

HALucinator: Firmware Re-hosting Through Abstraction Layer Emulation

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

IoT and Operational Technology



SECLAB




Device Internals




Many run Baremetal Firmware

Linux



Kernel abstractions used for hardware interactions

Baremetal




Raw hardware access

Hardware


- Expensive (\$10,000)
- Brittle, easily bricked
- No parallelism

Opaque

- Debug ports should be disabled
- If present, very limited



Re-hosting to the Rescue?



Firmware



Goal: Enable firmware testing without requiring its specialized hardware

Re-hosting Challenges



On chip

CPU
AES Accelerator
Hash
Coprocessor
Timers
Counters
Flash Controller
Clock Config
IAP
DMA

Off chip

Ethernet
SD-MMC
GPIO
Camera
LCD
Touch Screen
Wireless
EEPROM
Serial
CAN
Analog IO
USB

Re-hosting Challenges



SECLAB



On chip

CPU
AES Accelerator

Off chip

Ethernet
SD-MMC

Mouser Lists
44,520 Microcontrollers
3,502 Datasheets
26 Manufacturers

Analog I/O
USB

Re-hosting Challenges



SECLAB



On chip

CPU
AES Accelerator

Off chip

Ethernet
SD-MMC

Without support for peripherals baremetal firmware will not run!
There are 10,000's of peripherals and combinations there of!



Analog I/O
USB

Hardware Abstraction Libraries





MCU



HALucinator

Enables replacing HALs and other libraries with high level implementations. Transforming the re-hosting scaling problem from supporting 10,000's of devices to dozens of HALs

STMicroelectronics
Cube


ARDUINO

Firmware


On-chip Hardware
(e.g., MMIO)

Off-chip Hardware
(e.g., sensors, radio, ...)


High Level Emulation



High Level Emulation



High Level Emulation



Introspection – What is the firmware doing?


- Debugging/system testing
- Determine effects of malware on firmware
- Experiment with firmware in controlled environment

Vulnerability Research – Is the system vulnerable?

- Identify insecure interfaces
- Find memory corruption errors
- Fuzzing

Virtual Testbeds – How do vulnerabilities impact connected systems?

- System of systems modeling
- Firmware in the loop testing
- Software only testbeds of embedded systems



HALucinator implementation




SECLAB

Firmware

LibMatch

HALucinator



Our Contributions

CPU Emulator
(QEMU)

Uart
Handler

Ethernet
Handler

Peripheral Models

IO Server

Handler Example



SECLAB


Device-specific code


Python

QEMU


```
def i2c_read_buf(uc):
    # i2c_read_buf(char* buf, int len);
    buf = uc.regs.r1 # arg 0: The buffer
    l = uc.regs.r2    # arg 1: Buffer length
    assert(buf != 0)  # Crash on bad arguments
    assert(len > 0)
    data = I2CModel.rx('i2c', 0, len) # Get the data
                                      # from the virtual bus
    uc.mem[buf] = data      # Store it in the emulator
```











Step 1: Match library content




















- Built on AFL-Unicorn
- Program exits when the input is exhausted
- Deterministic timers based on block counts
- Interrupt events also based on block counts
- Crashes detected via Unicorn's own error detector as well as handler assertions

16 Firmware Samples

- ATMEL ASF
 - USART
 - FAT32 on SD-Card
 - HTTP Server
 - 6LoWPAN Sender and Receiver
- STM32Cube
 - UART
 - FAT32 on SD-Card
 - UDP-Echo Server and Client
 - TCP-Echo Server and Client
 - PLC
- NXP -MCUXpresso
 - UART
 - UDP Echo Server
 - TCP Echo Server
 - HTTP Server



LibMatch Results



SECLAB

	“Naive” LibMatch (Bindiff)	LibMatch w/ context
Correct	74.5%	87.4%
Missing	5.0%	3.2%
Collisions	18.8%	8.5%
Incorrect	2.5%	0.9%
External	--	9.96%

% avg matches across 16 test binaries


Three Handler categories:

- **Trivial**: Does nothing / returns a constant
- **Translating**: Collects arguments, interacts with a Model, returns a result
- **Internal Logic**: Needs to re-implement undocumented internal details

- Over 85% of handlers require little effort
 - 44.5 are “trivial”
 - 42.2 are “translating”
- Remainder: “Internal logic”
 - HAL behavior doesn’t abstract hardware well enough
 - HAL behavior makes assumptions not in the docs (e.g., uses its own heap allocator)

- Hundreds of millions of parallel executions
- Found crashes in ST-PLC, Atmel HTTP server, Atmel 6LowPAN(w/ Contiki)
- Fuzzed HTTP server at two different levels, found crashes in both
- **Discovered CVE-2019-8359 and CVE-2019-9183 in Contiki's network stack**

- Re-hosted ARM portion of all challenge sets
- Solved 18/19 challenges
- Verified 17/18 solutions w/ just the emulator
- Solved 3 challenges automatically using fuzzing
- Won first place!



HALucinator eliminates implementing 10,000s of peripherals by using HALs

