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MAJOR ISSUES IN THE TRAINING OF
SECURITY PERSONNEL

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ABSTRACT

The effectiveness of the response component of a physical protection system depends greatly upon the training received by the security personnel. This paper discusses the issues and problems in the area of training which were of greatest concern to the attendees of the 1980 and 1981 INMM sponsored Technical Workshops on Guard Training. The attendees were training supervisors of managers of security personnel and represented a variety of organizations and companies including DOE facilities, NRC licensees, the military, private security contractors, and governmental agencies. Major categories of concern include: professionalism in security, legal constraints and obligations, physical and psychological testing and standards, governmental requirements, morale and motivation, and tactical training techniques.

INTRODUCTION

A security program is only as good as the people who administer it and participate in it. A corollary to that statement is that the people are only as good as the training and preparation they receive. Two INMM-sponsored workshops have been conducted to discuss the technical and operational problems associated with the training of security personnel. The first workshop was held in Gatlinburg, Tennessee, in 1980 and the second in St. Charles, Illinois, in 1981. This paper summarizes some of the major concerns and conclusions of the participants in the two workshops.

Workshop Attendees

The attendees consisted of supervisors and managers responsible for security personnel training from various locations possessing nuclear material. A cross-section of the various locations was represented.

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Type	Location	Number Attendees	Percentage
DOE Facilities		54	45
NRC Licensees		16	13
Government Agencies		16	13
Security Companies		16	13
Security Consultants		14	12
Military			4
TOTAL		121	100

Attendees from France and From Canada are included in the government agencies.

Professionalism in Security

Security personnel are a critical facet of a safeguards program. No matter how technically sound your security plan or how advanced your security equipment, if your personnel are not given an identity at a level commensurate with their responsibilities, and are not properly selected and trained, your system is defective. And worse, your facility is vulnerable. Lack of professionalism in security was perceived as a major problem.

At some locations the security organization is at the bottom of the organizational ladder and has the substandard salaries and benefits that naturally follow. This makes the recruiting and retention of qualified personnel nearly impossible. This situation is found more often with facilities having contract security personnel where, in many cases, the competition for the contract causes a lowering of standards in order to obtain the contract.

Problems with professionalism will continue to plague us until there are requirements for mandatory training based upon an adequate syllabus of instruction. In the nuclear industry training requirements are receiving increased attention and are being implemented - at least partially.

It was agreed that in addition to a universally accepted code of ethics to establish

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a high standard of professional conduct for security officers, there should be entry requirements, some sort of certification program, and licensing by the appropriate governmental agency. Such regulations and procedures should be self-imposed by an appropriate security organization; however, most of the workshop attendees desired tighter government controls.

Other suggestions made to improve the professional image of security personnel were: develop clear, fair, and publicized career and promotional systems; rotate security posts and positions; and insist upon behavior that is professional.

Legal Constraints and Obligations

From a legal viewpoint security officers are in a no-man's land between that of a peace officer and a private citizen. Some of the actions of an officer may be considered equivalent to those of a peace officer with the resulting partial protection given by law; however, almost assuredly the personal liability will be treated as that of a private citizen. The resulting problem is that the security officer may be forced to choose between subjecting himself to personal liability or doing his job.

A major concern was the use of deadly force; that is, force used either to kill or seriously injure another or when risk of such death or injury is likely. There was much concern over what attendees felt to be admonishments by officials to use deadly force to prevent theft of SNM or classified documents and of the legal problems which could face the individual security officer after such an incident.

The use of deadly force is never authorized and is legally justified in only a few instances. These instances include self-defense, defense of others, law enforcement, and necessity. It is not legal, generally, to use deadly force in defense of property.

Security officers are concerned that they are being asked to search, arrest, use force to prevent theft or sabotage, and to perform similar acts without being provided complete guidelines of legal conduct. It was agreed that an important and effective weapon of the security officer was knowledge of the law and that this knowledge should be obtained through training. Since both federal law and state law (especially for personal liability) apply, it was suggested that each facility needs to study its legal position and to provide guidance for the training of its security personnel. This guidance could be in the form of a document generated by the facility's legal specialists with the assistance of the appropriate governmental agency.

A clear, documented policy for the use of deadly force was seen to be essential. Complete understanding of this policy by each security officer can help reduce his delay or lag time in the event of a serious armed confrontation. It

can well mean the difference between death or survival.

Physical and Psychological Testing and Standards

It was generally agreed that security officers should be screened carefully both physically and psychologically to insure that they are capable of performing their envisioned tasks upon which the success or failure of the safeguards system may ultimately depend.

In both of these areas projects are underway to study and to formulate standards and procedures. The DOE is developing physical standards which can be applied to discriminate between those who can do the job and those who cannot and which will satisfy the legal requirements for validity. The NRC is proposing a program of pre-employment background investigations and psychological evaluation coupled with behavioral observation during the course of employment, which is aimed at increasing the trustworthiness and reliability of all nuclear employees including security officers.

Some workshop attendees believe that there may be more than one category of security officer. For example, some may be designated to perform routine types of activities and others may be selected to perform the more demanding and stressful roles.

Governmental Requirements

The attendees felt that more guidance than was being received is necessary. Two examples of inadequate guidance given were the apparent refusal to provide specific guidance regarding the use of deadly force, and the lack of specific training guidance regarding armed responses by security personnel.

It was the consensus of opinion that specific guidance rather than general guidance is needed in the area of security officer training.

The requirement for towers was discussed and was not acceptable to the majority. It appears that the officer in the tower is considered expendable. A good television camera was suggested as an alternative.

Some concern was expressed that the governmental agencies did not fully appreciate the problems associated with the implementation of new rules, regulations, and requirements.

Morale and Motivation

The nature of the job of the security officer is such that morale and motivation are a continuing problem. As one attendee expressed it, "years and years of total boredom accentuated with a few moments of sheer terror."

The two major causes of problems in this area were seen as being the poor image of the security officers, partially because of titles such as "guard" and the age-old idea that security personnel are second-class employees, and the lack of management support.

Increased professionalism and better training were seen as ways to improve the existing situation.

Tactical Training Techniques

The tactics needed by security officers to assure an adequate response require specialized training. This training takes man-hours and money - both in short supply in security organizations.

A first step is to determine the exact training required. Specific learning objectives expressed in performance terms are considered necessary to determine the validity and the value of the training program. A major consideration is to identify the level and nature of the threat to which training can be realistically performed.

Attendees concluded that individual tactical training must precede team training and that redundancy is required to assure skill acquisition and retention. It was believed that to start with team training rather than individual training would be counterproductive.

Although all officers need some basic tactical training, it does not appear to be cost effective to train all officers to the required level of proficiency. Tactical training is composed primarily of physical skills which demand that officers be in excellent physical condition. It was suggested that in-hours time be provided for the physical training of selected response officers.

Realistic site-related scenarios were recommended which should include both defensive and offensive tactical requirements. The use of laser-equipped training weapons was recommended when team training was being conducted.

Although parts of a tactical training program will be site-specific, there is a large degree of commonality in this type of training. The DOE is developing a series of training materials consisting of television tapes and related instructional materials which can be used to teach these commonalities.

The attendees agreed that a high degree of confidence in one another was required by response force officers. Therefore, it was recommended that they train together as a team or unit. To depend upon whatever officer is close by as the facility's response was not considered the best approach.

Summary

Security officers are the critical implementing elements of our technically engineered safeguards systems. However, there are weaknesses in the bond between technology and the human element of security systems which can affect protection quality. A viable and effective security force must be developed by management to ensure maximum efficiency in performance. The problem is to ensure that the security officers are properly prepared to respond to ingenious, flexible, highly-competent and ruthlessly-tenacious adversaries. The officers must be trained to deal with potential foes who are militarily organized and equipped, highly skilled, and driven by intangibles such as ideology, willingness to kill, and above all, willingness to die.

A partial solution to this problem comes from emphasis upon proper training. One step in addressing and solving the problem is to communicate effectively and objectively on the major issues in training. This paper has given a brief summary of the major concerns expressed by the 121 attendees at the two INMM-sponsored workshops in training. Collectively, we can lend our support to our security organizations which will improve the excellence of the response component of our safeguards and security systems.