


A Comparison Study of Feature Extraction and Data Fusion Techniques for Improving Cyber-Physical Situational Awareness

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Background:

- Modern power grids are tightly integrated with communications systems and cyber networks, and this integration continues to increase as more communication-enabled devices are added
- It is no longer sufficient to independently collect and analyze physical systems data and cyber data
- Detecting modern cyber-physical attacks on the power grid requires an integrated analysis of both cyber and physical data sources



Methodology:

- Tested three feature extraction methodologies:
 - Principal Component Analysis (PCA) with Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)
 - Stochastic Neighbor Embedding (t-SNE)
 - Autoencoder (AE)
- Each method was run on the cyber only, physical only, and combined cyber/physical datasets

Key Takeaways:

- Each feature extraction technique is a feasible choice for cyber-physical system analysis
- AE provides a fully unsupervised feature extraction plus anomaly detection solution
- The result plots for the physical and cyber-physical cases are nearly identical. We hypothesize that this is due to the larger number of physical features as well as the upsampling of the cyber data


Collected Data:

- Cyber Data collected from 3 substation locations:
 - Round-trip times (RTT)
 - Packet retransmits
 - Cyber data collected at 1 sec intervals and upsampled to 33 samples per second
- Physical Data collected from 8 PMU sensors:
 - Voltage magnitude and angle
 - Current
 - Frequency
 - Physical data sampled at 33 samples per second


Scenario:

- A real-time, cyber-physical WSCC 9-bus system simulated using the Sandia SCEPTRE emulation platform
- First, a line and generator stop functioning
- Second, a denial of service (DoS) attack begins
- Third, due to the DoS attack a load shedding command is prevented from going through








Cyber




Physical



Cyber-Physical



SVD



t-SNE