

# Assessing the Consequences of Postclosure Criticality in Spent Nuclear Fuel

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# Background

- Disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is the responsibility of the US Department of Energy (DOE)
- Thousands of metrics tons of SNF has accumulated, much of which is stored in dual-purpose canisters (DPC)
- DPCs are licensed for storage and transportation but were not designed for disposal; not designed to preclude criticality over repository timescales ( $10^6$  yrs)
- DOE has been investigating disposal of SNF in DPCs
  - Avoids expense and worker dose associated with repackaging
  - Introduces issues with respect to possible repository temperature limits
  - Introduces issues with respect to emplacement and engineering
  - **Introduces possibility of postclosure criticality**

# Managing Potential Occurrence of Postclosure Criticality

- Lower the probability of occurrence of postclosure criticality so that it is unlikely from a regulatory point of view
  - Use long-lasting neutron absorbing material in future DPCs; would require new license
  - Revise the loading map for to-be-loaded SNF; would not require new license and is being explored as a possibility
  - Add filler material to already-loaded DPCs; subject of talks at this conference
- **Assess the consequences of postclosure criticality and include in repository performance calculations or exclude on the basis of low consequence**
  - Identify features, events, and processes (FEPs) that need to be considered
  - Develop the tools needed to include the relevant FEPs in models used to evaluate the performance of hypothetical repositories for  $10^6$  years (performance assessment)
  - Conduct performance assessment analyses both with and without the occurrence of postclosure criticality and compare the results

# Analysis of FEPs

- Started with the list of FEPs developed for the Yucca Mountain Repository Performance Assessment
  - Identified FEPs that could affect potential for and/or extent of a criticality event
  - Identified FEPs that could be affected by a criticality event
  - Identified FEPs that fell into both categories
  - Identified FEPs not previously considered for further development
- Undisturbed repository conditions (examples)
  - Geometry and materials of waste package components
  - Degradation rates of various components
  - Backfill permeability
  - Depth and saturation status of repository
- Termination mechanisms: grid spacer degradation


# Analysis of FEPs (cont'd)

- Nuclear Criticality in a Waste Package
  - Waste package must fail first and allow water to enter
  - Evaluation of as-loaded conditions indicate that about 70% of DPCs would remain subcritical under two different stylized scenarios (loss of absorbers and loss of baskets)
  - Neutronics of the critical system inside the DPC are coupled with the thermal-hydrologic properties of the repository
- Thermal Effects (examples)
  - Change properties of materials both inside and outside the waste package, which would affect groundwater flow and radionuclide transport
  - Affect corrosion rates for grid spacers, baskets, cladding, fuel, etc.
- Inventory Effects
  - Generate fission products, some of which would not otherwise be included in performance assessment calculations
  - Generate and deplete fissile material
  - Generate and deplete neutron absorbers

# Develop Tools to Model Relevant FEPs

- Used PFLOTRAN to model the performance of a hypothetical saturated repository in a shale host rock 500 m below the ground surface
- PFLOTRAN already includes many of FEPs associated with undisturbed repository conditions, but not criticality
- Developed a criticality submodule
  - Heat of criticality
  - Change in radionuclide inventory
  - Decay heat from fission products created during the criticality event
  - Specify start time and end time for criticality event
- Modify PFLOTRAN
  - Include saturation and temperature dependent anisotropic thermal conductivity
  - Include change in backfill materials (bentonite to illite)
- Implementation of a grid spacer degradation model currently in process


# Hypothetical Saturated Repository



## Argillite Reference Case

### Stratigraphic Unit Sequence


Sandstone	
<b>Shale Host Rock</b>	
Shale/Limestone	
Shale	
Shale/Sandstone (aquifer)	
Shale/Sandstone	
Limestone (aquifer)	
Shale	
Sandstone (aquifer)	
Limestone (aquifer)	




# Performance Assessment Analyses

- Waste package fails at 9,000 years after repository closure; water enters the waste package; quasi steady-state criticality event begins
- Power of criticality event ranges from 1 to 4 kW; limited by moderator density and assumes sub-cooled (non-boiling) conditions
- Duration of criticality event is 10,000 years
- Studied changes in radionuclide inventory at 20k years resulting from 2.47 kW event
- Compared repository performance with criticality event to that without criticality event
  - Temperature and liquid pressure at specific observation points within the model
  - Effects of illitization model on permeability
  - Transport of four radionuclides
  - Dose to a member of the public from I-129


# Performance Assessment Analyses – PFLOTTRAN model




# Performance Assessment Analyses – Inventory Changes in Stable Fission Products




# Performance Assessment Analyses – Inventory Changes in Radioactive Fission and Activation Products




# Performance Assessment Analyses – Inventory Changes in Actinides and Decay Products




# Performance Assessment Analyses – Observation Points




# Performance Assessment Analyses – Waste Package Temperature




# Performance Assessment Analyses – Waste Package Pressure







# Performance Assessment Analyses – Backfill Permeability (bf0)




# Performance Assessment Analyses – Cs-137 Concentrations



# Performance Assessment Analyses – Sr-90 Concentrations



# Performance Assessment Analyses – Dose to Member of Public



# Further Work

- Analyze neutronics under higher pressure conditions
- Analyze neutronics under boiling conditions
- Incorporate additional FEPs into model of postclosure criticality
- Examine repository-wide uncertainty and variability
- Complete implementation of the grid spacer degradation model

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# Questions?