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Multilayer Network Models for Coordinating Orchestration of Systems Security Engineering



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


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Outline

- Introduction
- Security Orchestration in FuSE
- Multilayer Networks → Security Orchestration
- Demonstration → Lone Pine Nuclear Power Plant
- Insights & Implications






Introduction

Part of the challenge [in systems security engineering] is the lack of a system science discipline within which to ***integrate a system security science***...Security is predominantly a heuristic practice where we encase that which works in some attempt at engineering for repeatability and consistency...[yet] ***developing the science of system security and security engineering is preferable*** over doing more of the same harder (heuristics).

(Willet 2020, 5)



Introduction



Introduction



Socio-cyber-physical paradigm

Move beyond domain-specific solutions
to focus on engineering for *interactions*

Security coordination

Including between protective solutions
& with *non*-protective (sub)systems



Multi-domain approaches

Dynamic decisions & operations
for relevant & adaptable system defense

Multilayer network models

Demonstrated approach that helps
capture interactions & coordination

From reactive → proactive

Aligning security functions with
real-world complexities & interactions



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
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


Security Orchestration: FuSE




(Dove, et. al 2021)

Security Orchestration: FuSE



If interactions* are important for security, *then* there's a need to *coordinate them!



(Dove, et. al 2021)



Security Orchestration

| Category | Architectural Premises for the Future of Systems Security Engineering |
|-------------------|--|
| Foundational | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>integrate system security & cybersecurity engineering (mutually influential) *</i>• <i>context matters → context-aware systems with flexible human interfaces*</i> |
| Strategic Framing | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• security is an infinite game of continual adaptation to retain/regain the advantage• international coalitions for governance & adjudication to influence standards• avoid one-size-fits-all & create options with varying principles & risk tolerance• cybersecurity is (likely) the primary national security risk for many countries• <i>successful security & cybersecurity depend on successful national coordination*</i>• hedge digital failures with analog alternatives → reduce risk in a digital world• <i>system value determines levels of resistance & resilience in the design*</i>• avoid Gordian knots of liability by framing structure & accountability in design |
| Tactical Framing | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• security is a functional requirement for engineered systems• the science of system security & security engineering is preferable to heuristics• <i>all technology is not equal & equality today's relationships may change*</i>• adaptability ("to fix") & expendability ("to fry") are key to complex systems• compositional security, where readily available modules are less prone to error• <i>encoding axiomatic principles to facilitate non-deterministic systems action*</i>• <i>automated logic in compositional security to resolve views across contexts**</i>• <i>design principles include varying (in)dependence in systems security**</i>• adaptively identify & encode early indicators as part of system design• context driven dependencies & constraints force prioritizing security principles |

*Premises determined to influence the context for security orchestration

**Premises specifically identified by Willett (2020) for “security orchestration”





Security Orchestration: Definition

| | |
|--------------|---|
| Category | Architectural Premises for the Future of Systems Security Engineering |
| Foundational | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>integrate system security & cybersecurity engineering (mutually influential) *</i> |

Security orchestration → “...***connecting disparate security*** technologies through standardized and automatable workflows ***that enables security*** teams to effectively carry out ***incident response*** and security ***operations***.”

Trade varying (in)dependence in systems security

... & encode early indicators as part of system design

... driven dependencies & constraints force prioritizing security principles


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


(Iyer 2019)


Security Orchestration: Multilayer Networks



[a]



[b]



[c]



LDRD

Security Orchestration: Multilayer Networks



Multilayer Network models can help fill gaps identified by (Iyer, 2019)

1

A lot of data but little follow-up

2

Tools that don't talk to each other

3

People that don't talk to each other

Security orchestration tool ingests data & performs actions based on predetermined actions




Multiple data flows into security orchestration for centralized collection/correlation of alerts

Provided best practices can remove variation in response quality, collaboration can provide structure

- Provides structure to evaluate multi-domain interactions
- Unused data captured as performance measures for emerging security behaviors
- Defines (in)outflows as performance measures
- A common (mental or systems) model to align domain-specific security solutions
- A common (mental or systems) model to coordinate discussions security worldviews
- Identifies & highlights focal areas to support real-time decision-making & investigations




Security Orchestration: Demonstration





Security Orchestration: Demonstration


| | Experimental Condition | Conclusions & Insights |
|-------|---|--|
| Green | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Random node removal<i>No communications rerouting</i> in the security system | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Complete communications failure follows power law behaviorBaseline for pushing curve up & right |
| Blue | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Random node removal<i>Small communications rerouting</i> capability in the security system | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Complete communications failure follows power law behaviorRerouting capabilities delays complete communications failure |





Security Orchestration: Demonstration

Diversity → a desired SSE outcome to be orchestrated within the system



- Measures of diversity:
 - Shannon Index
 - Functional redundancy
- For the LPNPP:
 - *Shannon Index (SI)*: ratio of passive infrared sensors among the total number of different detection sensors
 - *Functional redundancy (FR)*: detection can be achieved by technical sensors, digital pattern tracing, or human observation
- SI vs FR plots for LPNPP
 - High FR, low SI → high variance in detection, but limited variance for assessment
 - Design goal: improve variance in assessment (higher & to the right)



Insights & Implications

| Category | Premises for Future Systems Security Engineering: Security Orchestration | Related Elements of Multilayer Network Models for Systems Security |
|-------------------|--|---|
| Foundational | <ul style="list-style-type: none">integrate system security & cybersecurity engineering (mutually influential)context matters → context-aware systems with flexible human interfaces | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Common (mental/systems) model & cross-domain (intra-layer) measuresDynamic & topological multilayer network performance measures |
| Strategic Framing | <ul style="list-style-type: none">successful security & cybersecurity depend on successful national coordinationsystem value determines levels of resistance & resilience in the design | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Common (mental or systems) model of security & cross-domain (e.g., intra-layer) performance measuresDynamic/topological multilayer metrics → emergent behaviors |
| Tactical Framing | <ul style="list-style-type: none">all technology is not equal & equality today's relationships may changeencoding axiomatic principles to facilitate non-deterministic systems actionautomated logic in compositional security to resolve views across contexts*design principles include varying (in)dependence in systems security* | <ul style="list-style-type: none">Dynamic & topological multilayer network performance measuresEmergent behaviors via component selection & relationship definitionInter-/Intra-layer edge connections & related performance measuresCross-domain (e.g., intra-layer) performance measures |


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Insights & Implications



Multilayer networks → identify cross-domain connections → optimize security orchestration

Multilayer networks → provide framework to capture cyber/digital elements → security orchestration



Multilayer networks → produce range of performance metrics → quantify security orchestration

Maturity of security orchestration → needs to capture humans, cyber & non-linear ops environments → address real-world SSE complexities



Questions?

