




Sandia  
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SAND2020-11451C

# Radioisotope Systems Launch Safety Overview



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
**Nuclear Science Week, Oct 21<sup>st</sup> 2020**




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

## Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) Enable Exploration of the Outer Solar System



# Curiosity on Mars



# Multi-Mission Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (MMRTG)



Safety is built from the inside out and from the outside in.  
Analysis must quantify this for decision makers.

# Launches Can Fail



Atlas Fallback-1965



Titan 34D-Apr 18, 1986



Antares-Oct 28, 2014



Delta 241-Jan 27, 1997



# Launch Safety Analysis Approach

Identify **main sources** of risk, to allow for potential **mitigating actions**, to **reduce** the overall mission **risk**

Goal: **Quantitative** estimate of the risk that is **defensible** and **credible**

- Mean probability of an accident
- Mean probability of release of PuO<sub>2</sub>
- Mass of PuO<sub>2</sub> released (“source term”)
- Health effects (dose, latent cancer fatalities over 50 years)
- Land, crop contamination
- All expressed as mean values, percentile values, and exceedance probability graphs
- Quantify uncertainty

# Risk Estimation Methodology



Detailed simulations and Monte Carlo sequence codes used to develop the probabilistic risk analysis

- Potential accidents associated with the launch
  - Probability
  - Environment
- Detailed understanding of the response of power system to insults
  - Explosion Overpressure
  - Fragments
  - Ground Impact
  - Thermal Environment
  - Reentry
- Atmospheric transport and consequences
  - Thermal buoyancy effects from fires
  - Meteorological conditions
  - Population and land usage distribution



# Mission Phases

**Phase 0 – Prelaunch**,  $T < t_1$ , from installation of the MMRTG to just prior to start of engines at  $t_1$

**Phase 1 – Early Launch**,  $t_1 \leq T < t_x$ , start of engines to no potential for land impact in the launch area,  $t_x$

**Phase 2 – Late Launch**,  $t_x \leq T$ , end of Phase 1 to the launch vehicle reaching 30,480 m (100,000 ft), above which reentry heating could occur

**Phase 3 – Suborbital Reentry**, end of Phase 2 to just prior to orbit

**Phase 4 – Orbital Reentry**, end of Phase 3 to spacecraft separation

**Phase 5 – Long-Term Reentry**, end of Phase 4 to no chance of Earth reentry


# Representative Accident Scenarios (RASs)

Divide mission into six phases


Construct accident scenarios within each phase

Groups accident environments into RASs

Combine results from each RASs into phase and overall results, based on the relative probability



# Launch Safety Code Suite




# Risk & Uncertainty



Provide a comprehensive risk & uncertainty picture developed to cover the entire analysis process

- Performance of stability and convergence analyses
- Update of unknown probability distributions using Bayesian methods




Bayesian Posterior Diagnostics

# Blast & Impact

Some blasts and impacts have the potential to breach the multiple layers of protection

Determine range of end states

- Blasts
  - Launch destruct
  - Shockwave from ground impact of propellant tanks
  - Shockwave from ground impact of solid propellant fragments
- Impacts
  - Ground surface
  - Spacecraft and launch vehicle debris/fragments
  - Solid propellant fragments



MMRTG 45° Impact at 100 m/s  
(terminal velocity is 60 m/s)  
No fuel release

# Fire & Thermal



Solid Propellant Burn Test

Liquid propellant fire temperatures exceed  $\text{PuO}_2$  vaporization temperatures

Solid propellant fire temperatures exceed iridium clad melt and  $\text{PuO}_2$  vaporization temperatures

Determine effect of potential fire environments on the range of  $\text{PuO}_2$  vaporized and resulting particle sizes changes due to the vaporization and condensation

# Reentry


Atmospheric reentry effects have the potential to breakup

- Launch vehicle
- Space vehicle
- MMRTG

Determine range of the reentry environments on the configuration

- Trajectory
- Heating of components
- Ablation

MMRTG Breakup v-gamma Map  
(gamma is entry angle)




# Release Locations and Amounts



LASEP (Launch Accident Sequence Evaluation Program) models numerous potential scenarios, randomly choosing time of failure, explosion characteristics, etc.

Release location and amounts determined mechanistically

Probability distributions for release are determined




Potential release locations from numerous LASEP launch simulations

# Example Source Term Results



Source Term  
Exceedance  
Graph






# Atmospheric Transport & Consequences

## Establish transport and deposition of source terms

- Puff/plume height (IAT)
- Meteorological effects (HYSPPLIT)

## Determine potential health effects from release (FDOSE)

- Inhalation, resuspension, ingestion, cloudshine, and groundshine
- Doses, land contamination, crop sequestration





# Summary

Safety analyses are required, and enabling, for the use of radioisotope power systems

The response to potential accident scenarios is modeled in a stochastic manner with a Monte Carlo simulation

- Results are combined and weighted by appropriate likelihood values
- Estimated consequences calculated

This information is used to guide power system or spacecraft designs, mission architecture or launch procedures

- Potentially reduce risk
- Inform decision makers