Derivation of models for nuclear weapon terrorist arming and detonation risk analysis
Abstract
This report investigates "use control" for the on-site arming and detonation, by terrorists, of stored weapon systems. We investigate both components of weapon "use control", which we define as: (1) weapon "use denial" * that we model as a probability, Pj (denial), that represents the chances that terrorists attempting to arm a type j weapon will commit a non-recoverable error, and (2) weapon "use delay" that we model as a random variable, Tj , that represents the arming delay imposed by the use control features of a type j weapon, before detonation can occur. Using information pertaining to the physical security system at a storage site, the postulated terrorist attack force size, and simulated combat engagement outcomes, we formulate the frequency, fj , and probability, P(dj ), of on-site detonation, for generic weapon types j. We derive a model that disjoins the performance of site physical security, from that for weapon use control, if the use control random variable Tj has a Uniform or histogram distribution. This is an especially significant result where most complex distributions can be adequately approximated with a histogram. Hence, we can conduct combat simulations to obtain the physical security performance of a specific storage sitemore »
- Authors:
- Publication Date:
- Research Org.:
- Lawrence Livermore National Lab. (LLNL), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Org.:
- USDOE Office of Defense Programs (DP)
- OSTI Identifier:
- 4077
- Report Number(s):
- UCRL-ID-132476
DP0101011; ON: DE00004077
- DOE Contract Number:
- W-7405-Eng-48
- Resource Type:
- Technical Report
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
- Subject:
- 45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEFENSE; Nuclear Weapons; Risk Assessment; Mathematical Models; Control
Citation Formats
Parziale, A A. Derivation of models for nuclear weapon terrorist arming and detonation risk analysis. United States: N. p., 1998.
Web. doi:10.2172/4077.
Parziale, A A. Derivation of models for nuclear weapon terrorist arming and detonation risk analysis. United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/4077
Parziale, A A. 1998.
"Derivation of models for nuclear weapon terrorist arming and detonation risk analysis". United States. https://doi.org/10.2172/4077. https://www.osti.gov/servlets/purl/4077.
@article{osti_4077,
title = {Derivation of models for nuclear weapon terrorist arming and detonation risk analysis},
author = {Parziale, A A},
abstractNote = {This report investigates "use control" for the on-site arming and detonation, by terrorists, of stored weapon systems. We investigate both components of weapon "use control", which we define as: (1) weapon "use denial" * that we model as a probability, Pj (denial), that represents the chances that terrorists attempting to arm a type j weapon will commit a non-recoverable error, and (2) weapon "use delay" that we model as a random variable, Tj , that represents the arming delay imposed by the use control features of a type j weapon, before detonation can occur. Using information pertaining to the physical security system at a storage site, the postulated terrorist attack force size, and simulated combat engagement outcomes, we formulate the frequency, fj , and probability, P(dj ), of on-site detonation, for generic weapon types j. We derive a model that disjoins the performance of site physical security, from that for weapon use control, if the use control random variable Tj has a Uniform or histogram distribution. This is an especially significant result where most complex distributions can be adequately approximated with a histogram. Hence, we can conduct combat simulations to obtain the physical security performance of a specific storage site independent of the use control features associated with specific weapon types that are stored, or might be stored, at the site. In turn, we can obtain the use control performance for various weapon types, independent of where they are stored and the physical security systems surrounding them. Our models can then mathematically combine physical security performance and weapon use control performance for any combination of storage facility and weapon type.},
doi = {10.2172/4077},
url = {https://www.osti.gov/biblio/4077},
journal = {},
number = ,
volume = ,
place = {United States},
year = {Sun Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 1998},
month = {Sun Mar 01 00:00:00 EST 1998}
}