




# Summary of the Nuclear Risk Assessment 2019 Update for the Mars 2020 Mission Environmental Impact Statement



PRESENTED BY

Dr. Daniel J. Clayton


Probabilistic Safety Assessment & Management  
PSAM 16

June 26-July 1, 2022


# Perseverance Rover on Mars



Multi-Mission  
Radioisotope  
Thermoelectric  
Generator



# Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG)



Safety is built from the inside out and from the outside in. Analysis must quantify this for decision makers.



# Space Nuclear System Sits on Top of a Very Powerful Launch Vehicle





# Launches Can Fail



**Atlas Fallback-1965**



**Titan 34D-Apr 18, 1986**



**Antares-Oct 28, 2014**



**Delta 241-Jan 27, 1997**

# Space Nuclear Systems Launch Safety Approach

Identify **main sources** of risk, to allow for potential **mitigating actions**, to **reduce** the overall mission **risk**

Goal: **Quantitative** estimate of the risk that is **defensible** and **credible**

- Mean probability of an accident
- Mean probability of release of radioactive material
- Mass of material released (“source term”)
- Health effects (doses, latent cancer fatalities)
- Land, crop contamination
- All expressed as mean values, percentile values, and exceedance probability graphs
- Quantify uncertainty



# Characterization of Risk



Probabilistic **methods** applied to generate specific **probabilities** of interest to define the **risk** picture for **decision makers**

$$\underline{P(C > c_i)} = \underline{P(C > c_i | release)} \underline{P(release | accident)} \underline{P(incident)}$$



Probability of an accident occurring

Probability of a release given an accident

Probability of a consequence greater than a certain threshold given a release

# Mission Phases



**Phase 0 – Prelaunch**,  $T < t_1$ , from installation of the system to just prior to start of engines at  $t_1$

**Phase 1 – Early Launch**,  $t_1 \leq T < t_x$ , start of engines to no potential for land impact in the launch area,  $t_x$

**Phase 2 – Late Launch**,  $t_x \leq T$ , end of Phase 1 to the launch vehicle reaching 30,480 m (100,000 ft), above which reentry heating could occur


**Phase 3 – Suborbital Reentry**, end of Phase 2 to just prior to orbit

**Phase 4 – Orbital Reentry**, end of Phase 3 to spacecraft separation

**Phase 5 – Long-Term Reentry**, end of Phase 4 to no chance of Earth reentry



# Launch Safety Code Suite





# National Environment Policy Act Activities

January 2014 – Nuclear Risk Assessment (NRA) for the Mars 2020 mission

November 2014 – Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)

January 2015 – Record of Decision (RoD) to proceed with mission

## Investments made towards mission

- Mars 2020 rover and scientific payload design
- Mars landing site selection
- Selection of launch vehicle and launch period
- Power system fueling
- NASA/DOE safety testing & modeling updates

July 2019 – Mars 2020 Mission Final Safety Analysis Report

August 2019 – National Security Presidential Memorandum-20 (NSPM-20)

September 2019 – Nuclear Risk Assessment 2019 Update

January 2020 – Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS)





# National Security Presidential Memorandum-20

This Memorandum establishes an updated and risk-informed **process** for **launching space nuclear systems** by

- Structuring launch authorization for space nuclear systems to follow a **tiered process** based on system characteristics, level of potential risk, and national security considerations
- Establishing **safety guidelines** to assist mission planners and launch authorization authorities in ensuring launch safety across the full range of space nuclear systems.
- Directing that safety analyses incorporate **past experience** to maximize effectiveness and efficiency.
- Replacing the mission-specific **ad hoc** Interagency Nuclear Review **Panel** (INSRP) with a **standing** Interagency Nuclear Safety Review **Board** (INSRB).

# Comparison with NSPM-20 Safety Guidelines



Results from the **NRA 2019 Update** show **probabilities** and uncertainty intervals at the NSPM-20 **dose levels within safety guidelines**



# Accident Probability Comparison



## Reduction due to updated launch vehicle information

- Selection of launch vehicle
- Additional launches of similar launch vehicles
- Fault tree development

# Total Probability of Release Comparison



## Increase due to model and input parameter updates

- Solid propellant fragmentation and trajectory
- Liquid and solid propellant fire environments
- Plutonia release model
- Potential debris impact area
- Blast model information
- Module and iridium cladding response to impact forces

# Consequence Measure Comparison



## Increase due to model updates and increased source terms

- Weather data
- Propellant plume rise with particle tracking in plumes
- Age-specific and organ-specific dose coefficients
- Organ-specific and exposure pathway-specific risk coefficients
- Region-specific crop information



# Consequence Risk Comparison



## **Increase in consequence risks**

- Decrease in accident probability
- Increase in release probability, source term, and consequence measures

## **Uncertainty level of 25x specified in 2014 NRA**

- Three consequence risks above factor of 25
- Three consequence risks below factor of 25

# Summary



**NRA** addresses **response of system** to potential accident and abort conditions and provides the **technical basis** for radiological risks in **SEIS**

**NRA updated** based on specific investments and revised models and input parameters

Overall mission consequence **risks increased**

**SEIS issued** based on updated information

Well **within safety guidelines** in NSPM-20

**Successful launch and landing** on Mars (and still going strong)