



# RAPID ANALYSIS OF MISSION SOFTWARE SYSTEMS

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# The Problem



AP Photo/Mark Zaleski

LILY HAY NEWMAN SECURITY 11.28.18 02:10 PM

## RUSSIAN HACKERS HAVEN'T STOPPED PROBING THE US POWER GRID



### ■ Question:

- How do I keep electricity flowing?

# The Problem



Photo from <http://carleyknight6.wordpress.com/>

## Backdoors Keep Appearing In Cisco's Routers



by [Lucian Armasu](#) July 19, 2018 at 10:00 AM - Source:

Over the past few months, not one, not two, but five different backdoors joined the list of security flaws in Cisco routers.

### ■ Question:

- How safe is my data on the internet?



# The Problem



US Army Photo/Nate Allen

## Secret Back Door in Some U.S. Phones Sent Data to China, Analysts Say

点击查看本文中文版


By MATT APUZZO and MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT NOV. 15, 2016

WASHINGTON — For about \$50, you can get a smartphone with a high-definition display, fast data service and, according to security contractors, a secret feature: a backdoor that sends all your text messages to China every 72 hours.

### ■ Question:

- How do I keep sensitive information private?

# A Common Thread



***This is not a phone.***

*It is a computer that makes phone calls.*

*A refrigerator is a computer that keeps things cold. An ATM machine is a computer with money inside. Your car is not a mechanical device with a computer. It is a computer with four wheels and an engine. - Bruce Schneier*



# A Common Thread



What makes all these systems work is **software**.

Software manages the  
**information** and **operation** of these systems.

We want to answer questions about software.

# The Challenge


Understanding

- Grade of steel
- Bulkheads
- Rivets
- Propeller
- Lubricants/cooling
- Effect of saltwater
- Effect of cold/ice
- Radar characteristics
- Operational range



Physical  
Systems

1940



# The Challenge

Understanding

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Physical  
Systems

1940

A ship isn't a ship.  
It's a computer that floats and moves.

## TAKEAWAY:

Software is now the weak link.

*We need to be able to pose and answer  
questions about software systems as well as  
we do about physical systems.*

- Communications
- Radar/sonar
- Navigation
- Propulsion
- Power production
- Fire detection and suppression
- Engineering
- Fresh air/water

All the software:

...written under contract

...embedded in the commercial components

...used for design/evaluation/testing/support



Software  
Systems

2020






Why is there a problem?



# Software Development




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33	00	00	00	ae
ff	04	c7	c3	c9
7c	01	00	ff	00
cd	aa	82	0e	f7
93	66	68	00	00



Cost to develop




# Reverse Engineering





# Reverse Engineering



# The Problem is Growing



## MORE PLACES

Software driving more  
and more systems




## BIGGER

Increasing software  
size and complexity  
Increasing number of  
versions



## FASTER

Increasing rate of  
updates



## ASYMMETRY

Developer tools  
improving faster than  
RE tools



# Our Approach

*Mission-driven, end-to-end focus – not technology*




# Learn by Doing: Case studies

**HIDDEN  
TRIGGER  
DETECTION**

**NETWORK  
PROTOCOL  
EXTRACTION**

**INDICATORS  
OF  
COMPROMISE**

# End to End



Get the question right

Decompose and solve

Make the answer count

# Get the Question Right

- **A (snarky) Murray Gell-Mann description of the Richard Feynman “algorithm”**
  1. Write down the problem
  2. Think hard
  3. Write down the solution
- **Corollary:**
  - Be able to state the problem before you attempt to solve it
- **We partner with human factors experts to:**
  - Identify meaningful government mission problems that we have some hope of addressing



# Getting the Question Right – Indicators of Compromise

- Is my network safe?
- Are there adversaries operating on my network?
- Are any of these malicious tools being run on my network?
  - Malicious tools identified out of band
- What are the observable artifacts of this software running?
  - Created files
  - Registry entries
  - Hostname lookups

Complex



Complicated

# Decompose the Question

High level question

What indicators of compromise does this malware exhibit?

Reasoning about supporting evidence

Does it write to any suspicious files?

...

Which files?

What data?

...

...

Gather Properties

Direct fwrite() calls

Indirect Syscalls

...


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


- Abstraction
- Inference
- Deduction



- Searching
- Pattern Matching
- Computation

# Current Division of Labor



## OBSERVATIONS:


- Analyst doing repetitive tasks
- Analyst solely responsible for mountains of data and reasoning
- Analyst experiences cognitive overload

## PROBLEM:

Poor division of labor between the human and the tools



# Incremental Improvement



Develop knowledge transfer interfaces:

- human ↔ human
- tool ↔ human
- tool ↔ tool

Benefits:

- Balanced division of labor
- Reusable analysis components
- Enable collaborative sensemaking

# Decompose the Problem – Indicators of Compromise

- **Observable artifacts are the result of system calls**
- **What system calls are invoked by the program?**
  - Obfuscated dynamic library loading and function lookup
- **What are the arguments passed to identified system calls**
- **Often reduces to inferring the value of strings at system call sites**
- **Use an existing analysis – constant propagation**
  1. Lift binary using BAP
  2. Special purpose, flexible memory and pointer model
  3. Constant propagation abstract interpretation domain

# Make the Answer Count

## 1. Estimate the confidence we should have in answers we provide

- Verification and validation
- Efforts to produce collections of ground truth binaries
  - Currently focusing on the lifting phase of the analysis
  - Correct disassembly, CFG recovery, and pointer analysis

## 2. Get answers to the right place in the most useful form


- Sets of strings as signatures for NIDS and HIDS
- Be explicit about uncertainty
- Consider other places where constant propagation results are useful
  - Interactive reverse engineering and analysis tools

Complicated



Complex





# Final Thoughts

# RAMSeS

- Static analysis
- Existing, third party binaries in support of program understanding
  - Focus on solving problems of practical, not just theoretical interest
  - Prefer to use or adapt what exists today
- What the plan *isn't*
  - Traditional program verification
  - Infrastructure for scaling analyses
  - One Tool to rule them all
  - A recipe for perfection (Progress not Perfection)
  - A quick fix

# Questions?



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