Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards: The past, the present, the future

Markin, J T; Augustson, R H; Eccleston, G W; Hakkila, E A

Title: Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards: The past, the present, the future

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Abstract

Nuclear materials accountancy was introduced as a primary safeguards measure in international safeguards from the inception of the EURATOM safeguards directorate in 1959 and IAEA safeguards in 1961 with the issuance of INFCIRC 26. As measurement technology evolved and safeguarded facilities increased in both number and size, measurement methodology requirements increased as reflected in INFCIRC 66 (Rev 2.) in 1968 and later in INFCIRC 153 in 1972. Early measurements relied heavily on chemical analysis, but in the 1960s it evolved more and more toward nondestructive assay. Future nuclear materials accountancy systems will increase in complexity, driven by larger and more complex facilities; more stringent health, safety, and environmental considerations; and unattended automation in facility operations. 15 refs.

Authors:: Markin, J T; Augustson, R H; Eccleston, G W; Hakkila, E A

Publication Date:: Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1991

Research Org.:: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Los Alamos, NM (United States)

Sponsoring Org.:: USDOE; USDOE, Washington, DC (United States)

OSTI Identifier:: 5428424

Report Number(s):: LA-UR-91-2461; CONF-910774-30
ON: DE91016237

DOE Contract Number:: W-7405-ENG-36

Resource Type:: Conference

Resource Relation:: Conference: 32. Institute of Nuclear Materials Management (INMM) annual meeting, New Orleans, LA (United States), 28-31 Jul 1991

Country of Publication:: United States

Language:: English

Subject:: 98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL PROTECTION; NUCLEAR MATERIALS MANAGEMENT; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS; ACCOUNTING; IAEA SAFEGUARDS; DESTRUCTIVE TESTING; EURATOM; IMPLEMENTATION; INSPECTION; MONITORING; NONDESTRUCTIVE ANALYSIS; PLANNING; SURVEILLANCE; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS; CHEMICAL ANALYSIS; COOPERATION; EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES; INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; MANAGEMENT; MATERIALS; MATERIALS TESTING; SAFEGUARDS; TESTING; 055002* - Nuclear Fuels- Safeguards, Inspection, & Accountability- Nontechnical Aspects

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                    Markin, J T, Augustson, R H, Eccleston, G W, and Hakkila, E A. Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards: The past, the present, the future.  United States: N. p., 1991. 
        Web.

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                    Markin, J T, Augustson, R H, Eccleston, G W, & Hakkila, E A. Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards: The past, the present, the future.  United States.

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                    Markin, J T, Augustson, R H, Eccleston, G W, and Hakkila, E A. 1991.  
        "Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards: The past, the present, the future".  United States.  https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/5428424.

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@article{osti_5428424,

  title        = {Development of nuclear materials accounting for international safeguards: The past, the present, the future},

  author       = {Markin, J T and Augustson, R H and Eccleston, G W and Hakkila, E A},

  abstractNote = {Nuclear materials accountancy was introduced as a primary safeguards measure in international safeguards from the inception of the EURATOM safeguards directorate in 1959 and IAEA safeguards in 1961 with the issuance of INFCIRC 26. As measurement technology evolved and safeguarded facilities increased in both number and size, measurement methodology requirements increased as reflected in INFCIRC 66 (Rev 2.) in 1968 and later in INFCIRC 153 in 1972. Early measurements relied heavily on chemical analysis, but in the 1960s it evolved more and more toward nondestructive assay. Future nuclear materials accountancy systems will increase in complexity, driven by larger and more complex facilities; more stringent health, safety, and environmental considerations; and unattended automation in facility operations. 15 refs.},

  doi          = {},

  url          = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5428424},
  journal      = {},
number       = ,

  volume       = ,

  place        = {United States},

  year         = {Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1991},

  month        = {Tue Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1991}

}

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