change.

Recently social scientists have devoted attention to the structure and organization of social movements and community action groups

(Anderson and Dynes, 1973; Gillespie et al., 1976; Zald and Ash, 1966). Thus, it is recognized that to effect goal achievement, movements must evolve a division of labor, devise a way to regularize interaction among members, and establish some form of leadership that will organize tactics and strategy for bringing about change. Furthermore, as time passes social movements tend to increase their membership and develop specific programs for obtaining goals. Such increases in followers place pressure upon the movement to keep membership records, to evolve roles for officers and cadre, and to develop and maintain a literature which lays out the movement's ideology. Also, as specific programs for change are instituted, a need for stable funding develops with a concomitant need for maintaining careful records within the movement. Thus, a movement that evolves such features as a fine division of labor, programs for goal realization, and a large membership will form a defacto "movement organization" designed to systematize and coordinate the behavior of members. Although movements which persist for any period of time undergo significant formalization processes, the structure of the movement organization may become more or less complex with the intervention of other factors; for example, continued growth or decline of its following.

It is important to emphasize that viewing a movement from an organizational perspective is by no means a new development. Indeed, Phillip Selznick's (1952) analysis of the organization and tactics used by the Bolsheviks to assume control of the Soviet Union represents a classic example of organizational analysis applied to a social movement. Interestingly though, Selznick's research turns out to be an isolated example of this kind of analysis. It is only within the last decade that

use of an organizational perspective in the study of social movements has come into full flower.

The groundwork for the development of this perspective may be seen in Herbert Blumer's early work on a lifecycle or natural history model of social movements. In an attempt to further refine and explicate the "stages" of social movements devised by Dawson and Getties (1948), Blumer described both the organizational characteristics and leadership styles common to movements in different stages of development. By reading downward in the column labeled "description" in Table 1, the progressive refinement of a complex organization may be traced from the loose-knit collectivity which characterizes the stage of social unrest through the

Table 1

LIFE CYCLE MODEL OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
(Adapted from Blumer, 1951:203)

Stage of Development	Leadership Style	Description
1. Social unrest	Agitator	No structure; restless, uneasy people who are susceptible to suggestion
2. Popular excitement	Prophet-reformer	Distinct within-group communications; sharpening of objectives
3. Formalization	Statesman	Emergence of roles, division of labor, goals tactics
4. Institutionalization	Administrator	Bureaucratization, conversion to less radical tactics, definite hierarchy

bureaucracy of the institutionalized stage. Although Blumer chose not to focus on movement organizations or formalizations per se, it is clear that he appreciated the operation of such processes and structures. Furthermore, in describing the growth toward higher levels of organization and the changes in leadership style from agitator through administrator, Blumer provided perhaps the earliest statement of the impact of the formalization process as it is reflected in the structure of social movements.

Since the Sixties, sociologists have increasingly turned their attention toward organizational aspects of social movements, focusing upon shifts in leadership (Perry et al., 1974), goal transformation (Zald and Denton, 1963), the impact of competing ideologies within social movement organizations (Perry et al., 1975), and the effect of size (Blau, 1970) on the development of movement organization. Furthermore, there have been several attempts, most notably those of Meyer, Zald, and Ash (1966), to systematize knowledge of movement organizations in terms of formal theoretical propositions. What these studies reveal, then, is a shift in the unit of analysis from the individual to the internal structural dynamics and form of movement organizations.

This shift to an organizational level of analysis, aside from emphasizing questions regarding the structure of any given movement, also introduces the idea of interaction between movement organizations and the environment in which they operate. Thus, as Pickvance (1974) has argued, the fate of any particular movement organization, whether it flourishes or declines, depends to a large extent upon its relationship to the local community which serves as its environment. The study of the role of

organization-environment exchanges in the etiology and persistence of formal organizations has lately come to occupy much of the attention of organization theorists. It is reasoned that the factors which affect the shape and performance of organizations are not wholly of an internal origin. Hence, like operant psychologists who contend that human behavior is shaped by the individual's stimulus environment, it is acknowledged that organizations too are founded and grow within active environments that provide stimuli to which the organization must immediately respond and that necessitate the development of strategies to guide future responses in a direction appropriate to organizational goals. Working within this paradigm, researchers have begun to assess the importance of interorganizational networks (Benson, 1975), patterns of linkage and dominance (Blau and Schoenherr, 1971:330-358), boundaries (Aldrich, 1971), domain consensus (Braito et al., 1972), and policy space (Randall, 1973) in the analysis of organizational performance.

To further demonstrate the necessity for considering the impact of the environment in the analysis of social movement organizations, one may again look at the formalization process through which movements evolve into organizations. The natural history model implies that movements, given appropriate levels of membership and leadership zeal, would tend to move exclusively in the direction of higher levels of organization; namely, toward the institutional stage. Yet, the empirical record indicates that this is not the case and that some movements persist at the same level of organizaton, and others grow for a time and then decline in level of organization eventually disappearing from the scene (see Messinger, 1955).

Furthermore, it is not always possible to explain a movement's decline in terms of either psychological or internal organizational variables. For example, although member morale and commitment remained high in the Freie Gemeinde (free thought) movement and the organization was stable, the movement flourished only a short time and collapsed. In this case it may be pointed out that member enthusiasm did not compensate for the loss of consensus in the community that the goals of the movement were acceptable and important. Similarly, David Sills' (1957) study of the National Foundation of Infantile Paralysis identified several broad environmental (community) factors which sustained NFIP in spite of the fact that levels of coordination in the organization varied tremendously and the levels of membership commitment waxed and waned. Indeed, NFIP achieved its initial goal of seeing a reduction in polio and was sustained while establishing a new and broader goal to continue the movement's existence. Specific issues of community consensus will be explored in greater detail later. The present discussion is intended to underscore the idea that when social movements are conceptualized as organizations, a new dimension of analysis at the level of the local community must also be explored. This approach to social movements from the perspective of the community is also not new, but has been only unsystematically applied to social movements. Interestingly, one can see a striking similarity of the concepts comprising interorganizational network analyses to those of human ecology (Hawley, 1950). In fact, Park's (1936) classic discussion of human ecology speaks of the community in terms of the symbiotic relations of its components: dominance, competition, and succession. The implication, of course, is that the

study of interorganizational environments is easily seen as an extension of organizational analysis to the level of the local community.

It is within this framework of the local community that the present report seeks to place the analysis of social movement organizations. Given that social movements manifest themselves through a variety of organizational forms, and that they seek change in the existing social order, the relationship between movement organizations and communities is a primary factor in the persistence of the movement and, therefore, in the probability that any change in the community will actually be instituted. Thus, the remaining chapters of this report will address three major problem areas:

- Specification of the features of the local community that constitute an organizational environment;
- Elaboration of a model for understanding the interplay between movement organizations and their environments; and
- Assessment of the conditions that mediate community transformation or change based upon the activities of movement organizations.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Analytically, the distiction made between movements and action groups relates to the geographic localization of the latter; unless otherwise noted, we will use the terms social movement or movement organization to refer to both social movements and community action groups.

CHAPTER III

THE COMMUNITY AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Modern systems theory has sensitized social scientists to the importance of environment-organization exchanges in studying the etiology and growth of organizations. While early theorists tended to ignore the environment (Taylor, 1911; Mayo, 1933; Roethlisberger and Dickson, 1939), more recent work in the tradition of human ecology has devoted considerable attention to environmental variables (Stein, 1960; Haverstroth, 1965; Thompson, 1968). Unfortunately, these attempts to explicate the role of the environment have emerged sporadically and are scattered through the literature of the past two decades. Consequently, there is a pronounced lack of consensus regarding an appropriate framework for the interpretation of environmental effects. Also, the theoretical status of environmental variables changes with the values of the theorist and even the dimensions (variables) considered to be relevant have become a matter of subjective debate.

There is little doubt that the cross-disciplinary nature of organizational theory and systems theory has contributed to the perpetuation of the organization-environment conceptual controversy. In an attempt to clarify the issues this chapter will develop a working definition of organizational environments, and review the literature with the aim of constructing a workable conceptual framework which is acceptable within a variety of theoretical perspectives. The resulting

schema should provide an integrated framework for interpreting the interplay between organizations and their environment.

Defining Organizational Environments

Organization theorists typically treat the environment as everything that is external to an organization. Litterer (1965:422), for example, has noted that "by environment we mean that portion of the world external to the organization with which it comes into contact." Similarly, Hawley (1950:12) has stated that "environment is a generic concept under which are subsumed all external factors and forces to which an organization or aggregate of organizations is actually or potentially responsive." Thompson (1968:27) likewise views the term environment as a residual category which "refers to everything else." There are several problems with these definitions, in that they are:

- too abstract, failing to specify salient factors;
- ambiguous, failing to differentiate environmental factors from nonenvironmental factors;
- devoid of conceptual perspective, which further contributes to their ambiguity by not focusing upon the important elements with respect to organizational structure or behavior; and
- impossible to measure, due to the high degree of abstraction and ambiguity.

A survey of the assumptions underlying these problematic aspects of defining environment as "everything external" can be useful in arriving at a more satisfactory characterization.

The premature use of a high level of abstraction by conceiving of an organization's environment to be an undifferentiated, all encompassing thing does not facilitate ascertaining how things ouside of an organization affect the structure and behavior of the organization or vice versa. The notion that "environment" may be conceived as a single category results in a theoretical constant, thus vitiating the possibility of systematically assessing its effects. Furthermore, the conception of environment as "everything external," is ambiguous because it assumes that everything outside of an organization is in concert and uniformly exerting an influence upon the organization. That is, it assumes that all aspects of the environment are varying together. This is a highly dubious assumption which does not specify organization-environment linkages, nor for that matter does it provide a handle for investigating the possible sources, directions, magnitudes, and shapes of effects.

Certainly the type of knowledge that one seeks to produce about organizations will have a bearing upon which aspects of the environment are defined as important. Therefore, the failure of definitions to provide a perspective, framework, or paradigm in examining the linkages between organizations and their environments further damages the utility of conceiving environment as everything external. This is so because "everything external" is undifferentiated, all encompassing, in concert, producing random (or constant) effects, and fails to suggest sources, directions, magnitudes, or shapes of effects taking place between an organization and those things outside the organization.

The concept of organizational environment might be more usefully defined as "a set of material and social conditions, comprised of numerous discontinuously nonrandom varying elements which may be observed to produce or receive an effect from the existence of an organization" (Gillespie and Perry, 1975:5). This definition has the merit of answering each of the criticisms noted above. Conceiving the environment as a set of conditions recognizes that the things outside of an organization are of various natures which cannot be realistically represented as "everything external." That these conditions are made up of numerous discontinuously varying elements recognizes that the various things outside of an organization cannot necessarily carry uniform effects to or from a particular organization. Finally, that these elements must be observed to change or be changed by the presence of an organization indicates that only those things that are measurable and have an effect are relevant. The notion of effect includes both increases and decreases in the likelihood of some particular behavior occurring. Thus, constraints as well as more direct changes are recognized as important. Of course, the definition advanced here may be criticized as cumbersome, but such criticism must be tolerated until more is known about the specific nature of linkages connecting organizations to their environment. To this end, attention may be focused upon developing a conceptual framework specifying the elements of organizational environments.

Environment Elements

Researchers have only rarely considered more than one or two environmental features at a time. To remain consistent with the definition of environment proposed here, we must establish guidelines for presenting a more accurate assessment of the forces which impinge upon social movement and community action organizaions. It is possible to more carefully specify the problem by segmenting organizational environments into particular content areas or conditions. Ideally, these content areas would be delimited in a manner that maximized the variation between content areas and minimized the variation within contact areas (see Blalock, 1973:516-520). In this way, the particular effects of one or another aspect of the "environment" upon particular elements of organizational structure or behavior can be ascertained.

Hall (1972a:298) has suggested that organizational environment be separated into seven areas: technology, legal, political, economic, demographic, ecological, and cultural. The difficulty with Hall's taxonomy is that it is devoid of a theoretical rationale, and it remains fairly abstract. Thus, Hall does not reveal why these seven areas, as opposed to other possible areas, should represent the salient aspects of an organization's environment. Hall also seems to ignore the likelihood of area overlap. For example, measures of the legal and political areas would quite probably tap similar conditions. Likewise, demographic and ecological factors frequently overlap, thereby bringing about distortion in assessing impact from or to one or another of these areas.

Furthermore, Hall's (1972a:304-306) discussion of cultural conditions limits considertion to values and norms, while excluding consideration of nonverbal communication. In this regard, the studies of Hall (1959, 1969) have demonstrated the importance that certain nonverbal communications, especially a culture's conception of space, time, and socialization, have upon the structure of organization. If Hall's conceptual schema is to generate consistent research findings, then it would seem to require refinement in terms of an explicit theoretical rationale and a more precise specification of the elements of the environment.

Another way, somewhat more satisfactory, to approach the problem to delimiting environmental elements involves selecting a single, necessary condition as a common denominator for interpreting the impact of given environmental variables upon particular dimensions of the structure and behavior of organizations. An appropriate point of departure may be found by focusing upon the question of organizational survival. Organizations, defined as a set of people or positions coordinated to achieve specified objectives, require a technology, either routine or nonroutine; they need rules, but some operate informally and others formally; size is important, but both big and small organizations persist; feedback is necessary, but some offer more than others, and so forth. The question to be answered here is: "What factor bears most heavily upon the continued existence of an organization?"

Community consensus with regard to an organization's product or service goals can be seen as a necessary condition for organizational survival. Indeed, this is particularly true for social movement

organizations and community action groups. By examining studies which focus upon the role of the environment in the origin and historical development, and ideology, values, and legitimation of organizations, we can begin to build a firm case for the importance of community consensus. In so doing the foundation is also laid for the development of a conceptual scheme for understanding organization-environment exchanges.

Origin and Historical Development

Lipset, Trow, and Coleman (1956) in their study of the International Typographical Union (ITU) describe and analyze the environmental forces which facilitated the development and continued maintenance of a two-party political system within ITU. This organization was selected for study because it represented an anachronism: an apparent exception to the other trade unions, and to the "iron law of oligarchy" postulating that over time organizations come to be controlled by the few (Lipset et al., 1956:448). However, it was found that rather than disproving Michels' hypothesis they had "given additional empirical support . . . by demonstrating that where an effective and organized opposition does exist, it does so only because the incumbent administration does not hold a monopoly over the resources of politics." In seeking the factors which prevented the development of a monopoly for one party or the other, Lipset and his colleagues identified six dimensions and a number of variables in the environment which had an impact upon ITU's nature and development. With respect to the origin and historical development of

ITU, five variables were determined to contribute to the development of a two-party system: (1) federation at time of emergence, (2) subunit autonomy, (3) ownership decentralized in industry, (4) organizational security, and (5) homogeneity of member interests. The operation of these variables can be seen with a brief overview of the early historical development of ITU.

The printing trade grew in privately owned shops geared to local markets. But the skills of the tradesmen, especially the requirement that they be literate, promoted the development of occupational solidarity which gave rise to common concerns in manager-worker relations (Lipset et al., 1957:27-34). ITU merged in 1850 as a loose federation engaged in providing mutual aid during strikes and preventing management use of strike breakers. The orientation to local markets provided for very little competition between areas which facilitated a continuation of the federated structure, and also put control of collective bargaining for wages and benefits primarily at the local level (Lipset et al., 1957:17-26). By developing its structure based on numerous locals, ITU incorporated divergent interest groups with respect to organizational policy. For example, large locals with many resources wished to sustain a high degree of local autonomy, while small locals who were more dependent upon the ITU wanted to have centralized control. These and other interest group differences resulted in two approximately equal groups vying for control of ITU: one militant and the other moderate. The employers obviously were most variable to the moderates so the militants were obliged to go underground, forming secret societies designed to augment ways of forcing employers to accept their demands

(Lipset et al., 1956:34-55). The approximately equal support for these two groups and the nature of the secret societies made it difficult for either group to monopolize control. Thus, two contending parties were built into the structure of the ITU.

In summary, the trade skills facilitated the development of a craft bond which gave its members a secure base for dealing with employer relations. Further, a decentralized industry along with federated union structure and considerable autonomy of the locals provided a set of conditions which was favorable to the development and persistence of a two-party system within ITU. Since these conditions are not unique to ITU per se, they should be recognized as necessary but not sufficient factors in the explanation of ITU's current two-party structure.

Stinchcombe (1965) found that certain aspects of organizational structure--such as the use of unpaid family labor, separation of owners from management, and the percentage of professionals employed--correlated with the time when particular types of organizations emerged. In explaining this correlation, Stinchcombe (1965:153) notes that new organizational structures emerged in relation to a society's culture base, especially technology and "then, both because they can function effectively with those organizational forms, and because the forms tend to become institutionalized, the basic structure of the organization tends to remain relatively stable." The persistence over time of an established organizational structure is hypothesized to result from (a) the maintenance of continued efficiency, (b) incorporating vested interests, or (c) enjoying a monopoly with respect to the goals being pursued (Stinchcombe, 1965:169).

The difficulty with Stinchcombe's characterization in terms of the schema being developed here is that the time of origin of an organization's industry is a single item indicator for a variety of conditions--including the level of technology, the criteria controlling wealth and power distributions, organizational legitimacy, and the structure of labor markets. Hence, the age of an industry possibly provides an after-the-fact means of discovering the effects of certain environmental variables, but the age of a particular organization carries little significance when considered by itself.

A study of 46 work organizations in England conducted by Pugh et al., (1969:95) corroborated the notion that the age of an organization carries little impact upon the organization's structure. It was found that older organizations were somewhat more decentralized and autonomous, but presumably this was a function of environmental conditions existing at the time the industry emerged.

In addition, a scale measuring historical changes in the organization's location, product or service, and ownership was constructed (Pugh et al., 1969:95). It was found that older organizations were more likely to have experienced such changes. It was also found that organizations experiencing more change had more decentralized structures, but the authors argued that this may have been confounded with age. The difficulty arising from not having a theoretical rationale is clearly evident here. An adequate conceptual schema will have to postulate how it is that certain variables affect one another.

The importance of the Lipset, Stinchcombe, and Pugh studies is that they recognize and document the discontinuous nature of organizational environments. Factors connected with the origin and historical development of organizations were found to affect certain aspects of the structure and not others. The work of Lipset and Stinchcombe suggests that historical factors might be viewed as predisposing conditions, defining the parameters within which other aspects of organizational structure and environments must operate. Pugh, on the other hand, views factors connected with an organization's origin and history at the same conceptual level as other environmental aspects.

Ideology, Cultural Values, and Legitimation

Selznick's (1949) study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)--a federally funded, locally administered organization--found that TVA's policy of local (grass roots) involvement resulted in a revision of its initial goals. TVA was established fundamentally to produce electric power and fertilizer, and to control flooding, but also to maintain and extend forests and to help poor farmers develop recreation areas. Selznick discovered, however, that the vested interest of the local administration--the land grant colleges--and the value commitments to conservative groups at the local and national level led to compromises of these goals through the process of co-optation. That is, representatives of the conservative groups were brought into the organization to assume various decision-making positions. Thus, the organizational objectives related to small farmers and forests were neglected, while the production

of electric power, fertilizer, and dams were emphasized in the interest of big business and big farming. Selznick's study provides a view of formal organizations as rational instruments for the attainment of certain goals which, however, are guided or misguided by ideology. The process of goal attainment is compared to an adaptive organism adjusting to and compromising with its political-institutional environments; in essence, the values and interest groups of the surrounding community.

Messinger's (1955) study of the Townsend movement (an organization established during the depression to provide welfare assistance to the aged through a radical economic plan) found that a loss of organizational legitimacy resulted in the organization changing its goals in order to continue its existence. The Townsend movement prospered with 2.5 million members in 1936. Over time, as the economy recovered and the government assumed the task of caring for the aged, membership dropped 98 percent to 56,650 persons by 1951 (Messinger, 1955:4). Rather than disbanding, the organization invented new goals focusing upon fellowship and the production of patent medicines. Messinger, like Selznick, describes this process as an organizational adaptation to environmental values. In other words, there was value consensus among the membership that their initial function was now legitimately served by another group (in this case the government) and therefore, in order to stay "alive," the implementation of new goals was necessary.

Gusfield's (1955) study of the Women's Christian Temperance Union found, in contrast to the Townsend movement, that loss of value legitimacy can lead to a shift in the goal-object rather than a change in the organizations per se. WCTU was a middle class based organization,

initially established for the purpose of moralizing lower class persons by persuading them that drinking ruined a "respectful" life. But the polarized conflict between prohibition and drinking was compromised in time, with moderate drinking becoming respectable. Thus, the moral indignation of the WCTU message was left high and dry with no basis for "rescuing the poor demoralized drinkers." Rather than changing the goal of moral rescue, however, WCTU simply shifted their attention to the demoralized upper class. This suggests that organizations adopting moralizing goals will resist goal succession and persist, goals intact, so long as some target group can be identified.

Bendix (1957), in his book Work and Authority in Industry compares the east (the Soviet Union and East Germany) with the west (England and the United States) over time, examining the consequences of different ideologies for the development of industrialization. Bendix (1957:1-2) is "particularly concerned with ideas which pertain to the relations between workers and employers or their agents." But again, as in the above cited studies, the notion of legitimation guides the analysis throughout. The essential difference noted by Bendix lies in the development of an autonomous business class in the west, while in the east management has always required legitimation from the government. Thus, industrialization in the west developed in terms of materialistic aggrandizement and "natural" authority with respect to positions within the business class. Industry in the east, on the other hand, developed in terms of an ideology justifying managerial authority in terms of the collected benefit. Lipset's study of the international typographical union, as discussed previously, also identified three variables relating

to legitimacy and value systems: (1) belief that opposition within the rules is acceptable, (2) job placement by achievement rather than political description, and (3) legal protection for political opposition. These variables, however, turn out to be three aspects of the same thing. Lipset and his colleagues point out that the belief that opposition within the rules is right results from a balanced distribution of power such that the incumbent administration at any given time cannot destroy its opposition without undermining the goals of the organization (1956:467). Nevertheless, once this belief is established it continues to have an impact independent of shifts in power distribution. It might be predicted, therefore, that once the power distribution became too far skewed one way or the other, this factor would predispose members to support the minority position, thus returning the balance of power. The other two factors--job placement by achievement and legal protection--would seem to be manifestations of the belief that opposition within the rules is right. The ITU, being high on all of these dimensions, was consequently insured of a continued two-party structure.

Demerath and Thiessen (1966) studied the Sauk City, Wisconsin, chapter of the Freie Gemeinde (free thought) movement, an agnostic social movement initially started in Europe in opposition to organized religion and established in the United States about 1850. They found that this organization's lack of community ideological legitimation with respect to its agnostic doctrine set the stage for a sequence of adaptations which eventually resulted in the organization's collapse or demise.

Demerath and Thiessen (1966:676-677) point out that generally an organization lacking ideological legitimation in its social setting may

adapt by: (1) obscuring its values, (2) providing acceptable services, or (3) becoming militant. These adaptations take place over time, however, and the necessity for, or the sense of urgency associated with, an organizaton's adaptation can be slowed down or mediated by additional factors both in the organization's structure and in its environment. With respect to the environment, it was found that the presence and nature of social class distinctions (vertical differentiation) were important variables which moderated the Freie Gemeinde's mode of adaptation (Demerath and Thiessen, 1966:677-678).

By studying the organization over time, Demerath and Thiessen were able to show that a split in the social class composition among members of the Catholic church--the community's dominant religious ideology--worked to preserve temporarily the existence of the movement. The community was initially established by Catholics who had migrated for political reasons, while the more recent migrants came for economic reasons. The "old Catholics" being well established, comprised the community's upper class and since they migrated for political reasons there was much in common between their values and those of the Freie Gemeinde. Thus, as long as the old Catholics retained their upper class standing, the free thinkers were protected from the antagonism of the lower class Catholics. But, because Sauk City was a small town, the impact of "mass society" broke down the traditional vertical class differentiation and resulted in a more homogeneous social class composition with the Catholic church. This exerted pressure on the Freie Gemeinde chapter to adapt.

The mode of adaptation selected was related to the degree of "horizontal differentiation." Sauk City had become relatively undifferentiated. On the other hand, Milwaukee was institutionally differentiated. By comparing Freie Gemeinde organizations in these two cities it was found that "other things being equal, a dissident group in an undifferentiated context will move toward legitimation" (Demerath and Thiessen, 1966:678). This is because in a small, undifferentiated community it is difficult to go unnoticed and pressures to conform are likely to be uniform and consistent from every segment of the community. The characteristics of the Sauk City organization--middle class members, noncharismatic leader, and diffuse goals--were such that successful achievement of legitimation undermined the purpose of the organization. The undifferentiated nature of the environment precluded militancy as a viable strategy, and the pursuit of legitimacy meant that the organization had to obscure its agnostic ideology. To do so was to acknowledge that the organization no longer had a reason for existing.

In summary, the above studies suggest that organizational legitimation depends upon the degree of consensus both within the organization and the community or society, as well as whether the organization's ideology is positive or negative. Furthermore, the particular combinations among these three variables indicated different consequences for organizational survival, "character," or goal maintenance. The combination of organizational ideology, organizational consensus, and cultural consensus and their consequences are illustrated in Table 2.

For organizations with positive goals, if there is member consensus and cultural consensus, then the organization will thrive as did the Townsend movement during the early part of its history. But if cultural consensus is lost--as in the post-depression period of the Townsend movement--then goal succession is likely. On the other hand, if there is no member consensus, but the opposing groups each have cultural consensus, then the organizational structure (character) will be modified to accommodate the contending positions within the organization. Both the Selznick and the Lipset studies illustrate this circumstance.

Table 2

ORGANIZATONAL TYPES BASED ON ORGANIZATIONAL GOALS AND CONSENSUS VERSUS CULTURAL CONSENSUS

Organizational Goal	Organizational Consensus	Cultural Consensus	
		High	Low
Positive	High	Townsend - -	Townsend (goal succession)
	Low	TVA ITU	Empty Cell
Negative	High	WCTU - - - - Freie Gemeinde	WCTU (shifted population)
	Low	Empty Cell	Freie Gemeinde (died)

For organizations with negative goals, if there is member consensus and cultural consensus, the organization also will thrive as did the Women's Christian Temperance Union during the early part of its existence. But in contrast to organizations with positive goals, if there is a loss of cultural consensus the organization will maintain its goal and shift target population. Perhaps this is because negative or moralizing goals require a high degree of commitment on the part of the membership, and to consider changing goals constitutes undermining the organization. This can be seen with the Freie Gemeinde organization, where a loss of members and cultural consensus resulted in the organization's demise.

Table 2 also indicates the obvious; namely, that any organization which lacks member consensus and cultural consensus is unlikely to exist. Table 2 briefly summarizes the results of several empirical studies. Its real importance, however, lies in the fact that it suggests a theoretical rationale predicting what will occur under certain combinations of variables. Thus, by modifying, elaborating, and refining this schema in terms of additional environmental conditions it may be possible to develop a conceptal schema which will allow us to explain why particular changes in one or more aspects of the environment will have a certain effect upon organizational behavior or structure. In other words, to look at and measure environmental segments in terms of their impact upon consensus provides a theoretically consistent means of investigating the impact of environmental aspects upon organizational structure and behavior or vice versa.

It has been argued then, that by interpreting the impact of member consensus and goal orientations in terms of community consensus, certain

predictions can be made regarding the likelihood of a change in target populations, goal succession, or the demise of an organization. One may summarize these predictions in the form of six propositions:

- For organizations with positive goals, if there is member consensus and cultural consensus, the organization will thrive or persist over time.
- If cultural consensus is lost, it is likely that the organization will adopt new--more culturally acceptable--goals.
- If member consensus is lost, it is likely that the structure of the organization will change so that contending ideologies can coexist.
- For organizations with negative goals, if there is member consensus and cultural consensus, the organization will thrive or persist over time.
- If cultural consensus is lost, the organization will retain its goals and shift to a new target population for support.
- Without regard to the nature of its goals, an organization which loses both member consensus and cultural consensus will cease to exist.

Therefore, having established community consensus as representing a necessary condition for the survival of an organization, we can begin to explore the necessary and sufficient conditions associated with particular organizational structures and behaviors. Thus, by elaborating and expanding this schema in terms of additional environmental conditions it should be possible to understand why a particular change in one or more aspects of the environment will have a certain effect upon organizational structure or behavior.

CHAPTER IV

AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING ORGANIZATIONAL PERSISTENCE

The purpose of this chapter is to devise a logic by which the community consensus model can be adapted to the analysis of particular social movement organizations and community action groups. This chapter will also present a series of propositions in the form of a causal model which facilitates prediction of the persistence of emergent or newly developing organizations.

Emery and Trist (1972:275) have hypothesized that increasing rates of change among various elements external to an organization--even though these are not directly connected to the organization's inputs and outputs--will have consequences for organizational processes. This argument suggests that an organization surrounded by a "turbulent field" (e.g., a changing social environment) will increase survival behavior and, correspondingly, decrease goal achieving behavior. Richard Hall (1972:302) corroborates this claim noting that "in periods of chronic distress, an organization is likely to cut back or eliminate those programs it feels are least important to its overall goals."

This phenomenon poses several important theoretical questions with respect to the interplay between organizations and their environments. That is, will emergent (i.e., new) movement or action organizations, once established, compete or cooperate with other existing organizations? Will such emergent organizations be co-opted or legitimized as independent units? Levine and White (1961) and Evan (1972) have

developed theoretical frameworks for handling these issues. While these researchers agree on certain issues, they disagree or are unclear with regard to others. Nevertheless, from their work it is possible to build an initial framework by recognizing and specifying important variables for the analysis of organization-environment interplays. A brief outline of each theory follows, accompanied by a examination of their points of agreement and disagreement regarding interorganizational relations.

Levine and White (1961) studied 22 health organizations in a New England community and developed an exchange theory to account for their interrelationships. They defined cooperation as an organization exchange which is considered to be "any voluntary activity between two organizations which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals and objectives." Organizations cooperate by exchanging elements which among health orgaizations included cases, labor services, funds, equipment, and information. The nature of the exchanges can be further specified by noting the mode of exchange (formal or informal) and by ascertaining the direction of exchange. Directions may be unilaterial (give, but don't take), reciprocal (give and take), or joint (elements from two organizations acting in unison toward a third party). Levine and White maintain that any kind of cooperative activity may be conceptualized as an exchange. For example, an interorganizational case conference may be viewed as an exchange of information.

Levine and White outline several conditions which mediate exchanges between organizations (1972:345-352). Organizations which depend upon a particular organization-set for support or other inputs are likely to

seek exchanges within that organization-set. Thus, Levine and White report that corporate organizations with connections outside the community are less likely to interact with local agencies (1972:346). Also, the nature of an organization's task constitutes another factor in exchange. Some organizations can discharge their functions more or less independently, while others require frequent interaction with other organizations. Levine and White report that agencies with direct service functions were more likely to enter into exchanges than were agencies providing indirect services (1972:349). A third factor for exchange is "domain consensus," by which the authors mean interorganizational agreements concerning respective goals and functions (1972:352). Unless domain consensus can be achieved, it is predicted that competition rather than cooperation would characterize most exchanges.

Evan developed his framework for analyzing interorganizational relations primarily by extending the concept of role-set from individuals to organizations (1972:326-340) and by introducing the idea of organization sets. Evan then proceeds to examine interactions between a given organization (the focal organization) and other oganizations within the set. Evan contends that the role relations of an organization's boundary personnel form one index of the climate of interorganizational relations. Hence, cooperation among organizations may be conceived in terms of the frequency of transactions which occur among their boundary personnel.

Evan's work has two important implications for the study of interorganizational relations. First, if the goals of the focal organization are similar to the goals of other organizations in its set,

Evan contends that organizations will compete (1972:332-336). If, however, the organizations have overlapping memberships, Evan argues that goal similarity promotes cooperation rather than competition. Second, Evan suggests that if the focal organization's functions complement the functions of other members of its organization set, an atmosphere of cooperation will prevail. In summary, resource shortages for differential control of important resources are two factors by both Levine and White and by Evan as prerequisites for organizational cooperation. Thus, cooperation is seen as a mechanism for dealing with limited resources. Furthermore, resource shortages may be characterized as necessary but not sufficient conditions for cooperation. When faced with resource shortages which hinder or preclude goal attainment, an organization might cooperate or undergo goal succession by designating a new goal or by switching its goal emphasis to a secondary goal. Either of these latter strategies could have the effect of permitting an organization to shift resources when faced with probable decline due to limited resources. An important aspect of organizational analysis lies in determining the point at which an organization might change its goal rather than adopt a cooperative stance vis-a-vis its organization set.

The propositions developed in the sections which follow will be framed in terms of the environmental factors of change and community demand or ideology as well as the organizational factors of capacity, formalization, and task orientation. These variables will be shown to be key dimensions in predicting the emergence, maintenance, or demise of a community action or social movement organization.

Much of the theme of Chapter III focused upon the importance of community consensus as a factor which shapes the life history of organizations. The argument was that for organizations (whether seen as social movement organizations or in terms of the bureaucratic model), the local community forms an environment at the first level of contact. Without regard to an organization's external ties, it must exist within and form some ongoing relationship with the local community, a community composed of voluntary associations, official or governmental agencies, pressure groups, social movements, and so forth. Therefore, we can characterize this environment as a social system and describe it with the vocabulary of systems analysis: inputs, throughputs, and outputs (cf. Von Bertalanffy, 1968).

It was pointed out earlier in this chapter that organizations operating within an unceratin environment or "turbulent field" tend to reallocate their resources and energy away from goal achievement and toward retrenchment or simply insuring that the organization itself will survive. When one looks at community service organizations, this shift to survival maintenance has a important impact upon the social system's internal balance with regard to inputs and outputs. That is, when the community system itself is experiencing actual or threatened changes in its levels of inputs from outside, it must rely upon the organizations which comprise its various subsystems to redistribute resources internally in such a way as to maintain balance or equilibrium (Buckley, 1967). This process is demonstrated in Figure 1: if a system operates with a particular level of inputs (time one), and experiences a disruption or change in inputs (time two), it must rely upon the social

service subsystem to reorganize the internal distribution of inputs (time three) either temporarily or on a long-term basis to insure equilibrium. For example, assume that one wished to introduce a technical change of innovation (e.g., building a nuclear facility or other industrial plant) in a given community. Such a proposed change in the environemt would constitute stress for the system; within the community system questions tend to arise involving--for example--location of the facility, economic impact, consequences for health and welfare, overall quality of life, and long-term social impacts. If the established or existing political and



Figure 1: Diagram of system inputs under three conditions

governmental agencies in the community system cannot quickly marshall resources to answer satisfactorily the demands for service (i.e., question answering), the situation represents that which is depicted in "time two" of Figure 1 (blocked inputs). When one recalls that in a turbulent field, service organizations (agencies) tend to shift to self protective behavior, it is not difficult to understand how readily system inputs can be disrupted. Thus, to the extent that established service organizations will not or cannot assume their supportive tasks vis-a-vis the local community, a gap is created between the level of demands for service and the services actually delivered. On the basis of this reasoning and the literature reviewed in Chapter III, our first proposition may be advanced:

- The greater or more pervasive the change in inputs, the greater will be the discrepancy between the level of services provided by establshed agencies and the community's demands for service.

Furthermore, as we suggested in Chapter II, two conditions must be present in the environment for an emergent group to become a social movement organization: some degree of formalization and relative success in meeting unmet demands (providing health and safety information, for example). Both of these conditions are dependent to a large extent on the length of the time lag between the emergence of the new group and the initial response of the established organizations. Thus, the second proposition:

- The longer the time lag before estabished organizations can restore system stability, the greater the probability that social movements or community action groups will emerge to attempt to provide transitory inputs.

Also, a new organization is likely to be more poorly coordinated and less effective than established organizations. This general ineffectiveness flows from the new organization's lack of clearly elaborated goals, absence of clearly defined centers or power, lack of trained personnel, and the absence of a developed administrative structure. It is to be emphasized that these conditions correlate positively with a short period of time for development. Therefore, under normal conditions, one would expect the goals and personnel of emergent organizations to be absorbed by the established agencies as they routinely performed their services. The greater the environmental change (disruption of inputs), however, the more likely the established organizations are to shift to survival maintenance, thereby increasing the time lag and providing emergent groups an opportunity to formalize. It is not suggested that under such conditions all emergent groups will formalize; rather, that formalization becomes one alternative to being absorbed by or joining with established organizations.

Research to date portrays emergent organizations as task oriented, loosely structured, traditionless, and short-lived groups. It has been suggested by Quarantelli (1970:2) that such organizations emerge to accommodate the unmet needs of a system under stress and subsequently disappear. Parr (1970) also reports that emergent organizations typically arise to relieve excessive demands placed on established organizations and that they disband as the unmet demands diminish. Parr (1970:429) concluded that "group emergence is one means through which community social systems cope with stress." These studies imply that the

generation of emergent groups is a response which would be common to all communities undergoing stress. Proposition three therefore states that:

- The larger the number of unmet community demands, the more likely is the creation of emergent organizations.

We now extend the reasoning presented thus far by postulating that the specific task orientation of an emergent organization is likely to produce high initial success in meeting the community's demands for service. A fourth proposition, then, suggests that:

- As emergent organizations perform their tasks, the number of community demands decreases.

If one were to extrapolate from the existing literature on emergent organizations, one would predict that as the unmet community demands are met, the likelihood of the emergent organization formalizing and persisting would decrease; that is, the emergent organization would die. However, as pointed out earlier, the presence of an extended time lag between external impacts and the appropriate response by established organizations facilitates an increase in information exchange and interaction patterns between the emergent group and other community organizations. This, in turn, increases the probability that the emergent group will formalize; assuming that the longer information is being exchanged, the more likely it is that unmet community needs still persist. If so, the emergent organization will have a stake in legitimizing its operation. This suggests the fifth and final proposition:

- The longer an emergent organization formalizes, the greater the probability it will persist and compete with established organizations which provide similar services.

A primary variable in predicting the dissolution or persistence of an emergent organization is its success at formalization, and formalization is directly related to the number of unmet community demands over time.

A Predictive Strategy

The propositions developed regarding the behavior of new (emergent) social movement organizations suggest an informal model for predicting organizational emergence and persistence. The temporal model of predictive variables is shown as Figure 2. The model suggests that the larger the magnitude of the disruptive event (X_1), the lower the ability of the normative system to adapt (X_2) to the change in inputs. It also states that the greater the magnitude of the event (X_1), the greater will be the volume of unmet community needs or demands (X_3). System demands or needs (X_3) are directly related to organizational emergence (X_4) which, in turn, decreases the volume of demands at some future time (X_5). The ratio of change in system demands to time (X_5:X_3) is the key factor which determines the formalization of an emergent organization. Formalization will occur if unmet system demands increase (producing a ratio greater than or equal to 1), while dissipation of the emergent organizaton is likely if system needs decrease over time (producing a ratio less than 1). Finally, formalization (X_6) is seen as the instrumental factor in predicting organizational persistence (X_7). Figure 3 is a causal representation of this same model with temporal paths excluded, illustrating the central role of the index of change in system demands in predicting a movement organization's formalization and persistence.



Where:
- X_1 = magnitude of the disruptive event;
- X_2 = adaptability of the normative system;
- X_3 = system needs at time one (T_1);
- X_4 = organizational emergence;
- X_5 = system needs at time two (T_2);
- X_6 = formalization;
- X_7 = organizational persistence;
- broken arrows = inverse relationship;
- solid arrows = positive relationship;
- double arrows = noncausal, temporal paths;

Figure 2: A temporal model for the emergence, formalization and persistence of emergent organizations



Where:
- X_1 = magnitude of the disruptive event;
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- X_3 = system needs at time one (T_1);
- X_4 = organizational emergence;
- X_5 = system needs at time two (T_2);
- X_6 = formalization;
- X_7 = organizational persistence;
- broken arrows = inverse relationship;
- solid arrows = positive relationship;
- double arrows = noncausal, temporal paths;

Figure 3: A causal model for the emergence, formalization, and persistence of emergent organizations

CHAPTER V

COMMUNITY CHANGE AS A FUNCTION OF THE OPERATION OF MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS

In the preceding chapters we have examined phases of development of social movement organizations, emphasizing the specification of factors which control the emergence and persistence of such organizations. Furthermore, explicit attention has been devoted to formulating a scheme which is sensitive to the role of the environment in the movement organization's growth, persistence, or decline. To make the analytic task manageable, the local community was conceived as the larger environment for movement organizations. Thus, our analysis has generally focused upon the impact of the community (that is, the environment) on movement organizations; it is also important to examine impacts in the opposite direction.

Community transformation or change is an important issue in the study of social movements and community action groups. In assessing the extent to which the community was changed as a function of the operation of a movement, social scientists have seen themselves as examining the "success" of a movement. That is, the measure of social movement is usually taken in terms of visible alterations in the host community which are consistent with the movement's ideology. For example, a group may actually halt construction of a nuclear plant. Turner and Killian (1972:327) provide support for such a characterization of movements by arguing that a typology may be developed which classifies movements as power, value, or participation oriented with regard to the way in which

the membership relates to the social environment. Thus, movements seek to promote or retard certain social changes in the community and one way in which their performance may be assessed is in terms of changes which are actually established or presented. Also, from an examination of community transformation, one can begin to isolate factors, circumstances, or conditions which appear to be important in impeding social change.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine some changes in aspects of the environment which can be a function of the movement organization and changes in the structure and tactics of the movement organization which appear to be a response to the environment. In pursuing this task we shall also be constructing a catalog of variables important in the promotion of community change. Hence, the aim is to contribute to the analytic repertoire of both social scientist and social interventionist.

Three general factors have been isolated as important in directed social change which involves both established organizations and social movement organizations: shifting levels of environmental inputs, the adaptability of the movement organization, and the character of the goals of the movement organization relative to other organizations operating in the environment. Furthermore, each of these factors contributes to the way in which the public defines a movement organization, which impacts upon (1) the perceived legitimacy of the movement organization, (2) the type of opposition it will face, and (3) the nature of the means of goal achievement open to the organization (that is, legitimate-illegitimate). These variables, in turn, are important factors in the effective operation of any movement organization (Killian, 1964; Zald and Ash,

1966). Our discussion of social change in the local community will focus alternately on each of these three factors.

Environmental Inputs and Stability

As Killian (1974:426) has pointed out, social movements appear to be born from instability or social stress; a function of "the struggle of groups within the society to change some aspect of the culture." The literature on social system stress suggests that during times of instability emergent organizations appear, serve as temporary stabilizing inputs to the social system, and then disappear after the emergency period has passed (Barton, 1969; Gillespie and Perry, 1976; Taylor et al., 1970:79-108; Perry et al., 1977). It has been noted, however, that not all emergent social movement organizations eventually dissolve. It has been argued that this is the case because not all types of system stress may be characterized as similar. The image of movement organizations (which emerge as a function of system stress) as short lived or transitory is probably a function of the fact that most research on such organizations has focused upon distress situations marked by sudden onset and a short duration. Some community disruptions, however, can be represented as gradual onset with long duration (Barton, 1979:40-47). It is important to emphasize that the relative success of a movement organization in meeting community demands, and the degree of member commitment to a movement organization, increase with the length of the time lapse between the emergence of a movement organization and the initial response of established organizations. Furthermore, the specific

task orientation, the low level of formality, and the high coincidence of face-to-face interaction which characterize movement organizations suggest that participants will experience considerable reinforcement for their participation and will develop a high level of commitment without regard for the apparent effectiveness of the movement organization to meet community demands. Hence, prolonged distress situations per se generate conditions which enhance the probability that movement organizations will resist dissolution. If we approach community action from a cost-benefit perspective, it would appear that modifying established organizations to cope with the changing environment would be more effective than allowing the evolution of social movement organizations; unless, of course, the movement organization provides a unique service not already subsumed within the goal structure of existing organizations. If the environment has changed so radically and thoroughly as to require a previously unnecessary service on a large scale, it should be acknowledged that the most useful interventionist approach is the creation of the new organization. In situations involving demands which fall within the purview of existing organizations, it would seem desirable to modify the existing organizations to deal with the new demands. In their study of administration and organization in disaster, Thompson and Hawkes (1962) suggest that established organizations may adapt to changing environments by making structural modifications, changing or extending definitions of the task environment, and/or developing "synthetic organizations" which mediate temporary alliances among existing organizations. We have seen, on the one hand, shifts to survival maintenance by established

organizations in times of stress, and research has documented the success of emergent organizations in the short run. These findings may be reconciled by arguing that the environmental instability dictates corresponding changes in the structure of organizations and when the environment is again stable (although different), different organizational structures are again operable. To illustrate this point, we can consider the directed changes discussed by Thompson and Hawkes and explore several modes of adaptation which might be undertaken.

To accommodate a changing environment, one of the most visible things an established organization may do is to institute some structural modification. During periods of environmental stability most organizations maintain some variant of a bureaucratic structure, but the standardized rules and procedures and impersonality of the bureaucracy tend to block effective goal attainment during periods of environmental uncertainty. Under these latter conditions, a decentralized structure and informal mode of operation would seem to be a more effective means of implementing community service and, therefore, promoting community stability. There is no inherent reason why bureaucratic organizations, faced with environmental stress, could not put into effect some short-term decentralized mode of operation. For example, officials could be relocated to strategic areas of need and given relative autonomy in decision making. The central office could be reduced to a skeleton crew concerned principally with coordination. These and other structural modifications, depending upon the nature of the system stress, would seem necessary in order to break the mold which has traditionally made established bureaucracy inept in the face of environmental change.

A slightly more conceptual adaptive strategy for community change involves having established organizations redefine their task environments. Typically, bureaucracies seek to categorize their clients and standardize the service to be provided, the changes in the environment alter the composition and needs of the pool or persons requiring services. Standard classification schemes become inappropriate as the environment changes. Under conditions of environmental instability, established organizations should be prepared to forego routine activities and focus on new community definitions of needs. Decentralization would facilitate feedback in this regard, but careful attention would have to be paid to maintaining an equitable distribution of service relative to organizational resources. Furthermore, if normal procedures for extending services are bypassed, methods would have to be devised for assessing the extent of need in various areas of the community. At a minimum, this would entail a shift in the function of leadership from an emphasis on control and authority to an emphasis on coordination.

The formation of alliances among established organizations in the local community also constitutes a means of coping with community stress which minimizes the impact of or need for emergent organizations. Thus, during periods of environmental uncertainty, cooperation among different organizations and community groups enhances the resource base for attacking problems and reduces the likelihood of providing overlapping services or depleting resources through competition. To promote viable cooperation, leaders of established organizations have to temporarily overlook formal guidelines in recruiting personnel. Thus, organizations

could effectively incorporate community manpower and volunteer service groups to supplement their regular service to the community. In so doing, established agencies would increase their effectiveness by incorporating community viewpoints and novel ways of providing services. Community intervention groups could also benefit from such alliances in that they could draw upon already established centers for coordination. Hence, administrative personnel could be minimized permitting the concentration of community resources on problem solving rather than on the construction of overlapping authority structures.

All of these strategies, then, constitute acceptable means of implementing social change at the community level, assuming that the substance of change falls within the scope of the goal structure of established organizations. It has been noted, however, that to meet system demands which are decidedly outside the purivew of existing organizations, an alternte (and probably more effective) strategy involves the creation of an organization. Given this option, two remaining factors discussed initially in this chapter come into play. Organizational flexibility and the nature of goals are important features in the success of emergent organizations.

Organizational Flexibility

The capacity to adapt to change among organizations with an established set of personnel who deal with the public is at best limited. Thus, several kinds of conditions conspire to constrain a community's ability to adapt to changes in levels of system inputs. In

the first place, the nature and extent of environmental change can never be completely anticipated. This circumstance is exacerbated with the slow or progressive onset of environmental distress because there appears to be a tendency among the members of a community system to construct temporary, makeshift ideologies which bolster the community's optimism regarding the possibility of immediate relief and solutions to the problem situation. In addition, Dynes (1970) has found that communities anticipate future environmental change primarily in terms of past events. Communities which experience a flood, for example, will prepare for the future by building flood banks or dikes just a few inches above the water level reached by the past flood. Finally, community preparedness also varies with such things as the season of year for long duration environmental distress.

The above conditions involve constraints upon the ability of a social system to adapt to external change, and work to preserve the existence of particular unmet needs brought on by the increased demands being made upon the system. In general, the magnitude of change in system inputs would seem to be inversely related to the adaptability of the established organizations. External changes of certain intensities or durations will create areas of unmet needs in a system which cannot or will not be met by existing mechanisms.

The three modifications suggested in the discussion of environmental changes would seem possible correctives for these restraints on oganizational adaptability. A decentralized structure, coupled with receptivity to community feedback, and a working connection with other organizations and groups, would increase the awareness of the effects of

changes in inputs, decrease dependence upon prior experience, and allow better integration among various established organizations.

Goal Structure and Movement Organizations

Social movements and community action groups begin with a loose knit structure of goals. As movements formalize into movement organizations, this loose collection of goals is translated into clearly defined objectives, usually accompanied by statements laying strategies and tactics for their attainment. This contrasts with established agencies which pursue more diffuse goals. New organizations also differ from established systems in that they are characterized by loosely defined or developing centers of power, shortages of equipment and trained personnel, and informally arranged administrative structures. Each of these dimensions has been found to correlate positively with the short period of time that a new organization has been in existence (Tsouderos, 1955). Therefore, when the goals of new and established organizations overlap and the established organizations are better equipped to achieve the goals, established organizations should be expected to absorb the clientele of emergent organizations, leaving the new organizations without an operating base. With a prolonged environmental instability, however, established organizations tend to undergo shifts to survival maintenance, offering an opportunity for new organizations to become better organized and to be potential competitors to the established organizations.

We have already suggested that the emergence of social movements depends upon the presence of certain conditions in the community (Parr, 1970:424-427). Furthermore, it can now be seen that a prolonged distress situation generates conditions which enhance the likelihood of competition among movements and established organizations. It is not argued that all new organizations under such conditions will compete, but that competition is an alternative to being absorbed by established organizations.

Therefore, we can explain the persistence of emergent movement organizations as terms of the internal structure of sentiment and Evan's model of interorganizational relations. Focusing upon the transformation or change of communities, however, a creation of social movement organizations as agents of change must be given a mixed review. If the movement organization fulfills community demands which are new and do not come under the purview of established organizations, then (assuming it operates successfully) over time the movement organization will become institutionalized as part of the community's social system. Under these conditions, movement organizations are positive agents of change and may be seen as efficient means for community transformation or change.

Movement organizations which seek to perform community services that fall within the goal structures of existing organizations can be seen as efficient from the standpoint of the larger community system only up to a point. To the extent that a movement organization bridges the gap between excessive community demands and the output levels of established organizations during the period of environmental instability, it becomes the most efficient means of dealing with such crises. That is, a

movement organization which arises during a crisis to supplement the efforts of over-taxed established organizations and then disappears when the crisis is passed, maintains a cooperative rather than a disruptive stature vis-a-vis the community system. The work of disaster researchers on emergent rescue organizations has provided considerable documentation for this pattern (Parr, 1970:424-427).

If the time lag between the initial emergence of the movement organization and the point at which established organizations are able to adjust their output to fully handle community demands is prolonged, an alternative pattern may result. Under these conditions, the movement organization is afforded time in which to formalize and develop a body of clients, two circumstances which appear to promote competition with the organization set. Viewed in terms of the efficient operation of the community system, such competition for limitive resources is counter-productive. That is, when concern focuses upon service provision, competition among provider organizations for resources has the general effect of fragmenting the collective resource base and hampering the delivery of said resources.

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APPENDIX A

INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSIPS:

A Review of the Literature from a Community Conflict Perspective

How contact among organizations occurs, what purposes it serves, and what the implications are for the parties involved has been the subject of a growing body of literature (see Walsh, 1976). This appendix seeks to identify and address the major issues that arise in that literature and discuss specific contributions in so far as they bear on these issues. The major issues are: clarity with regard to level of analysis, definition of the basic dimensions of interorganizational relationships, and specification of the dynamic characteristics of interorganizational relationships.

The Organizational versus the Elite Paradigm

It should be made clear from the outset that a conscious choice has been made in favor of adopting an organizational paradigm as the basis for addressing the phenomena at hand. This means that organizations will constitute the unit of analysis in the discussions that follow. Moreover, organizations are viewed as actors.[1]

There is an alternative paradigm that has been used in the study of some aspects of the very same set of phenomena. The elite paradigm also recognizes the existence of organizations; however, the unit of analysis is not the organization, but key individual members of the organization. Such individuals are viewed as members of an elite. Moreover, individuals do not act on behalf of organizations (as boundary persons) but on behalf of themselves using the organizations of which they are members as bases of resources or power.

Both paradigms have received theoretical and empirical support. For example, Presthus (1962) and Terryberry (1968) have stressed the importance and usefulness of the organizational approach, while Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970) and Zeitlin (1974) have argued persuasively for an elite approach. Many other studies could be cited as well. Citing more studies would not help in deciding which paradigm more accurately reflects reality, since, contrary to Zeitline's proposal, the question cannot be answered empirically.

The assertion that there exists an elite has meaning only within the elite paradigm. Therefore, "When paradigms enter, as they must, into a debate about paradigm choice, their role is necessarily circular. Each group uses its own paradigm to argue in the paradigm's defense. . . . As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice--there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community" (Kuhn, 1970, p. 94). And that assent expressed through empirical choice has been for an interorganizational paradigm.

The decision to adopt the organizational paradigm was based on more than a frequency distribution of paradigm choices by authors. The organizational paradigm is simply more comprehensive. It encompasses not only the relatively small scale or stable situations conductive to the emergence of an elite, but also situations posing severe conceptual or empirical difficulties for an elite approach. Large-scale, nation-wide networks of relationships (Levine, 1972), new systems of relationships (Warren et al., 1974), and implicit relationships (Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973) are examples of such situations. In addition, the organizational approach permits the collection of extensive comparative data from large

numbers of networks (Clark, 1968; Turk, 1973, 1977). Consequently, the interorganizational paradigm will form the basis of the discussions that follow. Studies grounded in the elite perspective are integrated into the discussion when appropriate, however.

Historical Perspective

Early concern with interorganizational relationships developed from a concern with intraorganization phenomena. Increased attention began to be directed to the environment, particularly to efforts to dimensionalize the environment. This interest predated the work of Emergy and Trist (1965) and Terryberry (1968) by over a decade. Dimrock (1952) described the processes through which the Recruitment and Manning Organization of the War Shipping Administration expanded its jurisdiction and protected its future against rival organizations. Dimrock focused on the development of coalitions among organizations and the deliberate use of power by rivals. In addition, he stressed the need to adapt to a changing environment. However, Dimrock's approach was from the point of view of a focal organization, his own Recruitment and Manning Organization.

Dill (1958) divided the environment into four elements: customers, suppliers, competitors and regulatory groups. Though he did not explicitly state that three of these four elements are really sets of organizations, Dill treated them as such in his discussion.

Form and Nosow (1958) provide the earliest attempt to describe interactions among organizations. In their account of the reaction of

Genesee County, Michigan, to a devastating tornado, they primarily focused on the actions of specific disaster control organizations. However, they also described the nature of the interactions, or, more accurately, the lack of interaction, among organizations. Form and Nosow concluded that coordination will occur only when hierarchical control is present; the activities they observed were predominantly individual and uncoordinated. Thompson's (1967) concept of the ad hoc or synthetic organizaton is based on a misinterpretation of these results.[2]

Miller's (1958) account of a three-year juvenile delinquency program provides the first coherent perspective on the interorganizational field. Miller recognized the systematic nature of the interorganizational field and focused on the dynamics of conflict within the field. In another early study with a field perspective, Long (1958) treated local communities as nondirected ecological systems.

Ridgway (1957) and Macaulay (1963) focused explicitly on relationships among business organizations. Ridgeway dealt with relationships among manufacturers and dealers, while Macaulay was concerned with the determinants of the degree of formality or informality characterizing contractual relationships. Both dealt with the dynamics of relationships, paying particular attention to bargaining. In addition, both authors dealt with important dimensions of interorganizational relationships, such as resource exchange. Ridgway also examined the degree of autonomy possessed by dealers in relationship to manufacturers and the nature of the dependence relation between the two types of organizations.

Phillips (1960), an economist, also focused specifically on the interorganizational field. He argued for making organizations the unit of analysis in the study of relationships among organizations rather than attending to the internal characteristics of particular organizations. Phillips' theory postulated four determinants of the degree of formal interfirm organization: the number of organizations involved; the degree of symmetry in the distribution of power among them; the degree of value conflict and dissimilarity; and the degree of formal interaction among outside interests.

With the publication of articles by Levine and White (1961) and Litwak and Hylton (1962), interorganizational relationships came to be recognized as an important field of inquiry. The impact of these two articles has been substantial and somewhat out of proportion to their actual contributions. Their contributions will be discussed later; what is important here is that they represent one of two divergent approaches.

Both were concerned with service organizations. Both treated resource exchange as synonomous with the existence of interorganization relationships. Finally, and most importantly, both assumed that cooperation was the desired state of relationships; conflict was viewed as a temporary condition indicative of system malfunctions.

Later work based on experiences with business organizations by Evan (1966) and Guetzkow (1966) dealt more fully with conflict and tactics such as bargaining. In addition, these two works and those that followed were more concerned with dependence relationships, overlapping membership as a dimension of interorganization relationships, and the role of boundary personnel.

A number of studies in both traditions (cooperative and competitive) followed (see Walsh, 1976). While there has been no shortage of theoretical works, integrative efforts have been few and far between. Van de Ven has developed a model applicable to the emergence of voluntary relations among organizations. Marrett (1971) attempted to integrate the literature relevant to health and welfare (service) organizations. White and Vlasak (1970) used the medium of a symposium to "make a critical review of the current state of knowledge regarding the interorganizational relationships, with particular emphasis on the health field" (p. 2). Several interesting, though limited, papers (Reid, 1970; Thompson, 1970) emerged from this effort. Finally, Negandhi (1975) has pulled together articles dealing with many of the issues around the dimensions and processes of interorganization relationships and published them as a book of readings. Negandhi's book draws from both traditions.

Level of Analysis

A recurring problem in the study of interorganizational relationships is the specification of the level of analysis appropriate for a particular investigation. Four distince levels of analysis have appeared (Aldrich, 1974) in the literature: intraorganizational, pair-wise, organization-set, and interorganizational field.

The Intraorganizational Level of Analysis

Intraorganizational level studies seek to describe or explain interorganizational relationships in terms of intraorganizational

phenomena. Aiken and Hage (1968) exemplify this type of approach. Structural characteristics (in this case, formalization, complexity, and centralization) are viewed as either encouraging or resulting from the existence of linkages with other organizations. A sample of organizations is examined and the correlations between the structural measures and the measures of interaction with other organizations are interpreted in light of the author's theory. Some of the studies of interlocking boards of directors (Allen, 1974; Dooley, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972) are also characteristic of this type of approach.

In general, the intraorganizational approach is valid and useful research strategy for addressing some limited aspects of interorganizational relationships, such as capacity for interorganizational relationships (Aiken and Hage, 1968), and, perhaps some characteristics of the potential relationship. Internal structural characteristics have been found to be related to the degree to which an organization is linked to other organizations in its environment. With regard to service organizations, Aiken and Hage posit that "with increase in division of labor, organizations become more complex and more innovative; the need for resources to support such innovations promotes interdependent relations with organizations and the greater integration of the organizations in a community structure" (p. 912).

Paulson (1974) revised the Aiken and Hage model and tested it with a sample of 138 health and welfare organizations. His results were consonant with theirs. In addition, Paulson found that internal structural characteristics accounted for approximately one-third of the variance in interorganizational linkages.

With regard to business organizations, the structural characteristics associated with a high level of linkage seem to be: size and assets (direct relationship); type of industry (higher levels are associated with high technological intensity); concentration (linkages are more common with median levels of concentration); and requirements for external capital (direct relationship) (Allen, 1974; Dooley, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976), though there is some disagreement as to the direction of the relationship of linkage level and the latter characteristic (Boyle, 1968; Mead, 1967).

The major difficulty with using the intraorganizational approach to study interorganizational relationships is its limited scope. The limitation in scope arises from the focus on the internal properties of organizations. It is a situation analogous to a study of the interactions of a group of individuals based solely on their scores on a battery of personality tests and measures of their predispositions to interact. Critical system level variables (in this example, rules and norms affecting the group, the history of the group, etc.) can only be incorporated, at best, as moderators, or defined and then assigned as a sort of constant to each member. The former method is theoretically absurd, the latter washes out all the variance on the very things to be compared. To approach the study of relationships among organizations solely from an interorganizational perspective is to ignore the systemic properties of the phenomena. An intraorganizational approach may, however, explain what types of organizations are likely to interact with other organizations and even help specify the nature of the link, but it says nothing about the pattern of interactions within the system, the

level of interaction within the system, and the influence of factors external to the organization.

The Pair-wise Level of Analysis

Pair-wise studies seek to explain interorganizational relationships by examining the linkages between organizations taken two at a time. Two different varieties of pair-wise studies are evident in the literature. One variety consists of studies that deliberately focus on two particular organizations because the phenomenon under examination is thought to be most parsimoniously dealt with as a dyadic relationship. Kochan's (1975) study of collective bargaining from an interorganizational perspective is characteristic of this approach. Other examples are Kriesberg's (1973) study of the relationship between public health and mental health personnel, Pfeffer's (1972) study of mergers, and White's (1966) case study of local conflicts between two national voluntary health agencies. In studies of this sort, that is, when the phenomenon under investigation may be viewed as essentially or primarily a dyadic relationship, the pair-wise level of analysis is appropriate and valid.

The other pair-wise approach is more common in the literature, and more questionable. It consists of reducing a network of interorganizational relationships to a set of dyadic relationships. The early article by Levine and White (1976:583) is an example of this variety of pair-wise studies. The authors set out "to explain relationships among community health and welfare agencies by viewing them as being involved in an exchange system." beyond that sentence, however, there is no discussion of what sort of system if any, might exist. The

authors look at exchange relationships between organizations classified in terms of form, function, prestige, and type of service. Their discussion is focused on why particular organizations enter into exchange relationships with other particular organizations. The fact that organizations within the system have multiple relationships with other organizations within the system is overlooked. The rest of the world impinges on the dyadic relationship as a "related factor" influencing the interdependence of agencies: "the accessibility of each organization to necessary elements from outside the health system."

In their discussion of the dimensions of the exchange relationship, the same reductionism emerges. The important dimensions are the characteristics of the two parties, the nature of the elements exchanged, the formality of the agreement between the two parties, and the direction of the exchange. Only in regard to the direction of the exchange is the existence of other organizations acknowledged. Joint exchanges are defined as exchanges in which "elements flow from two organizations acting in unison toward a third party. This type, although representing a high order of agreement and coordination of policy among agencies, does not involve the actual transfer of elements."

There are other examples. Reid's (1964) study of delinquency prevention explicitly adopts Levine and White's approach. A laboratory study by Stern, Sternthal, and Craig (1975) reduces interorganizational relationships to dyadic relationships in typical experimental social psychology style. Van de Ven and Koenig (1975) have even offered a reductionist theory of pair-wise relationships.

The pair-wise level of analysis, then, is appropriate when the phenomenon under investigation is adequately represented as a dyadic relationship. Collective bargaining is one such example. The pair-wise level of analysis is inappropriate, however, as a strategy for reducing the complexity of a network of linkages among organizations when the pattern of relationships within the network is important. Not only is the pattern of relationships among organizations lost, as well as the influence that relationships with other organizations in the system may have on an organization's relationships with one other particular organization, but the dyadic relationship also fails to capture the system level variables (as was the case with the intraorganizational level) as well.

The Organization-set Level of Analysis

Studies at the level of the organization set examine the interactions between a focal organization and the collection of organizations that populate its environment. The concept of an organization set was proposed and discussed in some detail by Evan (1966, 1972). The organization set is analogous to Merton's concept of the "role-set." Borrowing further from the role theory, Evan defines the organization, or class of organizations (1972), that is the point of reference as the focal organization. The focal organization interacts with a complement of organizations in its environment, the organization set.

The examination of interorganizational relationships at the level of the organization set has been a popular approach in both empirical and theoretical work. Presthus (1962) and Terryberry (1968) have argued that

organizations are becoming increasingly important as elements of the environment for both individuals and other organizations. Burt (1975) and Turk (1977) provide some empirical support for that position. And Jurkovich (1974) has argued that interorganizational networks are an easier part of the organization's environment to deal with than are the remaining unorganized sectors.

Much of the task environment literature is at the level of the organization set. Dill (1958) divided the task environment into four elements, three of which (suppliers, competitors, and regulatory groups) are other organizations or groups of organizations. This definition of the task environment in terms of other organizational entities is common in that literature (for example, Elling and Halebsky, 1961; Negandhi and Reimann, 1973).

In the course of their discussion of environmental complexity, Osborn and Hunt (1974) have developed the concept of task environment beyond a simple notion of suppliers, customers, and regulatory agencies. For Osborn and Hunt, other organizations are the task environment. They explicitly note the similarity between their concept of task environment, and Warren's (1967b) discussion of the interorganizational field. Broad factors facing all organizations, such as the general cultural context and conditions unique to a particular network, such as market conditions, constituencies, etc. (Brown, 1969), are not considered part of the task environment, but are viewed as clearly relevant in understanding the interdependencies among organizations.

A number of other analyses, not concerned with task environment, have also adopted the organization set as their level of analysis. Litwak and

Hylton's (1962) study of community chest programs and other coordinating agencies is an early example. They viewed the coordinating agency as an example of what Evan would later call a focal organization. The organization set in their study was the network of health and welfare agencies with which the coordinating agency (the fund raising organization) interacted. Their study focused on the conditions within that network that facilitated or permitted the emergence of coordinating agencies. They recognized the importance of such network characteristics as size, interdependence, communication, and standardization of activities for the very survival of the focal (coordinating) organization.

Other studies of coordinating agencies have adopted a similar approach. Warren's (1967a, 1967b) early work with coordinating agencies (community decision organizations, in Warren's terminology) is cast in an organization-set perspective. Metcalfe (1976) has described a focal organization that enjoyed some success in redesigning its organization set, while Maniha and Perrow (1965) have described an organization set that enjoyed considerable success in redesigning the focal organization.

The basic factor that distinguishes this approach or level of analysis from the previous two is the assumption that the focal organization and its organization set constitute a network of organizational roles. "Whatever the patterns of integration among them, the members of an organization set interact to produce unique and dynamic configurations of environmental forces" (Metcalfe, 1976). For Litwak and Hylton's coordinating agencies, existence itself was predicted on the outcome of those interactions.

It is this explicit recognition that a given organization's relationships with other organizations may be influenced both by cultural and system level variables, as well as by the interactions among those other organizations, that is the major advantage of the organization-set level of analysis. It is in those cases where these considerations are important to the analysis that the organization-set level is appropriate.

Consideration of these variables need not be at the expense of intraorganizational factors, though most research has focused, at most, only on the boundary units of the focal organization. Evan (1966) did suggest several ways in which the organization set can influence the structure and activities of the focal organization. Metcalfe's article balances Evan's by describing a number of ways in which the focal organization may redesign the organization set. Both suggest strategies for integrating an intraorganizational level analysis into an organization-set level study.

Other important advantages of this approach are derived from its simplicity, its applicability, and its convergence with other bodies of literature. Much of the apparent simplicity is due to the close and deliberate analogy to the concept of role-set coupled with the general, if superficial, familiarity of most researchers and theorists with role theory.

Applicability is an important advantage in terms of actually being able to use an approach to gather relevant data. The study of coordinating agencies with decision-making power (Litwak and Hylton, 1962), new agencies (Maniha and Perrow, 1965), and industrial organizations facing difficulties in their task environments (Hirsh,

1975) all seem to demand an organization-set level of analysis. The work cited is indicative of the feasability of such an analysis.

Finally, the overlap with other lines of research has proved to be an advantage. The convergence of the organization-set literature with the task environment literature has resulted not only in conceptual cross-fertilization, but also in bringing together the research on business and service organizations. In addition, the attempts to dimensionalize the external environment contained in the organization-environment literature have suggested key variables in describing the dimensions of relationships between the focal organization and its organization set as well as within the organization set.

The major limitation of the organization-set approach is the existence of a focal organization. So long as the focus of attention is on a particular organization, or the concern is with organization-environment relationships, then the organization set is a valid and appropriate level of analysis. It should be understood, however, that a basic internal-external dichotomy still exists. Relationships within the organization set are only important in so far as they influence relationships between the focal organization and the organization set. While the focal organization is viewed as only one component of a network of interacting organizations, operating within cultural and network specific constraints and norms, that system is still viewed from only <u>one</u> perspective: that of the focal organization.

<u>The Interorganizational Field Level of Analysis</u>

The fourth level of analysis seeks to move beyond that constraint. Studies at the level of the interorganizational field focus explicitly on

the network of interorganizational relationships (Aldrich, 1974) plus the institutionalized thought structure (Warren, et al., 1974) which supports and maintains it. Adoption of an interorganizational field perspective is not a particularly novel approach in the literature. In their early studies, Ridgeway (1957), to a limited extent, and Miller (1958), in a somewhat more explicit fashion, both viewed relationships among organizations as interrelated and interdependent, without basing their analyses on any sort of focal organization.

A number of later studies have also adopted the interorganizational field as the level of analysis. These studies fall roughly into three content areas: community structure, interlocking directorates, and public health organizations.

By far the largest group of studies falls in the area of community structure. Most of these are comparative studies which treat characteristics of interorganizational networks as predictors of such outcomes at the community level as: innovation (Aiken and Alford, 1970); type of decision structure (Laumann and Pappi, 1973); and distribution of power among elites (Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970). The most thorough analysis of community structure from an interorganizational field perspective is Turk's (1970, 1973a, 1973b, 1977) comparative study of the interorganizational networks in the 130 largest United States cities.

Two studies of interlocking boards of directorates have also adopted interorganizational field perspectives. Warner and Unwalla (1967) and Levine (1972) both relied on archival data to map integrated subsystems composed of financial and industrial organizations on a nationwide basis. The Levine study develops an unfolding variant of smallest space analysis to represent the network in terms of spherical (gnomonic) maps.

Finally, Baker and O'Brien (1971) have summarized and interpreted the interorganizational literature relevant to health care organizations in terms of a field perspective.

A number of theoretical works have adopted an interorganizational field perspective. Phillips (1960, 1961) was interested in the conditions conducive to the emergence of formalized interfirm behavior within oligopolistic markets. While his definitions are sometimes rather vague, in his basic assumptions, Phillips was quite clear. First, he assumed that firms in oligopolistic markets are members of a group (interfirm organization) that has an identify apart from the individual organizations. Second, he assumed that competition within the market takes the form of interdependent rivalry; one firm's gain means lossess for other firms in the market.

In addition, he argued that firms are the appropriate unit of analysis in understanding group (network) behavior. This strategy was, he felt, superior to focusing on firms as independent actors and attending to internal criteria. The point here is not the accuracy of his rather arbitrary assertion, but merely that by making it, he leaves little doubt that he was concerned with interorganizational phenomena at the field level.

Several other theorists have suggested schemes for dimensionalizing the interorganizational field (as distinct from the more general concept of external environment). While the empirical studies cited above were concerned with interorganizational relationships in terms of resource exchange, overlapping membership, and dependence relationships, the following theoretical works are more abstract in their

dimensionalizations. Drawing heavily from graph theory, Aldrich (1974) proposed a number of properties of interorganizational networks that he felt were worthy of investigation: degree of coordination, connectedness, overlap, reachability, and centralization. Turk (1973) relied on three properties: scale, or size of the network; the distribution and amount of power in the network; and method of influence within the network. Benson (1975) required six dimensions for his theory, though they were all variations of his basic dimensions of power and resource distribution. Warren (1971; Warren et al., 1974) was far more concerned with the dynamics than with the dimensions of interorganizational relationships, though domain consensus seems to assume some of the status of a dimension in his approach. Only Turk and Warren have actually attempted to test their models.

This surfeit of dimensions is indicative of one of the major problems in adopting the interorganizational field as the level of analysis. Without the perspective of a focal organization to structure theory and observation, it is not at all obvious how to capture the properties of an interdependent network of organizations in a scheme that adequately represents the phenomenon, yet is also parsimonious and operational.

When examined from a more optimistic viewpoint, this abundance of approaches suggests the major advantage of the interorganizational field approach: it is not tied to the perspective of one particular organization within the network. Indeed, the usefulness of the interorganizational field versus the organization-set approach hinges on the need for a focal organization to structure the analysis. Both approaches make the same assumptions about the organizational network.

Both recognize the importance of cultural and system level variables in influencing and/or constraining interaction within the network.

Adoption of the interorganizational field as the level of analysis is appropriate if the basic purpose of the study is to describe the pattern of interaction throughout the network or to characterize the network in some fashion. Levine (1972), for example, was interested in identifying subsystems within the larger, nationwide network of industrial and financial organizations. Warren, et al. (1974) were interested in (among other things) identifying the central organizations within the nine community networks in the study. Questions such as these simply cannot be addressed except from a field perspective.

Summary

This section has described four levels of analysis found useful in the study of relationships among organizations. The intraorganizational level is appropriate when the goal is to link internal organizational characteristics to the organization's interactions with other organizations in its environment. The pair-wise level is appropriate when interorganizational relationships are essentially dyadic in nature. The organization-set level of analysis is appropriate when the focus is on the relationships between a focal organization and the network of organizations that constitute its environment. The most significant difference between the organization-set and interorganizational field levels of analysis and the preceding two levels is the explicit recognition that relationships within the network or organizations may be interdependent and are influenced by cultural and system level factors.

Finally, the interorganizational field level of analysis is appropriate when the goal is to characterize the network of interactions in terms of network level variables rather than from the perspective of any particular focal organization.

Dimensions of Interorganizational Relationships

The previous discussion has highlighted the large number of schemes available for dimensionalizing relationships among organizations. Aldrich (1974), for example, has drawn his variables primarily from graph theory, while Phillips (1960) has relied on economics and Benson (1975) has turned to political science. With this diversity of sources, it is not surprising that no one underlying model is evident. However, when the empirical work is examined in some detail, basic patterns do seem to emerge.

The model to be proposed in the following pages rests on one assumption and one key distinction. All interorganizational activity is assumed to be purposive; not necessarily rational, but undertaken wih some purpose or intention on the part of at least one of the parties. The key distinction is between content and process. This is not a particularly original idea, but it is a distinction of proven worth in the study of groups and one not yet applied to the study of networks of organizations. Such a distinction permits the separation of the dynamics (or process activity) or interorganizational relationships, that is, cooperation, conflict, competition, cooptation, and all the rest, from the basic dimensions (content) of interorganizational relationships. The

dynamics of interorganizational relationships will be the subject of the next portion of this paper. This section is concerned with the dimensions.

It is proposed here that we classify the content of interorganizational relationships into two conceptual dimensions: transaction functions and influence functions. Transaction functions are defined as those voluntary relationships among organizations which involve the exchange of commodities (which may include resources, information, "goodwill," etc.). Influence functions are defined as those relationships among organizations that involve an attempt by at least one organization to constrain or determine the actions of at least one other organization. No particular correspondence between either of the dimensions and any of the dynamics is assumed. For example, one organization could influence another by cooptation, by bargaining for the desired course of action.

Transaction Functions

Transaction functions have received considerable attention in the literature and several models of resource exchange already exist. For the most part, these models vary only in presentation and detail. Most specify the commodities to be exchanged, the dynamics of the exchange (usually cooperation), and the various types of exchanges possible. Some look only at pair-wise exchanges, while others focus on the flow of resources through the system. Since the dynamics of interorganizational relationships will be the subject of a later section of this paper, this

section will concern itself with what constitutes an exchange and why exchange takes place at all.

The question of what constitutes an exchange relationship among/between organizations has received considerable attention in the literature. Often these discussions are more confusing than clarifying, due to a tendency (Black and Kase, 1963; Marrett, 1971; Reid, 1970) to confound resource exchange and cooperation. Many researchers have simply seen the two concepts as synonomous.

Several researchers have adopted rather limited concepts of exchange relationships. For Aiken and Hage (1968) and Paulson (1974), the establishment of joint programs is viewed as the mechanism for gaining resources and a type of organizational exchange. Elling and Halebsky (1961) are concerned with sponsorship, or financial support. Reid (1964) is concerned with resource exchange by service organizations only in regard to providing services for individual clients.

Most studies, however, fall within the following generalized version of Levine and White's dimensions of exchange. Their four main dimensions were: the parties involved; the nature of the resources exchanged; the agreement underlying the exchange; and the direction of the exchange. The discussion that follows extends their specific definitions to apply to exchange relationships in general.

Their first dimension, the parties involved, refers to the characteristics of the organizations involved in the exchange relationship. Much of the literature cited in the earlier discussion of the intraorganiza- tional level of analysis is relevant here.

Their second dimension, the nature of the commodities involved, refers to the types of commodities exchanged. For Levin and White, these commodities were divided into "actual" elements exchanged (consumers, labor services, and resources other than labor services), and information on the availability of these elements and on rights and obligations regarding them. Other schemes for classifying these commodities are available. For Benson, money and power are the only scarce resources to be exchanged. Jacobs (1974:50) sees five types of exchange relationships: input (raw materials) acquisition; output (product) disposal; capital acquisition; acquisition of production factors; and acquisition of labor. Other variations (Dill, 1958; Evan, 1966; etc.) on Jacobs' basic theme are common.

This sort of approach seems to constrain rather than facilitate progress. Instead of naming all the resources or commodities that might be exchanged, a more fruitful approach may be to agree to a first approximation of a definition of resources. Yuchtman and Seashore (1967:897) have provided such a definition: "broadly defined, resources are (more or less) generalized means, or facilities, that are potentially controllable by social organizations and that are potentially usable--however indirectly--in relationship between the organization and its environment." Yuchtman and Seashore go on to note that resources need not be physical or economic commodities, though a physical base must lie behind such a resource. Their example of an organization's reputation as such a nonphysical resource fits nicely wth Levine and White's discussion of the low regard for local branches of corporate organizations (which engaged in minimal levels of exchange with the local heatlh care system) held by the other member organizations.

Levine and White are concerned with their third dimension, the agreement underlying the exchange, only in terms of its degree of formality. Only two studies have dealt with the nature of agreements (or contracts) among organizations in more detail.

Though Macaulay's (1963) data are from business organizations only, his conclusions are generalizable to relationships among service organizations as well. He divided agreements into four areas: definition of performances, effect of unanticipated contingencies, effect of defective performance; and legal sanctions available to the parties. Rather than speak of the overall formality of the agreement, Macaulay defined four levels of attention applicable to each of the four areas of the agreement: explicit and careful attention, tacit agreement, unilaterial assumptions, and unawareness of the issue.

Macaulay found that careful planning of exchange relationships and use of legal sanctions to make adjustments or settle disputes rarely occur. Too careful planning or the use of legal sanctions often may have undesirable consequences for the parties to the exchange.

Hall, Clark, Giordano, Johnson, and Van Roekel (1977:458) offered a scheme for social service agencies. They characterized exchange relationships as: voluntary, standardized-voluntary, and mandated. Voluntary transactions apparently involve the exchange of resources under conditions of domain consensus and mutual gain and in the absence of formalized agreements governing the exchange. Standardized-voluntary transactions are those in which the "basis for interaction is voluntary, but standardized through some form of formal agreement." Mandated exchanges are qualitatively different from the preceding two, in that

they are characterized as more intense and imbalanced in favor of one party. They are also mandated by law or regulations.

Although the two approaches differ in orientation, there appears to be some correspondence between Macaulay's levels of attention and Hall et al.'s categories. The latter researchers were concerned solely with clearly specified transactions, while Macaulay incorporated all levels of specification in his model. Hence, voluntary and voluntary-standardized relationships are subsets of Macaulay's explicit-and-careful-attention category. Mandated exchanges are, in the terms of this review, more properly classified as influence functions rather than transaction functions.

Finally, the fourth dimension, the direction of the exchange, refers to the direction of the flow of the commodities involved. There are two schools of thought on the question of the direction of exchange relationships. On the one hand, Levine and White allow for a unilateral flow, "where elements flow from one organization to another and no elements are given in return" (p. 600). On the other hand, others (for example, Adamek and Lavin, 1975) have invoked the norm of reciprocity (usually citing Homans, 1958) to argue that not even organizations get something for nothing. And in a later paper (White, Levine and Vlasak, 1975:184) they too state that "no goods or services are ever transferred without reciprocity of some kind being involved. In organizations, as in individuals, the reciprocal aspect of a 'one-way transfer' of resources may be intangible . . . ." A test of the two competing hypotheses is, of course, not possible as it is rather difficult to operationalize the intangible in a fashion adequate to permit such a test.

It has generally been thought that organizations engage in exchange relationships with other organizations in order to obtain scarce and needed resources. And data do exist that appear to substantiate that position. Levine and White (1961:583) conclude that "under conditions of scarcity, interorganizational exchanges are essential to goal attainment." Van de Ven and Koenig (1975:212) assume that organizations enter into exchange relationships only when "compelled to do so to attain some goals or resolve problems that it cannot achieve by itself." Aiken and Hage (1968), Evan (1966), and Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) also conclude that it is the organizations most in need of additional resources that are most likely to enter into exchange relationships with each other.

On the other hand, Reid (1970) concludes that "scarcity of means could be said to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for cooperative undertakings. An organization lacking resources for goal achievement may avoid interaction by altering its goals" (p. 97).

Adamek and Lavin (1975) found that "agencies enjoying a relative abundance of elements were more likely to engage in exchange" (p. 197), a finding that would appear to contradict the results cited earlier. Like the results it appears to contradict, this finding is interpreted in terms of exchange theory. Adamek and Lavin agree with Levine and White that scarcity at the system level[3] provides a motive for organizations to engage in exchange relationships (Staw and Szwajkowski's data support this position). Exchange theory, they say, suggests that organizations "with an abundance of clients, funds and services to offer" can best afford to undertake exchange relationships, since well endowed

organizations can better honor the obligations incurred, will give away a smaller percentage of organizational resources in the process, and stand to gain prestige and community support by virtue of the willingness and ability to exchange.

There are two problems with this explanation, aside from the rather elusive character of exchange theory in general. The first concerns the shape of the relationship between scarcity of resources and propensity to engage in exchange. In a footnote, Adamek and Lavin suggest that the relationship may well be curvilinear, though their data are ambiguous on this point. They agree with Levine and White, that organizations with an infinite supply of resources would have no need for exchange. In this author's opinion, this "ideal case" hypothesis is irrelevant. Organizations with a supply of resources approaching infinity, whether those organizations be industrial or service, will, in my opinion, engage in exchange relationships to a greater extent than organizations with merely an "abundance" of resources, and for the very reasons cited by Adamek and Lavin. They will do so to maintain and increase their prestige and community support, because they can honor their obligations with little difficulty, and because, given an infinite supply of resources, the resources they give away are inconsequential. Testing these competing hypotheses is, of course, contingent upon finding organizations suitably well endowed, though some support for this author's position is available. Ridgeway's data indicate that in some networks, at least, organizations with an overwhelming superiority in resources (the auto makers) do engage in exchange relationships with

resource poor organizations (dealers) under certain mutually advantageous conditions.

The second problem with Adamek and Lavin's (1975:208) explanation concerns the causal links implicit in their model. To their credit, they point out that it is also possible to conclude from their data that "those agencies most willing to act upon the scarcity motive (for whatever reason) were relatively rich in clients and other elements because of their exchange relationships." The question of which came first, the exchange relationships or the abundance of resources cannot be answered from the Adamek and Lavin data, or that of the other studies cited. Pfeffer and Salanick (1978) argue that an abundance of resources permits greater involvement in interorganizational relationships but their data concerns mergers and joint ventures in the private sector. Studies dealing with the creation of new settings would seem to be relevant, since they provide longitudinal data. The data available (summarized in Sarason, 1972) are not conclusive, however.

The notion that an organization must have resources to trade before it can enter into an exchange relationship seems rather obvious. Since all surviving organizations are thought to possess some degree of slack (March and Simon, 1958), it may by that exchange relations are pursued in an iterative fashion. Organizations may use early small-scale exchange relationships to garner additional resources, which permit additional exchanges, which garner additional resources, and so on, within whatever system of constraints (tax base, profit margin, cultural norms, or body of law) limits the organization's freedom of action.

Influence Functions

Earlier, influence functions were defined as those relationships among organizations that involve an attempt by at least one organization to constrain or determine the actions of at least one other organization. Various sorts of interorganizational relationships that would fit this definition have been suggested and examined in the literature. And just as discussions of exchange relationships have been confounded with discussions of cooperation, influence functions have also been confused with process, usually with cooptation, bargaining, or conflict. When only the content of influence relationships is examined, three influence functions emerge: overlap of organizational boundaries, dependence relationships, and higher order of network control mechanisms.

Overlap of organizational boundaries. Overlapping boundaries have usually been synonomous with overlapping membership. Little attention has been paid to other ways in which organizations might overlap; since organizations are viewed as social systems, physical properties such as space have received little attention in this literature. There are a number of other possible ways in which organizations might overlap, however, depending on how broad a definition of what constitutes an organization is adopted. Such possible ties include: shared physcial space, shared clients, and shared distributors. Since the literature has been concerned with overlapping membership, the remainder of this section will focus on that subject.

While recognition and acceptance of both the importance of labor services as a recource and the possibility that organizations might enter into exchange relationships involving that resource (for example, Black

and Kase, 1963; Levine and White, 1961) came rather early in the study of interorganizational relationships, the possibility that "shared" or "traded" personnel might serve as a form of influence has, with the exception of one specific area, received little attention. That one exception is, of course, the study of interlocking directorates. Studies at the interorganizational field level by Warner and Unwalla (1967) and Levine (1972) have defined the network of interlocking directorates, identified the highly integrated subsystems within the network, and established the tremendous potential for influence that exists by virtue of the network of interlocks. Their results indicate the existence of geographical subsystems (with the New York subsystem as the hub) and subsystems of similar types of organizations (in spite of anti-trust legislation). Subsystems are linked with one another primarily through financial institutions.

Studies of interlocking directorates concerned explicitly with influence functions have been confined to the intraorganizational level of analysis. Pfeffer (1972b) was concerned with the intraorganizational factors related to an organization's decision to use its board of directors as a vehicle to influence or absorb other organizations with which it is interdependent. In general, organizations with large captial requirements and organizations in regulated industries were most likely to bring representatives of financial institutions and of important external power bases, respectively, onto their boards of directors. An early study by Elling and Halebsky (1961) also found that organizations within the relevant power bases represented were more effective in

obtaining resources from their environment than organizations without such representation.

Dooley's (1969) results were similar to Pfeffer's. He noted the importance of overlapping industrial and financial board memberships, as well as the tendency of organizations to include relevant interest groups on their boards. Dooley also found that management controlled organizations, that is, those organizations with heavy management representation on their board of directors, were less likely to have outside organizations represented on their boards. This was attributed to management's desire to avoid the influence of other organizations and interest groups.

A study by Allen (1974) yielded essentially the same resourse as Dooley's and Pfeffer's. In looking at board membership over time, however, Allen noted the decline in local representation (as organizations became less dependent on resources close to home) on corporate boards and the increasing frequency of interlocks with financial institutions.

Empirical studies of other forms of overlapping organizational boundaries are not available. Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970) were concerned with the power of individual organizational leaders as a function of multiple organizational memberships. Their results indicate that overlapping organizational memberships are used, rather successfully, as a means of exerting influence over a broader range of issues than suggested by the interlocking directorate studies.

Evan (1966) identified two types of overlapping membership in addition to interlocking directorates: employees of an organization who

the regulatory agency or the community (Pfeffer). The use of directorate membership as a means of influencing local interest groups has declined (Allen), though Perrucci and Pilisuk's data (1970) seem to indicate that high level management personnel may have assumed responsibility for influencing local issues through assuming leadership positions in local groups.

Dependence relationships. If the premise that organizations exist and must be studied within a network of organizations with which they are competing for scarce resources (Yuchtman and Seashore, 1967) and, hence, survival, is accepted, then it follows that dependence relationships are of considerable importance in understanding both the behavior of individual organizations and the characteristics of the overall network of organizations.

The management of dependence relationships constitutes a critical problem for most organizations (Perrow, 1979). In extreme cases, organizations seek to eliminate problematic dependency relationships either through absorption (merger) or through vertical integration (subsidiaries, joint ventures, etc.). Joint ventures may be a special case, however, since a growing body of literature suggests that jointly owned subsidiaries are an effective means of tacitly reducing competition between organizations in a newtork (Fusfeld, 1958; Mead, 1967; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).

Articles by Jacobs (1974), Mindlin and Aldrich (1975) deal with the concept of dependence relationships among organizations in some detail. Both adopt Emerson's (1962)[4] definition of dependence as a basis for their discussions. Mindlin and Aldrich note that dependence

also belong to a union holding a collective bargaining agreement with the organization; and employees of an organization who also belong to a professional group (AMA, APA, etc.). Adopting much the same logic used by Dooley, Evan hypothesized that the greater the overlap in membership between the focal organization and its organization set, the greater the influence of the organization set of the activities of the focal organization. (He does not mention the possibility of concurrent greater influence of the focal organization on the organization set.) Evan also suggests that overlapping boundaries tend to reduce competition; an hypothesis receiving some support from studies by Levine (1972) and others.

For Guetzkow (1966), overlapping organizational boundaries were one example of what he termed the interpenetration of organizations. As did Evan, Guetzkow also noted the overlap of organization with union membership and with professional group membership. Guetzkow did not discuss the possible influence functions that such overlapping membership might serve.

The use of overlapping organizational boundaries by one organization as a means of influencing relevant other organizations is evident from the research on interlocking directorates. Organizations are especially likely to include members of financial organizations in their directorates if their organization has large capital requirements (Dooley, 1969; Pfeffer, 1972b), though financial institution representation is fast becoming a standard policy (Allen, 1974). Organizations operating in regulated industries are very likely to include external sources of power that might be useful in dealing with

relationships within a network of organizations may be very complex and the concept of dependence has meaning only within the context of a particular relationship; organizations are not inherently dependent.

Jacobs suggested that dependence consists of two interactive components: "the essentiality of the item received and that item's availability from other sources" (p. 51). Influence is possible only when both conditions hold; dependence need not be confined to physical resources, however. Baker and O'Brien (1971) propose that influence may result from control of information flow as well. Litwak and Rothman (1970) point out that dependence relationships are stable only when the degree of dependence is moderate. "In cases of extreme asymmetry in interdependence, we would hypothesize no linkage at all or complete merger depending on the inclination of the nondependent member" (p. 148). Pfeffer's (1972) results regarding mergers and Ridgeway's (1957) data on manufacturer-dealer relationships appear to support their hypothesis.

Dependence relationships are distinct from transaction functions in that neither party to a transaction function exchange of resources derives any power over the other party by virtue of the exchange. This may occur for one of several reasons. Both parties may be dependent on each other for needed resources. Both parties may have alternative sources for the commodities exchanged. Or, an organization may be restricted to one particular organization in obtaining a particular commodity, but failure to obtain the commodity will not threaten the viability of the first organization. As Warren et al. (1974) point out, many apparent reverses that befall service organizations do not really

threaten the organization's existence, but merely result in a modification of the organization's goals (pp. 19-34). The organization's continued existence and domain are protected by the belief-value structure of the interorganizational field of which it is a part. Finally, an organization may be constrained from using the dependence of another organization as a source of influence by shared values or norms, or by legal restraints.

Network control mechanisms. Interorganizational dependence relationships may be examined at three levels, according to Mindlin and Aldrich: pair-wise, organization set, and interorganizational field. their own re-analysis of the Aston date was performed at the pair-wise level, though the preceding discussion has generalized their model to the organization-set level with only slight modification. Jacob's discussion was focused almost exclusively at the organization-set level. The subject of this section is influence at the level of the interorganizational field.

In defining what constitutes a network control mechanism, or means of exerting influence at the network level, the early theoretical works are rather vague. Phillips (1960) never does indicate what he means by interfirm organizations, though the reader is left with the impression that it may be anything from a sense of group identity among organizations to a bona fide regulatory agency. In a later article, Phillips (1961) indicates that is more or less what he intended. Guetzekow (1966) speaks vaguely of supraorganizational processes and mentions the unification of Germany under the Kaisers. Evan (1966) does not discuss the subject.

Whatever these earlier works lacked in specificity, however, they made up for in the extent to which they stimulated further research. At least four basic approaches to the study of influence at the network level can be identified in later works. These approaches vary in two respects. First, they may be classified in terms of whether they deal primarily wih intrasystem control mechanisms or suprasystem control mechanisms. Intrasystem control mechanisms operate primarily within the network. Of course, cultural factors may, to some extent, predetermine the actions of the network, but control is exercised primarily from within rather than being imposed from without. Suprasystem control mechanisms operate primarily on the network rather than from within it.

These four approaches also vary in terms of the assumptions they make about the degree of purposefulness present in the control process. Two levels seem to be popular. First, there is the explicit, formalized rationality of the decision-making approach. Second, there is the ecological, or self-regulating, approach. This modest model is presented graphically in Table 1. Studies which have adopted a particular approach are listed in the appropriate column.

The ecological-intrasystem approach has received the greatest attention. An interorganizational network is ecological in the sense that it is not administered, but rather, that the system is organized, and thus capable of exerting influence on its member organizations, through mutual understanding and tacit agreement. This understanding and tacit agreement among organizations are generally attributed to the inculcation of shared societal norms and values (which form the basis of

the norms and values of the network) into organization members (Warren et al., 1974). However, it is often unclear exactly how explicit this tacit agreement is among the organizations or their members. Long (1958:252) presents the matter suscinctly:

> Observation of certain local communities makes it appear that inclusive over-all organization for many general purposes is weak or nonexistent. Much of what occurs seems to just happen with accidental trends becoming cumulative over time and producing results intended by nobody. A great deal of the communities' activities consist of undirected cooperation or particular social structures, each seeking particular goals, and in so doing, meshing with others.

Table 1

Classification of Studies of Network Control Functions in Terms of Degree of Purposefulness and Locus of Control

	Degree of Purposefulness	
Locus of Control	Formalized Rationality	Ecological
Intrasystem	T. Clark (1970) Tuite (1972)	Long (1958) Litwak and Hylton (1961) B. Clark (1965) Baty, et al. (1971) Kriesberg (1973) Pfeffer and Leblebici (1973) Warren, et al. (1974)
Suprasystem	Thompson (1970)	Benson (1975) Hirsh (1975)

Clark (1965) and Kriesberg (1973) have provided descriptions of other interorganizational networks with substantially the same orientation as Long. Clark also noted the importance of individual organization's goals in determining the pattern of interaction within the network. Clark, however, differed from Long in viewing the development of interorganizational control mechanisms (in this case, an integrated plan

for curriculum reform) as an incremental and voluntary process rather than an accidental accumulation of trends.

Kriesberg looked at the development of cooperation between public health and mental health personnel in providing services. His discussion led him to the conclusion that formalized joint administration would facilitate maximum cooperation. However, he also feared that any hint of a superior-subordinate relationship between the two fields would lead to conflict and thus sabotage cooperative efforts. Since coopeation is, for Kriesberg, the desired state, he backed away from formalized administration toward what he called (but failed to describe) a modified mechanical model.

Studies of the movement of personnel among organizations within a network have focused on a form of interorganizational control mechanism that operates with a minimum of direction. Baty, Evan, and Rothermel's (1971) study of faculty interchanges and Pfeffer and Leblebici's (1973) study of executive succession both indicate the substantial impact that such movement of personnel within a network can have as a control mechanism. This impact may be expressed through a shift toward ideological and structural similarity, as in the Baty et al. study, or through increased interorganizational communication and sense of group identity in the Pfeffer and Leblebici study. Both studies support Phillip's theory of interfirm organizations and suggest that ecological mechanisms not represented in the typical study of interorganizational relationships may serve as important network control mechanisms.

An example of these more traditional relationships among organizations is Litwak and Hylton's well-known study of coordinating

agencies. Though they were concerned with coordination among agencies. much of their discussion (pp. 416-420) concerning the types of coordinating mechanisms expected to emerge from combinations of the predictors (level of awareness, standarization, network size, and degree of interdependence) is relevant to this discussion of network control mechanisms. Under conditions of moderate interdependence (high interdependence leads to merger; no interdependence--no network), Letwak and Hylton offer eight possible control mechanisms, in addition to coordinating agencies and the movement of personnel within the network. These range from external regulatory agencies to muddling through, and include legislation, the use of arbitrators, joint programs, conferences, and personal friendships.

All of these studies have one basic factor in common: they all have tried to identify forms of interaction or influence operating within a network of organizations. Warren has taken a different approach. He has focused on norms and values of a network as the primary mechanisms of control. In his study of selected service organizations in nine cities, Warren and his colleagues (1974) found that the most striking characteristic of the networks examined was the lack of interaction among member organizaions.

For Warren, it is the institutionalized thought structure[5] that is the mechanism of network control. Even though the network of human service organizations was not deliberately structured as it is, the consequences are the same as if it had been so structured. This is because upon the institutionalized thought structure rest the norms that govern the range of acceptable behavior among organizations, and most

importantly, the definitions of the domains of the individual organizations. Warren defines domain as "the organization's locus in the interorganizational field, including its manifest goals and its channels of access to task and maintenance resources" (p. 27).

The question of how an institutionalized thought structure arises has yet to be addressed explicitly. The scaling solutions achieved in attempts to develop measures of interorganizational relationships (Klonglan, Warren, and Winkelpleck, 1976; Rogers, 1974) suggest that frequency and/or intensity of contact may be a critical factor. Such a view would be convergent with the literature on negotiations (Walton and McKersie, 1965) which seems to show that increased frequency of contact leads to increases in attitude structuring, although increased contact alone cannot predict the direction of the shift in attitudes toward the other party.

Another view, advanced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggests that interorganizational mobility of executives contributes to an institutionalization of network thought structure. At present insufficient data precludes a thorough evaluation of these alternative explanations or the specification of other explanations. However, executive mobility and other homogenizing factors such as common educational backgrounds of boundary and decision-making personnel seem more persuasive. This seems especially so in light of a recently published study by Sebring (1979) showing that all manner of structural support (mutual organizational gain, munificent environment, legally binding contracts, etc.) proved inadequate as a basis for working interorganizational relationship in the absence of any common

characteristics between the boundary spanning individuals representing the two parties.

Since the institutionalized thought structure and the norms and domain consensus it sustains are shared by the members (organizations and individuals) within the field, organizations need not interact over every single issue that may affect their interests. They are secure in the knowledge that even if the issues are not resolved in the exact way they would prefer, the resolution will not be fatal to the organization. The system is self-sustaining:

> The interorganizational field structure protects the organizations in their individual interaction and in their need for continued viability. At the same time, the behavior of individual organizations has the aggregate effect of preserving the major configurations of the interorganizational field and the institutionalized thought structure that supports it (p. 60).

Though there is a considerable degree of variation among the studies of network control mechanisms, there are two fundamental similarities among them. First, network control mechanisms are primarily a function of the characteristics and properties of the network itself. They are neither imposed by nor primarily a result of external influence. Second, the control mechanisms are ecological in nature. Whether they are viewed as arising, evolving, or just accumulating over time, they clearly are <u>not</u> the product of any sort of rational planning activity.

Given these underlying similarities, the differences among the various specific examples of control mechanisms are more apparent than real. All the mechanisms mentioned are either means of fostering the development of an institutionalized thought structure (for example, through the movement of personnel within a network) or maintaining it (for example, through coordinating fund-raising agencies).

The ecological-suprasystem approach differs from the ecological-intrasystem approach in its emphasis on the importance of external constraints as control mechanisms. Benson (1975), for example, views the interorganizational networks as political economies concerned with the distribution of money and authority. The flow of resources into a network is contingent upon events occurring in the larger environment, which consists of authorities, legislative bodies, bureaus, and the public.

For Benson, network control is synonomous with differential power within the network. While power differentials may result from internal network structure, that is, differences in centrality, size, etc., among orgnizations, the key source of power within a network seems to lie in the linkages of member organizations to the larger social environment. The participants in this larger environment "are linked in interaction patterns centering on the governance of a given network, that is, the distribution of resources and power within the network" (p. 239). Overlying all of this is a "superstructure of interagency sentiments) similar in content to Warren's institutionalized thought structure, but apparently influenced by the ideology of the larger environment.

Benson's proposal is similar to Evan's (1972) assertion that a network of organizations might form the "focal organization" of a larger interorganizational system. Hirsh (1975) has adopted the same notion but takes the opposite approach. Rather than focusing on the success of the larger environment in controlling the network, Hirsh compares two networks in terms of their ability to influence the larger environment.

These studies resemble those of the previous section in that both view the network as an ecological phenomenon. Though Benson's model differs from the previous studies in the deliberateness with which network control is exercised, he does seem to assume that the conditions that gave rise to differential power, and hence control and influence within the network, were not delibarately planned or accomplished. The major factor which does distinguish the two sets of studies is, of course, the explicit introduction of the larger environment as the locus of control for the network.

The basic premise of the third approach shown in Table 1, the intrasystem-formalized rationality approach, seem to be that rational decision making is the appropriate control mechanism for interorganiztional networks. Tuite (1972) has provided a model of joint decision making applied to the interorganizational level. The goal of the process is the "coordination of the actions of the decision makers involved to ensure a result which is jointly optimal" (p. 9). The basic problem of joint decision making at the interorganizational, as compared to the intraorganizational, level "is the absence of a natural (established) authority relationship between the decision units" (p. 14). Naturally, the establishment of a centralized authority within the network is the first order of business, and the discussion of the technologies available for interorganizational decision making is predicated on the existence of that authority

It is doubtful that this borrowed approach can be grafted onto an existing network of organizations. Warren would argue that a central authority is unnecessary, Long would argue tha it is impossible, and

Litwak and Hylton would argue that a more efficient system already exists. Only Clark (1958) has addressed the question of decision making at the interorganizational level. His data do indicate that, at least for cities, centralization of authority is related to a higher level of output. His data are questionable, however,[6] and Clark says nothing about the degree of rationality or formalization in decision making for his sample.

At present, the suprasystem-formalized rationality approach consists of little more than speculation. Thompson (1970) suggests that a new type of organization is evolving: "I will refer to this as the evolution of organizations to manage infrastructures and in so doing, make it desirable for other organizations to behave in ways they wouldn't have, otherwise" (p. 165). Thompson uses the Federal Reserve Board as an example of an organization that controls by manipulation of the environment, rather than by decree. He, along with others, sees society as having achieved a level of complexity such that mechanisms of network control discussed earlier are no longer adequate.

Thompson's hypothesis is both challenging and frightening: challenging because it questions the continued stability inherent in the ecological perspectives of Warren, Benson, and others; frightening because it advocates the concentration of responsibility for decision making to major industrial organizations or government agencies.

Personally, I think such systems can be developed only with extreme difficulty and accompanied by costly failures. HEW, under the Johnson administration, embarked on just such an experiment. That agency attempted to restructure aspects of society through the infusion of

massive funding for selected projects, such as the Model Cities Program. A substantial body of literature is devoted to recounting in great detail how those projects were blunted and coopted by the existing agencies. Programs such as the Federal Reserve Board may function effectively where there is a recognized need for regulation but an aversion toward direct control and no established ecological control mechanism. But in systems where cooperation is the norm and domains clearly defined, such infrastructure orgnizations will, like the community decision organizations of the Sixties, either rapidly adjust to existing conditions or be phased out as counterproductive, competitive, and uncooperative.

Dynamics of Interorganizational Relationships

As defined earlier in this paper, the dynamics of interorganizational relationships refers to the process characteristics, as opposed to the content, of the relationships. For example, a transaction function might be carried out through a bargaining process. The study of the dynamics of interorganizational relationships suffers from two interrelated problems: a surfeit of imprecise terms and definitions, and a strong cooperation bias on the part of many researchers.

The definitions of an distinctions among bargaining, coercion, and cooptation are fairly standard, though not always without ambiguity. Unfortunately, this literature is also the playground of four Cheshire cats named cooperation, coordination, competition, and conflict.

To add to the confusion, too many writers have based their descriptions of how networks function upon some rather simplistic assumptions about how networks of orgaizations ought to function. For example, Black and Kase (1963) begin with the assertion that "it is natural to turn to the idea of bringing agency facilities together" (p. 27). For Reid (1964), coordination is a "cherished objective" in relationships among service agencies. Pruden (1969) believes that "as with intraorganizational relations, the heart of interorganization management rests in coordination" (p. 339).

Before proceeding to link the dynamic characteristics of interorganizational relationships to the dimensions discussed earlier, These two interrelated problems must be dealt with in some detail.

Definition of Terms

In sorting out the various definitions available, it might be helpful to begin with a dinstiction among dynamic characteristics in terms of their specificity. This dinstinction is analogous to that of tactics versus strategy. Bargaining, cooptation, and coercion are three rather specific ways of conducting a relationship, and their definitions are fairly standard across studies.

Bargaining. Thompson and McEwen's (1958) definition of bargaining is representative of how the term is used in this literature. "The term bargaining, as used here, refers to the negotiation of an agreement for the exchange of goods and services between two or more organizations" (p. 28). Bargaining involves the direct and knowing participation of the parties involved, as well as similar degrees of dependence upon one

another. It is a process of incremental mutual adjustment. Thompson (1962, 1967), Macaulay (1963), Yuchtman and Seashore (1967), and Kochan (1975) are examples of studies focusing explicitly on bargaining.

Coercion. Coercion is the deliberate use of force or the threat of force against an area of dependency of an organization in order to obtain the compliance of the dependent organization in some manner (Jacobs, 1974). Coercion involves deliberate action on the part of at least one party of the relationship and at east an appreciation of the circumstances of the relationship on the part of the other party(s). Coercion is usually viewed as an all-or-none approach, with little opportunity for adjustments. Coercion is also a costly option for the user as well as the target. Benson (1975) and especially Jacobs (1974) hae been concerned with the use of coercion in interorganizational relationships.

Cooptation. Thompson and McEwen define (based on Selznick's original definition) cooptation as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence" (p. 28). Cooptation has received considerable attention, particulary in the study of interlocking directorates (for example, Allen, 1974; Dooley, 1969; and Pfeffer, 1972b). Zald (1969) points out the risks to organizational autonomy that come with coopting other organizations or portions of the environment. Others (notably Brown, 1969; and Hirsh, 1975) have examined attempts at cooptation originating at other levels in the organization.

On the other hand, the other concepts, cooperation, competition, conflict, and coordination, represent general ways of approaching a

relationship, rather than specific techniques for conducting the relationship. As such, there is a great deal of room for variation in operationalizing the concepts, and no particular pattern of relationship can be unambiguously classified as representative of one or the other. These terms are usually defined solely by their common usage, thus introducing considerable additional ambiguity into any hypothesis of which they are a part.

It is virtually impossible to sort out the relationships among these four concepts or to find a common definition for them other than at the most general level. To presume to provide such a definition for them other than at the most general level. To presume to provide such a definition would be little more than adding my own "one best way" to the confusion. Rather, I think it sufficient at this point to describe how the concepts have been used in the literature. Additional attention to the problem is unlikely to appreciably further the study of interorganizational relationships.

Cooperation. Cooperation usually refers either to joint projects or to mutual respect of orgnizational domains. It is a term inevitably discussed in studies of service organizations and frequently used in studies of business organizations as well.

Coordination. Coordination usually refers to the peaceful delivery of complementary services, usually by health and welfare organizations. Coordination seems to be what happens when organizations cooperate. Both are thought to be good for all concerned.

Conflict. Conflict is all too often defined as the absence of cooperation. Since many of the basic sources of conflict, divergent or

competing goals, incompatible values, etc. (Coser, 1956), have not been examined within the context of networks of organizations, only one type of conflict situation, competition, really has been accorded much attention.

Competition. Competition is generally used in one of two contexts. The more precise usage involves the competition for scarce resources. In this sense, the three basic components of competition (see Khandwalla, forthcoming), negative interdependence, awareness of the consequences, and striving behavior, are present. The other usage involves organizations offering similar, or competing, services. While this may be called "free enterprise" in some networks, it is called "unnecessary duplication of services" among service organizations. In this usage, competition among service organizations is at the end of a causal chain beginning with lack of domain consensus, leading to a lack of cooperation, leading to a lack of coordination manifested in the existence of the competing services.

The Cooperation Bias

The greatest problem in sorting out the dynamics of interorganizational relationships is not one of definition, but rather one of first understanding, then placing in proper perspective, the prescriptive aspects of so much of the available research. The basis of the cooperative bias lies primarily in the sources of funding that have been available, and only secondarily in the trained inattention of the observers.

It is not a matter of chance that all the available studies of business networks have either used archival data (the interlocking directorate studies: Evan, 1972; Hirsh, 1975; the Joint subsidiary Studies: Fusfeld, 1958; Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; etc.) or have focused on the effectiveness or adaptability of focal organizations (Brown, 1969; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1976) or closed organization sets (Assael, 1969; Ridgeway, 1957). No private foundation is likely to provide the six-figure grants needed to replicate Warren et al. for networks of private business organizations, and were the funding to be obtained, gaining access to private organizations to the same degree as has been the case with service organizations is highly unlikely. (See Boyle, 1968 for a discussion of proprietary information and its implication for research.) The heavy emphasis on effectiveness in the organization-set and organization-environment studies is evidence of that fact.

And so, it seems, is the emphasis on cooperation. Funding agencies (HEW, NIMH, NSF, USPHS, for example) have provided substantial grants for the study of networks of service organizations and community networks. And the researchers, for their part, have set out to discover new ways of achieving coordination among a host of autonomous health and welfare organizations. In his critique of the literature, Zeitz (1975) concludes that,

> In most cases the government did not want, or was not able to utilize funding or legal power sufficiently to callenge the inherent autonomy of a multiplicity of public and private agencies under diverse auspices. The result was to try to discover various mechanisms which could help induce, persuade, cajole, or trick agencies into some measure of increased integration (p. 41).

Zeitz's suggestion is direct and to the point, but too simplistic. As Warren (1971) points out, norms of cooperation and coordination are stable and pervasive characteristics throughout networks of service organizations. Many of the researchers themselves (Aiken, Levine, Litwak, Marrett, Reid, Warren and White, for example) have either recieved their formal training in related areas or have worked almost exclusively with service agencies. It is not surprising that the development and maintenance of cooperative relationships should be of concern to them. Nor should the participation of the agencies themselves, both in research and new programs, come as a surprise. For the agencies, the studies represented an opportunity to participate in the development of innovative and scientifically-based programs to lead to meaningful organizational and interorganizational reform, but without threatening or questioning the existing institutional order.

A secondary factor contributing to the cooperative bias is the lack of clarity regarding levels of analysis. Most researchers have approached the dynamics of relationships within networks of service organizations from an interorganiational field perspective. In general, they were careful to distinguish between the interorganizational field, the organization-set, and the intraorganizational levels of analysis (Marrett, 1971). Unfortunately, no distinction seems to have been made between the interorganizational field level and the level of pair-wise interaction between organizations.

Linking Dynamics to Dimensions

In an earlier portion of this appendix, it was pointed out that neither transaction nor influence functions are necessarily linked to any

particular process. This section attempts to suggest which dynamic characteristics are most commonly linked to which dimensions.

Network control mechanisms. Warren has shown that notions of cooperation and coordination are more properly reserved for descriptions of the overall pattern of interorganizational relationships as viewed from a field perspective. They are more akin to indicators of the proper functioning of network control mechanisms than to labels for particular dynamic characteristics of specific relationships.

Conflict, because it involves fundamental differences between parties, is rarely seen in the interorganizational literature. Among service organizations, the institutionalized thought structure, and the norms and domain consensus it supports, sharply reduce the likelihood of open conflict occurring within a network.[7] Among business organizations, the occurrence of conflict, in the sociological sense, is also a rare event.

Competition, on the other hand, is not uncommon among either service or business organizations. However, competition is not a form of interaction between two organizations but rather an approach to interaction. Competition may describe the relative positions of a number of organizations vis-a-vis one another, but it does not describe the process of relationship. Competition, too, is more relevant as an indicator of the functioning of network control mechanisms than relationships among specific network members.

The more specific ways of conducting relationships are more relevant to the influence functions involving specific organizations (overlapping

boundaries) and transaction functions. Table 2 presents a graphic version of this discussion.

Dependence relationships. Dependence relationships may be characterized either by some degree of coercion (Jacobs, 1974; Schmidt and Kochan, 1977) or by bargaining. When the target organization's existence is protected by the belief-value structure of the interorganizational field, the target organization has other alternatives, or there are mutual dependencies, then bargaining is more likely to be preferred tactic.

Since actual coercion leaves little room for adjustments, and involves costs for all parties concerned, organizations tend to avoid its use. Instead, bargaining may be the first technique attempted for conducting the relationship. Given the potential for coercion that exists, however, it seems likely that bargaining will be conducted under at least an implicit threat of coercion. The University of Michigan Graduate Employee's Organization contract negotiations were an example of such a bargaining relationship. Given the National Labor Relations Board ruling questioning the status of students as full-fledged employees, the University Graduate Employee's Organization is susceptible to coercion from the University in the form of a challenge to the union's right to exist. (The use of this coercive power would not be without cost; for example, regents running for re-election in that heavily unionized state might face statewide opposition from organized labor.)

Overlap of organizational boundaries. Since most studies of overlapping organizational membership have been of interlocking directorates, cooptation has been the dynamic most linked with this

dimension of interorganizational relationships. Most of the references cited in the earlier discussion of overlapping membership discuss cooptation in some detail, so I will not dwell on it here.

Table 2

Relationships Between the Dimensions and Dynamic Characteristics of Interorganizational Relationships

Dimension	Dynamic
Transaction functions	Bargaining
Influence functions:	
Network control mechanisms	Cooperation/conflict Coordination/competition
Dependence Relationships	Coercion Bargaining
Overlap of organizational boundaries	Cooptation Bargaining Coercion

Interlocking directorates and, to some extent, the other forms of overlapping membership may involve other dynamics as well. In particular, the coopted party would seem to be in an excellent bargaining position (Zald, 1969), especially if the interests it represents are crucial to the organization. Authors concerned with the dangers of using cooptation as a tactic (for example, Perrucci and Pilisuk) have pointed out this possibility, as well as the potential for coercion or threat of coercion by the "coopted" party.

This suggests two interesting implications for the dynamic characteristics of interorganizational relationships. First, the dynamic

character of the relationship may change over time. What may have begun as an attempt at cooptation by one organization may become a bargaining situation as the target organization realizes its potential for influence, or as events within or external to the network bring about changes in he relative position of the participants.

The second implication is that what appared to be rather straightforward and easily identifiable ways of categorizing the process or dynamic character of a relationship are actually rather imprecise lables after all. Is cooptation really a form of bargaining, once the target organization suspects, or is it coercion? The specific pattern of the relationship may not change, but the particular label may cease to be appropriate as the relationship becomes more elaborate.

This suggests that simple schemes to classify patterns of interorganizational relationships into one of a small set of categories may at times be a very misleading way to conceptualize the phenomenon. Relationships are often too complex to be unambiguously classified into one category or another. What appears to be cooptation from one participant's viewpoint may be perceived as bargaining by another participant. Also, the dynamics of a relationship may change over time, as events external to a particular relationship alter the relative positions of the participants. Unless these aspects (differing perspectives of participants, change over time) are incorporated into the classification process, both data and theory may well misrepresent the actual dynamics of interorganizational relationships.

Transaction functions. Since transaction functions were defined earlier as voluntary relationships among organizations which involve the

exchange of commodities, bargaining is the only tactic discussed that is available for conducting transation functions. The use of coercion or cooptation would remove the interaction from this classification to that of an influence function.

Perhaps, there may be other ways of conducting interactions, particularly transaction functions, that have not been treated. For example, routinized transactions may occur without any sort of what has commonly been known as interaction taking place. Admittedly, the fact that transaction functions may be conducted only through bargaining may be a weak point in the model.

Summary

This section has described the dynamic characteristics of interorganizational relationships as they have been developed in the literature. First, dynamic characteristics of relationships were defined and discussed in terms of their specificity. Next, the bases of the cooperative bias characterizing much of the research involving service orgaizations were described. Finally, the dynamic characteristics of interorganizational relationships were linked to the two dimensions, transaction and influence functions, developed in the previous section.

The concepts of cooperation, conflict, coordination, and competition were found to be most appropriate as expressions of the functioning of network control mechanisms. At the pair-wise and organization-set levels, the concepts of cooptation, coercion, and bargaining were linked to transaction functions and the other two influence functions of overlap of organizational boundaries and dependence relationships (see Table 2).

Finally, the limitations of these concepts emerged, as it became evident that the process of interorganizational relationships is more complex than can be encompassed in the simple approach to categorizing relationships that has become standard in the literature.

Conclusion

In the beginning of this appendix, three issues were singled out as most critical in the study of interorganizational reltionships. These were: problems in level of analysis, the dimensions of interorganizational relationships, and the dynamic characteristics of interorganizational relationships. The pages that followed have attempted to discuss and clarify the issues, integrate the relevant work, and suggest ways of conceptualizing these issues that will facilitate the development of further research as well as theory.

As it turned out, the question of levels of analysis proved to be amenable to this endeavor. Four levels of analysis that have been suggested in various places were pulled together into a systematic framework, and the appropriateness, advantages, and disadvantages of each level were developed.

In dealing with the substance of interorganizational relationships, the almost overwhelming complexity of the phenomenon and the diversity of the research rapidly become evident. Beginning with a basic distinction between the process and the content of relationships, the major themes were extracted from the literature. The content of interorganizational relationships was divided into transaction and influence functions, with

the latter further subdivided into overlap of organizational boundaries, dependence relationships, and network control mechanisms.

In discussing the process of interorganizational relationships, a basic distinction was made in terms of the specificity of the concepts. General strategies for conducting relationships among organizations were found to be more appropriate in characterizing the general functioning of network control mechanisms than relationships among organizations at the organization-set or pair-wise levels. When specific tactics for conducting relationshps were linked to the dimensions, it became evident that these concepts commonly used to categorize relationships are considerably less precise than they have appeared. Interorganizational relationships are simply too complex to be adequately reflected in this sort of model.

FOOTNOTES

1. Any discussion of organizations as the units of analysis runs the risk of anthropormorphizing organizations, through the use of basically psychological concepts to describe the activities of the organization. This paper is no exception. Let me state clearly that this is not my intention. People act, either as individuals or as members of an organization; an organization does not "act" through the patterns of member behavior may come to be described as the "action" of the organization.

2. Apparently Thompson interpreted the study to indicate the spontaneous emergence of temporary organizations, when, in fact, Form and Nosow state explicitly that no such organizations emerged.

3. Apparently a misinterpretation of Levine and White, as theirs is strictly a pair-wise model and says nothing about the system.

4. The dependence of an actor, A, on another actor, B., is "directly proportional to A's motivational investment in goals mediated by B, and inversely proportional to the availability of those goals to A outside the A-B relation" (p. 383).

5. "Some of the more important aspects of this institutionalized thought structure are: (1) its belief-value system, (2) the strategy for addressing social problems, (3) the organizational rationale of organizations in the social sector, (4) the authority structure of these organizations, and (5) their legitimation and power" (p. 20).

6. Clark used path analysis but did not adequately report his methodology, or fully describe his path model. This, coupled with relatively high levels of multicolinearity, and some ridiculous path coefficients in his results (percent Catholic general budget expenditures path coefficient = .92), led me to place little confidence in any of his results.

7. This may be because norms prohibit conflict, or because those organizations which lost are no longer in existence and, hence, no longer present in the network.

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