




Deep Deception



D. Farley, Z. Gastelum, T. Shead

Artificial intelligence and machine learning for IAEA safeguards

15 March 2022




Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Adversarial Machine Learning is an active area, and no winners

 x

“panda”

57.7% confidence

 $+ .007 \times$  $\text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$

“nematode”

8.2% confidence

 $=$  $x + \epsilon \text{sign}(\nabla_x J(\theta, x, y))$

“gibbon”

99.3 % confidence



AML of Safeguards Images



Trained Model Results

"Hyperboloid Cooling Tower"



Adversarial Results

"NOT Hyperboloid Cooling Tower"



Carlini & Wagner* Attack



"NOT Hyperboloid Cooling Tower"



"Hyperboloid Cooling Tower"



The trained model WAS NOT changed – rather, a small, nearly imperceptible, perturbation was added to the original image

* N. Carlini and D. Wagner, "Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks," in *IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy*, San Jose, 2017.

Even one pixel can change the answer



Cup(16.48%)
Soup Bowl(16.74%)



Bassinet(16.59%)
Paper Towel(16.21%)





Teapot(24.99%)
Joystick(37.39%)



Hamster(35.79%)
Nipple(42.36%)

Frames of an image can also be fooled




Can complete a partial image!




occluded

completions


original



What is the adversary's knowledge?



How does to adversary conduct an attack?



Successful Adversarial Attacks can take several forms

