Assessment of degradation concerns for spent fuel, high-level wastes, and transuranic wastes in monitored retrievalbe storage
Abstract
It has been concluded that there are no significant degradation mechanisms that could prevent the design, construction, and safe operation of monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facilities. However, there are some long-term degradation mechanisms that could affect the ability to maintain or readily retrieve spent fuel (SF), high-level wastes (HLW), and transuranic wastes (TRUW) several decades after emplacement. Although catastrophic failures are not anticipated, long-term degradation mechanisms have been identified that could, under certain conditions, cause failure of the SF cladding and/or failure of TRUW storage containers. Stress rupture limits for Zircaloy-clad SF in MRS range from 300 to 440/sup 0/C, based on limited data. Additional tests on irradiated Zircaloy (3- to 5-year duration) are needed to narrow this uncertainty. Cladding defect sizes could increase in air as a result of fuel density decreases due to oxidation. Oxidation tests (3- to 5-year duration) on SF are also needed to verify oxidation rates in air and to determine temperatures below which monitoring of an inert cover gas would not be required. Few, if any, changes in the physical state of HLW glass or canisters or their performance would occur under projected MRS conditions. The major uncertainty for HLW is in the heatmore »
- Authors:
- Publication Date:
- Research Org.:
- Pacific Northwest National Lab. (PNNL), Richland, WA (United States)
- OSTI Identifier:
- 5404485
- Report Number(s):
- PNL-4879
ON: DE84006793
- DOE Contract Number:
- AC06-76RL01830
- Resource Type:
- Technical Report
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE WASTES FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES; 11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS; CONTAINERS; CORROSION; HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTES; HEAT TRANSFER; MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE; SPENT FUEL ELEMENTS; DEFECTS; SPENT FUELS; OXIDATION; AFTER-HEAT; ALPHA-BEARING WASTES; BOROSILICATE GLASS; FUEL RODS; WASTE FORMS; CHEMICAL REACTIONS; ENERGY SOURCES; ENERGY TRANSFER; FUEL ELEMENTS; FUELS; GLASS; MANAGEMENT; MATERIALS; NUCLEAR FUELS; RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS; RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE; RADIOACTIVE WASTES; REACTOR COMPONENTS; REACTOR MATERIALS; SPENT FUEL STORAGE; STORAGE; WASTE MANAGEMENT; WASTE STORAGE; WASTES; 052002* - Nuclear Fuels- Waste Disposal & Storage; 050900 - Nuclear Fuels- Transport, Handling, & Storage
Citation Formats
Guenther, R J, Gilbert, E R, Slate, S C, Partain, W L, Divine, J R, and Kreid, D K. Assessment of degradation concerns for spent fuel, high-level wastes, and transuranic wastes in monitored retrievalbe storage. United States: N. p., 1984.
Web. doi:10.2172/5404485.
Guenther, R J, Gilbert, E R, Slate, S C, Partain, W L, Divine, J R, & Kreid, D K. Assessment of degradation concerns for spent fuel, high-level wastes, and transuranic wastes in monitored retrievalbe storage. United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/5404485
Guenther, R J, Gilbert, E R, Slate, S C, Partain, W L, Divine, J R, and Kreid, D K. 1984.
"Assessment of degradation concerns for spent fuel, high-level wastes, and transuranic wastes in monitored retrievalbe storage". United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/5404485. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/5404485.
@article{osti_5404485,
title = {Assessment of degradation concerns for spent fuel, high-level wastes, and transuranic wastes in monitored retrievalbe storage},
author = {Guenther, R J and Gilbert, E R and Slate, S C and Partain, W L and Divine, J R and Kreid, D K},
abstractNote = {It has been concluded that there are no significant degradation mechanisms that could prevent the design, construction, and safe operation of monitored retrievable storage (MRS) facilities. However, there are some long-term degradation mechanisms that could affect the ability to maintain or readily retrieve spent fuel (SF), high-level wastes (HLW), and transuranic wastes (TRUW) several decades after emplacement. Although catastrophic failures are not anticipated, long-term degradation mechanisms have been identified that could, under certain conditions, cause failure of the SF cladding and/or failure of TRUW storage containers. Stress rupture limits for Zircaloy-clad SF in MRS range from 300 to 440/sup 0/C, based on limited data. Additional tests on irradiated Zircaloy (3- to 5-year duration) are needed to narrow this uncertainty. Cladding defect sizes could increase in air as a result of fuel density decreases due to oxidation. Oxidation tests (3- to 5-year duration) on SF are also needed to verify oxidation rates in air and to determine temperatures below which monitoring of an inert cover gas would not be required. Few, if any, changes in the physical state of HLW glass or canisters or their performance would occur under projected MRS conditions. The major uncertainty for HLW is in the heat transfer through cracked glass and glass devitrification above 500/sup 0/C. Additional study of TRUW is required. Some fraction of present TRUW containers would probably fail within the first 100 years of MRS, and some TRUW would be highly degraded upon retrieval, even in unfailed containers. One possible solution is the design of a 100-year container. 93 references, 28 figures, 17 tables.},
doi = {10.2172/5404485},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/5404485},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sun Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1984},
month = {Sun Jan 01 00:00:00 EST 1984}
}