



Battery Energy Storage System Safety



SEPA Energy Storage Workshop

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


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
Batteries will provide substantial grid-scale energy storage



Energy Information Administration Annual Energy Outlook 2021 report projects 59 GW of battery energy storage on the grid by 2050 in the base case, 175 GW if more renewables



Impact and consequence of scale on safety



Safety issues and complexity increase with battery size

Safety research is heavily focused on lithium-ion as the primary application ready technology. However many emerging technologies identified as promising for grid-scale storage are less well studied.


Grid ESS are the new frontier of energy storage safety




2006 Sony/Dell battery recall
4.1 million batteries




2008 Navy, \$400M Advanced
Seal Delivery Sub, Honolulu



2010 FedEx Cargo
Plane Fire, Dubai



2011 NGK Na/S Battery
Explosion, Japan (two weeks
to extinguish blaze)



2018 Tesla Model S catches
on fire during normal
traffic/no accident



2011 Chevy Volt Latent Battery
Fire at DOT/NHTSA Test Facility



2012 Battery Room Fire at
Kahuku Wind-Energy Storage
Farm



2012 GM Test Facility
Incident, Warren, MI



2013 Storage Battery Fire,
The Landing Mall, Port
Angeles, (reignited one week
after being "extinguished")



2018-2019 A string of 21 energy
storage system fires in South Korea
leads to suspension of new projects



2013 Boeing Dreamliner Battery
Fires, FAA Grounds Fleet



2013 Tesla Battery Fires,
Washington, resulting from a
highway accident



2013 Fisker Battery Fires, New Jersey,
in the wake of Super Storm Sandy



2019 A fire in an ESS in Surprise, AZ
leads to an explosion injuring first
responders

ESS incidents typically make the news

Safety is critical to the widescale deployment of energy storage technologies.

Bloomberg



<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-23/explosions-are-threatening-lithium-ion-s-edge-in-a-battery-race>

There is a tendency to use the availability heuristic when considering risk.

To avoid this, consider how many batteries continue to operate without problems every day.

Greentech Media



<https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/aps-and-fluence-investigating-explosion-at-arizona-energy-storage-facility#gs.gpky5k>

The Korea Times



A series of fires in energy storage systems (ESSs) has been raising safety concerns, according to industry analysts, Tuesday.

With ESSs essential for optimizing energy efficiency, further accidents may compromise the feasibility of renewable power and hamper the government's bid to expand the use of cleaner energies.

According to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, it recommended individuals, companies and other organizations to stop using 584 unsupervised ESSs across the country.

https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2018/12/133_260560.html

Dedicated facilities for battery testing



- Hundreds of independent channels for testing, from coin cells to kWh modules
- 150 μ A to 2000 A current range capability
- R&D 100 Green Technology-awarded high-precision testers
- 70+ thermal chambers, ranging from 1.2 ft³ to 25 ft³
- -72°C to 95°C temperature capabilities
- Welding capabilities, including resistance, pinch, and spot
- Additional labs for materials characterization and 8000 ft² dry-room space for prototyping



World-class battery abuse lab (DOE Core facility)



- Comprehensive abuse testing platforms for safety and reliability of cells, batteries and systems from mWh to kWh
- Mechanical abuse
 - Penetration
 - Crush
 - Impact
 - Immersion
- Thermal abuse
 - Over temperature
 - Flammability measurements
 - Thermal propagation
 - Calorimetry
- Electrical abuse
 - Overvoltage/overcharge
 - Short circuit
 - Overdischarge/voltage reversal
- Characterization/Analytical Tools
 - X-ray computed tomography
 - Gas analysis
 - Surface characterization
 - Optical/electron microscopy



Engineering Safety through Design - How to think about safety



The goal of safety engineering is to analyze, design, and document the safety of specific system.


Common methods:

Probability Risk Assessment (PRA)

- Assumes that accidents happen because the stochastic components of a system fail.
- Analysis answers three questions: What can go wrong? How likely is that? How bad would that be?
- PRA Consists of a combination of Event trees and Fault trees

Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)

- Accidents occur when interactions violate safety constraints
- The system enforces these constraints using feedback control
- STPA consists of:
 - Safety control structures
 - Unsafe control actions
 - Loss scenarios



Mechanics of Thermal Runaway



How does thermal runaway start?

- Thermal, electrical, or mechanical “abuse”
- However, “abuse” thresholds are statistical properties and can change with time, usage, and environment

Thermal runaway measured via accelerated rate calorimetry (ARC)

1. Self-heating onset temperature
2. Thermal runaway onset temperature
3. Total heat release (ΔT)




Figure Credit: Yuliya Preger <https://custom.cvent.com/5B9EB96FC2FC4AC69710004DEF407285/files/f4910d8f6dec42fb8b312e3934da8826.pdf>








Approaches to designing in safety

The current approach is to test our way into safety.

- Large system (>1MWh) testing is difficult and costly.

Supplement testing with predictions of challenging scenarios and optimization of mitigation

- Leverage world-class fire sciences, thermal modeling, and computing resources at SNL
- Develop multi-physics models to predict failure mechanisms and identify mitigation
- Build capabilities with small/medium scale measurements
- Still requires some testing and validation



Time: 46.683046

11 Cell to Cell Propagation

Thermal runaway in one cell can drive nearby cells into thermal runaway depending on:

- abuse thresholds,
- heat capacity,
- heat generation rate, and
- heat dissipation rate

Model Based Testing

- Successful prediction over a range of reduced SOC and metallic inserts.
- Collectively add heat capacity & increase time delay for cell runaway.
- Prevent propagation for 30% increase in net heat capacity.






Figure Credit: John Hewson
https://www.sandia.gov/ess-ssl/wp-content/uploads/2021/ESSRF/Hewson_John.pdf



An example of propagation testing




Different mitigation design strategies



Some of the design options available

- Prevent thermal runaway (e.g. non-lithium-ion chemistry)
- Limit the size (energy) of any one module
- Don't put the battery in an enclosure
- Enclosure deflagration venting



Andrew F. Blum and R. Thomas Long Jr. “Hazard Assessment of Lithium Ion Battery Energy Storage Systems FINAL REPORT” Fire Protection Research Foundation, 2016, Available: <https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/Files/News-and-Research/Fire-statistics-and-reports/Hazardous-materials/RFFireHazardAssessmentLithiumIonBattery.ashx>




Figure source: https://share-ng.sandia.gov/ess/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/4a_Hoff_GSS-Safety-Overview-v15.6_MHOFF-with-Notes.pdf

Sharing battery safety tools with the community



Launched heat release calculator based on Li-ion battery materials composition

Composition Case Formula(s)

Name of Layered Metal Oxide: Metal Composition 1

Cathode Mass: Optional

Ni Content: 0.00

Co Content: 0.00

Mn Content: 0.00

Al Content: 0.00

Total: 0.00

x = DoL: 0.00

LMO Formula: Li_xMO_2

*Required field

⑦ Oxidation Enthalpy (kJ/mol O_2 , for electrolyte solvent, etc.): -460.5

⑦ Ni cut-off for M_2O_4 formation: 0.50

Calculate

Lithium-ion Battery Thermodynamic Web Calculator

Results for:


Oxidation Enthalpy: -460.5 kJ/mol O_2
Ni Cutoff: 0.5

Case 1: Name = "NMC", Composition = $\text{Li}_{0.5}\text{Ni}_{0.333}\text{Co}_{0.333}\text{Mn}_{0.333}\text{O}_2$ (x = 0.5, M = $\text{Ni}_{0.333}\text{Co}_{0.333}\text{Mn}_{0.333}$)

⑦ Summarized Output:

Heat Release Summary with Solvent Oxidation and Increments [ΔH_f (J/g Li_xMO_2)] (Assumes Low Nickel Content)				
$\text{MO}_2 \rightarrow \text{LiM}_2\text{O}_4$	$\text{MO}_2 \rightarrow \text{M}_2\text{O}_4$	$\text{MO}_2 \rightarrow \text{LiM}_2\text{O}_4 + \text{M}_2\text{O}_4$	$\text{LiM}_2\text{O}_4 + \text{M}_2\text{O}_4 \rightarrow \text{MO}$	$\text{MO}_2 \rightarrow \text{MO}$
Initial Reaction 4	Reaction 2	Reaction 9	Reaction 11	Global Reaction 1
Low Temp Increment	Med Temp Increment	Med Temp Cumulative	High Temp Increment	Cumulative Total Heat Release
Case 1: -225.8	0.0	-225.8	-691.7	-917.5

Developing simulator of module-level thermal runaway propagation



Source: Randy Shurtz

<https://www.sandia.gov/ess-ssl/thermodynamic-web-calculator/>

Source: Andrew Kurzawski


Safety critical information availability to firefighters



The system should include a durable, external display, accessible from a safe location, for firefighters to access the following information:

1. what percentage of the cells in the system have vented,
2. is the ventilation system working as expected,
3. what voltages are present in the system,
4. what the temperature trending history is internally,
5. what actions have been taken by the automated systems (e.g. fire suppression), and
6. the presence or absence of any gases in hazardous concentrations (including smoke).

Training should focus on hazard identification, determining safe entry, methods for limiting the spread of a battery fire, identifying when the best approach is to not put out the fire (letting hazardous stored energy be dissipated safely), and determining when it is safe to leave an incident site.



Example layout for an energy storage fire alarm control panel

Ensuring Safety – Codes and Standards

Safety standards are developed through a consensus-based development process with diverse stakeholder participation.

Advantages:

- Broad agreement in the field
- Good at learning from past accidents

Disadvantages



- Slow to change (3-10 year revision schedules)
- Bad at preventing accidents before they happen

A few prominent examples are:

IFC – defines what safety standards shall be used in regions that have adopted it

UL 9540 – provides a hierarchy of safety standards for energy storage components, tests, and system integration

NFPA 855 – covers: installation, commissioning, O & M, emergency response, and decommissioning






Publication released quarterly

The following activities support that objective and realization of the goal:

1. Review and assess C/S which affect the design, installation, and operation of energy storage systems (ESS)
2. Identify gaps in knowledge that require research and analysis to provide data for technical committee inputs
3. Identify areas in C/S that are potentially in need of revision or enhancement and can benefit from activities conducted under research and development
4. Develop input for new or revisions to existing C/S through individual stakeholders, facilitated task forces, or through laboratory staff supporting these efforts



BUILT ENVIRONMENT

- iCodes – IFC, IRC, IBC
- IEEE – C2, SCC 18, SCC21
- NFPA 5000, NFPA 1, ISA

ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS

- UL 9540, MESA
- ASME TES-1, NECA
- NFPA 791

INSTALLATION / APPLICATION

- | | | |
|-------------|-----------------------|------------------|
| ▪ NFPA 855 | ▪ IEEE C2 | ▪ DNVGL GRIDSTOR |
| ▪ NFPA 70 | ▪ IEEE 1635/ASHRAE 21 | ▪ FM GLOBAL 5-33 |
| ▪ UL 9540 A | ▪ IEEE P1578 | ▪ NECA 416 & 416 |

SYSTEM COMPONENTS

- | | |
|-----------|------------------------|
| ▪ UL 1973 | ▪ CSA 22.2 No. 340-201 |
| ▪ UL 1974 | ▪ IEEE 1547 |
| ▪ UL 810A | ▪ IEEE 1679 Series |
| ▪ UL1741 | |

Acknowledgements



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