



## Special Session: Cybersecurity for Power Electronics

# DER Cybersecurity Stakeholder Engagement, Standards Development, and EV Charger Penetration Testing

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# Motivation for Improving Cybersecurity of Energy Conversion Devices

- DER, EV chargers, buildings, microgrids, and other control systems are increasingly **networked** and **internet-connected**.
- An **expanded cyber attack surface** is the price for advanced control, remote access, and convenience.
- **Cybersecurity is rarely a priority** in highly competitive, unregulated markets.

**Friday's Massive DDoS Attack Came from Just 100,000 Hacked IoT Devices**

October 27, 2016 | By Swati Khandelwal

**Analysis Of Friday Attack**

**Future DDoS Attacks Could Reach 10 Tbps**



Guess how many devices participated in last Friday's massive DDoS attack against DNS provider Dyn that caused vast internet outages?

Just 100,000 devices.

I did not miss any zeros.

<https://thehackernews.com/2016/10/ddos-attack-mirai-iot.html>


**BBC NEWS**

**Hackers 'could target electricity grid' via solar panel tech**

By Chris Baraniuk Technology reporter

06 August 2017 | Technology

<http://www.bbc.com/news/amp/technology-40861976>



The firms were located in Germany, used to convert electricity produced by solar panels

GETTY IMAGES

Hackers could target electricity grids through security flaws in solar panel equipment, a Dutch researcher has said.

Guess who Just Hacked a Building Automation System?

Woke up to news early this week, **IBM X-Force** hacked a **Building Automation System** using a combination of common vulnerabilities. Based on the [report IBM produced](#), here is what happened.

First the IBM team managed to find an exposed Wireless D-Link router that was installed to provide remote access to the building. Once at the router, the team used **URL manipulation** and **path traversal** to get access to local resources for the router. This enabled the team to find the router password.

<http://buildingautomationmonthly.com/guess-who-just-hacked-a-building-automation-system/>



**Hackers Could Hold Entire Wind Farms Hostage**

Security researchers have demonstrated that they can hack the software systems used in wind turbines, and warn that it may be possible to use the vulnerability to take an entire wind farm hostage. At the Black Hat security conference in Las Vegas, Jason Staggs from the University of Tulsa explained that some wind turbines have control systems that run aged, unsupported operating systems like Windows 98, which are straightforward to hack. In fact, as the **Financial Times** reports, it's been shown that it's possible to send a command to a wind turbine that can stop its blades from turning. More worryingly, he also found that the networks used in wind farms could lend themselves to a widespread attack. "Wind


<https://www.technologyreview.com/the-download/608464/hackers-could-hold-entire-wind-farms-hostage/>

**Hackers took over a couple's Nest devices, raised the temperature to 90°, and blasted vulgar music**



**Millions of IoT Devices Using Same Hard-Coded CRYPTO Keys**

<https://thehackernews.com/2015/11/iot-device-crypto-keys.html>



MILLLLLLLLLLLIONS of Devices Using Same Hard-Coded CRYPTO Keys

Millions of embedded devices, including home routers, modems, IP cameras, VoIP phones, are sharing the same hard-coded SSH (Secure Shell) cryptographic keys or HTTPS (HTTP Secure) server certificates that expose them to various types of malicious attacks.

**The Washington Post**

Democracy Dies in Darkness

**How a fish tank helped hack a casino**



<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/07/21/how-a-fish-tank-helped-hack-a-casino/>

**Smart home hacking is easier than you think**

Scary stories of hacking Internet of Things devices are emerging, but how realistic is the threat?

By Colin Neagle Assistant Community Editor, Network World | APR 2, 2015 4:14 AM PDT

<https://www.networkworld.com/article/2905053/smart-home-hacking-is-easier-than-you-think.html>

**Hackers Make the First-Ever Ransomware for Smart Thermostats**

YOU SUCK! Pay 1 Bitcoin to get control back



It isn't only the high voltage that electric car drivers should be worried about. (AP Photo/Ted S. Warren)

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EMAIL

COMMENT

By Colin Neagle Assistant Community Editor, Network World | APR 2, 2015 4:14 AM PDT

[https://www.vice.com/en\\_us/article/aeik9j/internet-of-things-ransomware-smart-thermostat](https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/aeik9j/internet-of-things-ransomware-smart-thermostat)

**Smart charging stations for electronic cars are extremely vulnerable to hacking**



Even though Tesla's recent sales numbers painted a positive picture for the often beleaguered company, it's still very early days for the electric vehicle market. The availability of EV charge points has been cited as a key obstacle in EV sales growth, but one researcher recently pointed to the newer generation of smart charge points, meant to make EVs more attractive by offering features such as the ability to monitor or schedule charges via smartphone, or pay by touchless smart card, as also being a considerable area of serious technical vulnerability. According

<https://qz.com/87385/smart-charging-stations-for-electronic-cars-are-extremely-vulnerable-to-hacking/>

# DER Cybersecurity Educational Webinar Series

Engagement activities bring together individuals across industry, academia, and government to exchange ideas and learn

## Monthly Educational Webinar Series

- 4th Thursday of Each Month
- Blend of research, implementation recommendations, general cybersecurity education, etc.
- Email [support@sunspec.org](mailto:support@sunspec.org) to participate!



Watch them on SunSpec TV:

[https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBtYkboJGd0&list=PLFHov2\\_eYmehGvz2SjlxkLNOfd2Ldk0z](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBtYkboJGd0&list=PLFHov2_eYmehGvz2SjlxkLNOfd2Ldk0z)

## 2021 Webinars

- **1/21/21 – Cybersecurity Advisory Group for State Solar (CATSS) Brief**
  - Campbell Delahoyde, National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO)
- **2/25/21 – Overview of IEEE 1547.3: A Guide for Cybersecurity of DER Interconnected with Electric Power Systems**
  - Ryan Davidson, MPR Associates
  - Frances Cleveland, Xanthus Consulting International
- **3/25/21 – Conceptualizing Systems Cybersecurity Challenges for Rooftop Solar**
  - Jeremiah Miller, DOE Solar Energy Technologies Office
- **4/22/21 – Securing the Industrial Internet of Things: Cybersecurity for DER**
  - Jim McCarthy, *NIST National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence (NCCoE)*
- **5/27/21 – An Industrial Cybersecurity Perspective**
  - Ben Miller, Dragos
- **6/24/21 – Centralized vs Decentralized DER Role-Based Access Control Implementation**
  - George Fragkos, *University of New Mexico*
- **7/22/21 – Software Vulnerabilities (Software Bill of Materials – Transparency in the Software Supply Chain; Longclaw – Firmware Analysis Framework; Next Generation Firmware Analysis for Energy Systems)**
  - Allan Friedman, *US Department of Commerce, NTIA*
  - Jovana Helms, *Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory*
  - Chris Lamb, *Sandia National Laboratories*
- **8/26/21 – Cyber-Physical Intrusion Detection/Mitigation System**
  - Shamima Hossain-McKenzie, *Sandia National Laboratories*
- **9/14/21 – Zero Trust Security for Distributed Energy Resources**
  - Kip Gering, *Xage*
- **9/23/21 – DER Incident Response**
  - Rob Caldwell, *FireEye/Madiant*
- **10/28/21 – Historical Public Key Infrastructure Failures**
  - Josephine Wolff, *Tufts University*



# Pre-standardization Activities



## SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup



### DER Cybersecurity Certification Procedure

- Defined standardized procedure for DER vulnerability assessments.
- Leads: [Danish Saleem \(NREL\)](#) and [Cedric Carter \(MITRE\)](#)
- Publication: "Certification Procedures for Data and Communications Security of Distributed Energy Resources"
- Future work: Expected development within UL 2900-2-4 STP

Complete



### Secure Network Architecture

- Created DER reference architecture best practice.
- Lead: [Candace Suh-Lee \(EPRI\)](#)
- Publication: "EPRI Security Architecture for the Distributed Energy Resources Integration Network: Risk-based Approach for Network Design"
- Future work: Risk-based approach adopted in IEEE 1547.3


Complete



### Data-in-Flight Requirements

- Encryption, authentication, and key management requirements.
- Lead: [Ifeoma Onunkwo \(Sandia\)](#)
- Publication: "Recommendations for Trust and Encryption in DER Interoperability Standards", "Recommendations for Data-in-Transit Requirements for Securing DER Communications".
- Future work: IEEE 1547.3 update, IEEE 2030.5 revisions.

Complete



### Access Control

- DER Role-Based Access Control recommendations.
- Lead: [Jay Johnson \(Sandia\)](#)
- Topics: Access control taxonomy and security models
- Publication: "Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resource Access Controls"
- Follow-on: Added recommendations to IEEE 1547.3 Guide

Complete



### Patching Requirements

- Establishing patching guidelines for DER devices.
- Lead: [Jay Johnson \(Sandia\)](#), [Ingo Hanke \(SMA\)](#)
- Publication: "Recommendations for Distributed Energy Resource Patching"
- Follow-on: Added recommendations to IEEE 1547.3 Guide

Complete



### Utility/Aggregator Auditing Procedure

- Creating recommended auditing practices for DER networks.
- Planned for Oct 2021. Lead: TBD
- Topics: Step-by-step auditing procedure for internal or external compliance review. Recommend data for attack forensics.

Starting


### Related Activity: Blockchain Workgroup

- Defined requirements and specifications for using blockchain to ensure the security of private keys in DER manufacturing environments.
- Leads: [Jörg Brakensiek \(Wivity\)](#) and [Alfred Tom \(Wivity\)](#)

# DER Cybersecurity Standardization

## IEEE 1547.3: Guide for Cybersecurity of DER Interconnected with Electric Power Systems


- Recommendations for utilities, vendors, and aggregators for securing DER systems
- Balloting planned for late 2021



## IEEE 1547.3 Scope with Clause 5 Recommendations

## California Electric Rule 21

- CPUC Resolution E-5000 required Utilities (SCE, PG&E, SDG&E) to meet with stakeholders to address cybersecurity concerns.
- IOU goal: Create a *Utility Cybersecurity Requirements Guide for Communication to DER Facilities*. Current topics being debated within workgroup:
  - Boundary Protection
  - Communication Protocols
  - Cipher Suites
  - Certificates
  - Authentication, Authorization and Access Control
  - Registration and Provisioning
  - System Logs and Reporting Mechanisms
  - Malicious Code Protection
  - Zero-trust models



## Rule 21 Communication Pathways

# Electric Vehicle Red Team Assessments

Sandia, PNNL, and ANL have a DOE Vehicle Technologies Office-funded project to secure EV chargers


- Working with EV charger vendors to understand vulnerability/risk landscape
- To date, the red team has investigated:
  - 8 DCFCs and 4 Level 2 chargers (from 10 companies)
  - 2 backend networks
  - OCPP 1.6 and ISO 15118-2 PKI requirements
- Findings have been incorporated into best practices
  - Specific vulnerability information has been provided to industry partners
  - Partners have already addressed many of the findings, or incorporated changes/mitigations into product roadmaps
  - Specific details have been abstracted out of public recommendations



# EV Supply Equipment (EVSE) Attack Graphs

An Attack graph shows attacker actions to achieve an objective



- EV Charger Attack Graph
  - Illustrates access points, staging areas, and consequences of concern
  - Graphically illustrates the steps an attacker must take to move from system/network access to the consequences of concern
  - Complex steps are displayed as images
  - Public vulnerabilities and red team results advise attack graph



# EV Charging Attack Graphs


- The green nodes have been successfully demonstrated on various EVSE models.
- Current testing is being done in partnership with an EVSE vendor.
- EVSE vendor is providing a replica of their cloud infrastructure for the assessment efforts.
- **Major Risk:** One EVSE owner was *not aware* of the Wi-Fi Access Point installed in the equipment.

Specific graphs show the current attack path being investigated by the red team



# Best Practices Infographic for Industry

- Guide is based on findings from hands-on assessments of systems
  - EVSE
  - Cloud systems
  - EVSE vendor and provider:
    - Business networks
    - Processes and procedures
    - Supply chain
- Covers all critical areas of the EVSE ecosystem in a single, concise document
- Provides the high-level view of the entire ecosystem ensuring critical security aspects are not overlooked
- There have been many recent public EVSE vulnerability disclosures.



# Thank you!

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