





Developing a comprehensive, adaptive system for large scale x-ray images



Robert Forrest, Sandia National Labs

SPIE 2022

4 April 2022

Big Picture



Our Task: Aid CBP's adjudication of data thereby supporting reduction of risk and the rapid and secure flow of commerce into the United States.



We run a portfolio of projects using Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) for Department of Homeland Security / Customs and Border Protection (DHS/CBP).

This talk will be an overview: An introduction to the problem and how we think about and engineer adaptive solutions.

Supporting technical details in other talks:

Resilient adjudication in NII with hierarchical object and anomaly detection

5 April 2022 • 1:40 PM - 2:00 PM

Synthetic threat injection using digital twin informed augmentation

4 April 2022 • 11:40 AM - 12:00 PM


Please connect with us to find out more.

Experience Gives Perspective



Initial project for DHS: Create an algorithm to find objects in 2D x-rays of packed bags.


Standard practice: Acquire dataset, use an industry standard NN. Declare success.



Process:

1. Prepare, generate data with specific demonstration target objects (4 months)
2. Annotate, label all the data. (2 months)
3. Run through industry standard algorithms.
4. Understand performance. Require more data to fill gaps. (Repeat 1.-2.)
5. Pilot System integration, GUI Development (6 months)
6. Present results to customer.

Successful Demo Of ATR



Customer Response: "What about X?", "Can you add Y?", "We are now more concerned with Z."
"What if it were (my special situation)?"

Lessons Learned:

Require a different approach.

One off solutions are not sufficient, we need continuous development.

Need a strategic method to respond dynamically to threat environment.

Expandability

System should get better over time. Avoid vendor lock in. Use standard APIs. Create a marketplace for ATR 3rd party algorithms.

Adaptability


Capability to make configuration changes and algorithm upgrades based on threat environment and mission need. Adaptation to lessons learned, performance and testing results, customer need and the latest techniques and methods.

Rapid Responsiveness

Detection of contraband needs to evolve at the speed of the dynamic threat.


Integrability

Detector exists in a larger system of abundant data, other detectors, and bodies of knowledge. Must provide generic interfaces for interoperability and a means by which many sources can integrate into a larger system.



Component Overview:

- Metadata: Universal Ontology, Labeling (Manual and Automatic)
- Data: Manually generated, Stream of Commerce (SOC), Synthetic.
- Algorithms: Utility, Model Zoo and Ensembling
- Inference engine: Recursive, persistent.



Data is always key.

Reality: normally, no perfect dataset exists – Need to triangulate based on available data.

Three Types:

SOC – Plentiful, unlabeled.

Used for: semi-supervised methods and for synthetic data.


Manually Generated – Laborious, labeled, only ground truth available.

Used For: Synthetic data isolated target items; validation. Experimentation on detector response.

Synthetic Data – Key enabling capability. Many uses, not ‘real’.

Used For: Many uses...

Synthetic Data – Key Capability



Generation of synthetic data from background 'scene' data and isolated 'target' items.

Allows generation of plentiful, labeled, relevant data.

Rapid Response to emerging threats – Train algorithms quickly

Less dependence on fielded detectors.

Many other potential uses.

Important to understand pitfalls.

Synthetic Data Generation



Method:

In attenuation space, crop target.

Choose background image, logical/strategic placement location.

Combine two images with Beer–Lambert law.

Filter noise to match scene image, avoiding double noise problem. Other histogram inspired adjustments.

GAN refinement.

Note: Can manually generate (target + background) to understand (target) + (background).

Additional improvements, see:

Synthetic threat injection using digital twin informed augmentation

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Synthetic Data Usage



Training algorithms generally. Basic Question: Does it help?

Quick Check Analysis

- Defined a Test Set of about 1000 images from 2D x-ray packed bags
- Overall Process:
 - Select % of Original, Synthetic Images, train simple model.
 - Evaluated trained model on Test Set

	100% Syn / 0% Original	0% Syn / 100% Original	100% Syn / 100% Original
Accuracy (%)	61.0	72.2	77.4

Other Uses:

More training data in difficult to construct configurations.

Provide understanding of algorithm capabilities. Probe edge cases.

Rapid training on new threats using few target images. (Threat library)

Additional results from large scale synthetic data usage in associated talk.

Conceptual idea: Threat Library




Rapid training on new threats using few target images. Idea: Threat library of images used for object detection.

Synthetic data generated with threat images. Models trained and deployed.

Working with vendors and the field to accumulate images.

Versions of synthetic data generated to train models.


Moving from examining small scale, packed bag x-ray images to large scale NII:



Notes on large scale NII:

- The same techniques as small scale work well.
- However: Material discrimination is more crude on large scale.
- Segmenting and breaking down the image become important...
- Generally more sensitive datasets, difficult to share results.

Inference Pipeline



Large scale data makes breaking down the 'scene' important.

Need a modular, configurable, and flexible inference pipeline.

Modular Design:



Individual modules perform a specific task, may operate on a sub-section of the image.

Modules provided with all upstream data about image, return products used by downstream modules. All historical knowledge about all images provided.

Modules intended to be easily configured into pipelines.


Pipeline performance measured against standard test sets.

Notional Pipeline Example



Example: ISO container segmented, generic intermodal OD or Manifest Verification algorithms can be applied in pipeline.

XATR: Automated Threat Recognition Execution Engine



Responsible for execution of inference pipeline.

Ability to operate locally (port net restricted) or in the cloud.

Executes in parallel on available modules. Based on modules registered required input/output.

Serves up versioned datasets

Recursion and performance monitoring...

For quantitative results, See:


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XATR: Two Core Capabilities

Recursion


Full Image



XATR continues hierarchy until all available modules are run.



Fundamental Ontology Objects



Automated Performance Measuring

- Like CI/CD for ML
- Ability to change configs, ML weights, pipelines.
- Versioned test datasets served.
- Result metrics built in.
- Iterative approach to development.



Both large and small scale adjudication of NII x-ray data are similar, but require thinking systematically about adjudication. Avoiding one off analysis and vendor lock in.

We designed a system that is expandable, adaptable, responsive and integrates easily into other systems.

Synthetic data is a key enabling capability that helps inevitable issues with lack of data.

Our modular execution pipeline (XATR) adheres to the above principles, we believe such open, adaptable systems are the future of adjudication for NII.