Safeguardability of the vitrification option for disposal of plutonium
- Los Alamos National Lab., NM (United States)
Safeguardability of the vitrification option for plutonium disposition is rather complex and there is no experience base in either domestic or international safeguards for this approach. In the present treaty regime between the US and the states of the former Soviet Union, bilaterial verifications are considered more likely with potential for a third-party verification of safeguards. There are serious technological limitations to applying conventional bulk handling facility safeguards techniques to achieve independent verification of plutonium in borosilicate glass. If vitrification is the final disposition option chosen, maintaining continuity of knowledge of plutonium in glass matrices, especially those containing boron and those spike with high-level wastes or {sup 137}Cs, is beyond the capability of present-day safeguards technologies and nondestructive assay techniques. The alternative to quantitative measurement of fissile content is to maintain continuity of knowledge through a combination of containment and surveillance, which is not the international norm for bulk handling facilities.
- Research Organization:
- US Department of Energy (USDOE), Washington DC (United States)
- OSTI ID:
- 420666
- Report Number(s):
- CONF-951259-; ON: DE96011798; TRN: 97:002149
- Resource Relation:
- Conference: Plutonium stabilization and immobilization workshop, Washington, DC (United States), 12-14 Dec 1995; Other Information: PBD: May 1996; Related Information: Is Part Of US Department of Energy Plutonium Stabilization and Immobilization Workshop, December 12-14, 1995: Final proceedings; PB: 474 p.
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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